Technocracy and Democracy: Conflicts Between Models and Participation in Environmental Law and Planning by Owen, Dave & Fine, James D.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
2005
Technocracy and Democracy: Conflicts Between
Models and Participation in Environmental Law
and Planning
Dave Owen
UC Hastings College of the Law, owendave@uchastings.edu
James D. Fine
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dave Owen and James D. Fine, Technocracy and Democracy: Conflicts Between Models and Participation in Environmental Law and
Planning, 56 Hastings L.J. 901 (2005).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/1234
Technocracy and Democracy:
Conflicts between Models and Participation in
Environmental Law and Planning
JAMES D. FINE* & DAVE OWEN**
I. INTROD UCTION ........................................................................................... 903
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE PARADOX: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
SCIENCE, AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION .................................................... 907
A. THE ENTRENCHMENT OF MODELING IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW .... 907
I. SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE ROOTS OF
MODELING REQUIREMENTS ...................................................... 907
2. MODELING, THE SIP PROCESS, AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT ...... 912
B. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION ......... 916
I. ORIGINS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROVISIONS ...................... 916
2. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND THE SIP PROCESS ........................ 919
III. MODELS AND THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS ...................................... 921
A . LIMITATIONS OF M ODELS ................................................................ 922
* Department of Environmental Science, University of San Francisco. Ph.D., Energy and
Resources, University of California. Dr. Fine can be reached at jdfine@usfca.edu. A portion of the
case study research was conducted as part of James Fine's Ph.D. dissertation, and was supported by
the Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy, Office of Natural Gas and Petroleum Technology, through
the National Petroleum Technology Office under the U.S. Department of Energy Contract No.
DE-ACo3 -7 6SFooo98. The views and opinions of the authors expressed herein do not necessarily state
or reflect those of the United States Department of Energy or the Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory. Dr. Fine's case study research was also supported by the Institute of Urban and Regional
Development. Dr. Fine thanks Drs. Nancy Brown, Gene Rochlin, and Elizabeth Deakin for their
scholarly guidance on early drafts, Dr. Timothy Duane for his encouragement, and the many
individuals who agreed to be interviewed, notably Dr. Steven Ziman, Robin DeMandel, and staff at
the San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District, Bay Area Air Quality Management
District, and the California Air Resources Board. The case study research is based on data gathered
through archival review of scholarly literature and popular press, as well as thirty interviews with
planners, modelers, and policy-makers at local, state and federal air quality planning agencies, and
with representatives from the regulated and environmental communities. These interviews took place
mostly in 2ooo and 2ooi and were thus retrospective in discussing planning processes and decisions in
the early 199os.
** Associate Attorney, Rossmann and Moore, San Francisco, California. J.D., University of
California School of Law (Boalt Hall), 2002; B.A., Amherst College, 1996. Dave thanks Professor
Holly Doremus for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and the staff at Hastings Law Journal for
their hard work and thoughtful edits. Dave can be reached at daveowen@alumni.amherst.edu.
[90I]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
I. U NCERTAINTY ........................................................................... 922
A. INHERENT LIMITS OF SIMULATION ..................................... 922
B. P REDICTION ........................................................................ 922
C. COMPLEXITY IN MODEL FORMULATION ............................. 923
D. INPUT DATA LIMITATIONS ................................................. 924
E. O PACITY ............................................................................. 926
2. SUBJECTIVITY ............................................................................. 926
A. MODEL SELECTION ............................................................. 927
B. ASSUMPTIONS ..................................................................... 928
C. RESULTS COMMUNICATION ................................................ 929
D. UNDERPREDICTION: THE OUTCOME OF UNCERTAINTY
AND SUBJECTIVITY .............................................................. 930
B. IMPLICATIONS OF MODEL LIMITATIONS ON PLANNING
P ROCESSES ....................................................................................... 930
I. COMPLEXITY AND THE BLACK Box PROBLEM .......................... 930
2. CONCEALED UNCERTAINTIES ................................................... 931
3. CONCEALED JUDGMENTS AND POLICY CHOICES ...................... 932
4. RELOCATION OF NEGOTIATION AND DECISION-MAKING .......... 932
5. A CONFLUENCE OF PARTICIPATION PROBLEMS: THE SIGNAL-
TO-NOISE PROBLEM ................................................................... 933
C. AFFECTED GROUPS .......................................................................... 934
I. P LA N N ERS ................................................................................. 934
2. JUDICIAL REVIEW ..................................................................... 935
3. ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES .................... 936
IV. MODELS AND PLANNING IN THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY ....................... 938
A. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 938
B. THE SETTING AND THE STAKEHOLDERS .......................................... 940
I. GEOGRAPHY AND POLLUTION ................................................... 940
2. PEOPLE, ECONOMY, AND HISTORY ....................................... 9. 40
3. THE POLLUTION PROBLEM ........................................................ 944
4. THE REGULATORS ..................................................................... 946
C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE 1994 AIR QUALITY PLAN ........................... 949
I. EARLY RESEARCH AND PLANNING EFFORTS IN THE SJV ........ 949
2. THE 1994 PLAN ........................................................................ 950
A. THE ADVISORY COMMITTEES ............................................. 951
B. THE MODELING AND PLAN DEVELOPMENT PROCESS ....... 952
C. APPROVAL OF THE PLAN .................................................... 957
3. THE CONTENTS OF THE PLAN ................................................... 958
4. UNCERTAINTY IN THE PLAN ................................................... 960
D. DISAPPOINTING RESULTS ................................................................ 962
E. CRITIQUING THE PLANNING PROCESS ............................................. 965
I. MODELS, THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY, AND THE
SHORTCOMINGS OF TECHNOCRACY ............................................ 965
2. MODELS AND THE ABSENCE OF INCLUSION ............................. 967
3. DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS AND THE ABSENCE OF
E XCLUSION ............................................................................... 969
F. SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY STUDY SUMMARY ........................................ 970
[Vol. 56:9oi
TECHNOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY
V. RECONCILING MODELING AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION .......................... 970
A. UNDERSTANDING MODELING .......................................................... 971
I. D ISCUSSING U NCERTAINTY ....................................................... 971
2. D ISCUSSING SUBJECTIVITY ........................................................ 973
B. PROVIDING RESOURCES FOR UNDERSTANDING ............................... 974
I. EDUCATING THE PUBLIC ........................................................... 975
2. INCREASING EXPERT REPRESENTATION .................................... 976
C. IMPROVING JUDICIAL UNDERSTANDING OF MODELING .................. 977
V I. C ONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 979
I. INTRODUCTION
Many of our environmental laws create an unfortunate paradox.
They mandate science-based planning, and that mandate often translates
into a practical or even legal requirement to use complex simulation
models.' The same laws also contain provisions for public participation in
government agency environmental planning and decision-making. When
agencies engage in technical decision-making, however, and particularly
when they use complex models, the reasoning underpinning decisions
becomes difficult for public participants to understand. As a result, legal
mandates for science-based planning and for public participation come
into conflict, and processes legally required to be transparent and open
can instead become opaque and closed.
This conflict is inherent in many environmental statutes, and is acute
in the State Implementation Plan (SIP) process required by the Clean
Air Act.' SIPs codify states' plans for meeting federal air quality goals?
This is a rather important function; although long recognized as an
environmental concern,4  air pollution remains a ubiquitous and
I. The term "model" does not lend itself to simple definition, but in general terms it is a tool
used to simulate some aspect of the real world. EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR
POLICY ANALYSIS 8 (1978) ("A model is a simplified representation of some aspect of the real world,
sometimes of an object, sometimes of a situation or a process. It may be an actual physical
representation-a glove, for instance-or a diagram, a concept, or even a set of equations. It is a
purposeful reduction of a mass of information to a manageable size and shape.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 740i-767Iq (2ooo).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407 7410 (2000); see West Virginia v. EPA, 36 F.3 d 86i, 867-68 (D.C. Cir.
2004). In California, local air districts write plans that are aggregated into a SIP by the California Air
Resources Board.
4. For an interesting historical account of one of the first American air pollution disputes, see
DONALD MACMILLAN, SMOKE WARS: ANACONDA COPPER, MONTANA AIR POLLUTION, AND THE COURTS,
189o-1924 (2000). For a description of later twentieth century air pollution history, see CHARLES 0.
JONES, CLEAN AIR: THE POLICIES AND POLITICS OF POLLUTION CONTROL (1975). A more recent account
of the i99o Clean Air Act Amendments is provided by GARY C. BRYNER, BLUE SKIES, GREEN POLITICS:
THE CLEAN AIR ACT OF 1990 AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION (2d ed. 1995). See also Clean Air Act
Amendments of 199o, Report of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. H.R. Rep. 101-490,
pt. I (990). For a lay description of air pollution, as well as historical accounts of air pollution events
that caused human and animal deaths, see STEPHEN E. BLEWETT & MARY EMBREE, WHAT'S IN THE AIR:
NATURAL AND MAN-MADE AIR POLLUTION (1998).
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sometimes deadly problem.' After thirty years of federal regulation, most
urban areas in the United States still have not attained all federal
ambient air quality goals.:The persistence of the problem affects millions
of people.' As a result, the general public has very good reasons to want
8to participate in air quality planning.
Although people hoping to participate in air pollution planning
processes might wish for those processes to be accessible, understanding
and addressing air pollution requires the use of computer-based air
quality simulation models. Models can process reams of data and
represent mathematically complex chemical, physical and social
relationships, allowing modelers to make predictions and test
assumptions in ways that otherwise would not be possible. Not
surprisingly, models have become essential and ubiquitous planning
tools, our dependence upon them making their abandonment all but
unthinkable.
Nevertheless, models are incomplete representations of reality and
suffer from many sources of uncertainty.9 Every model, strictly speaking,
is an approximation, for no model can be an exact representation of the
5. See AMERICAN LUNG Ass'N, 2002 STATE OF THE AIR REPORT, at http://www.cleanairstandards.
org/article/articleview/82/tl/27/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2004) ("More than 142 million Americans-75
percent of the nation's population living in counties with ozone monitors-are breathing unhealthy
amounts of ozone air pollution."). EPA also has reported that approximately 81.5 million and 34.7
million people lived in counties where allowable 8-hour and i-hour average ozone concentrations,
respectively, were exceeded, and that the problems occur in rural, suburban, and urban areas alike.
EPA, LATEST FINDINGS ON NATIONAL AIR QUALITY: 2002 STATUS AND TRENDS at
http://www.epa.gov/airtrends/reports.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2004).
6. See EPA, i-Hour Ozone Area Non-Attainment Map, at http://www.epa.gov/airprogml
oar/oaqps/greenbk/onmapc.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2003) (showing ozone non-attainment areas).
7. Id. The statistics provided by EPA may be misleading, however. By reporting population
totals for areas (e.g., counties) not in attainment of ambient air quality standards, EPA suggests that
the entire population in those areas is breathing air of similar quality. In fact, air quality standard
violations may occur infrequently and in only portions of the county.
8. The term "public" can be used to encompass a broad range of potential participants, ranging
from regulated industry to at-risk individuals to public interest groups. In this article, our discussion
focuses primarily upon lay citizens and the public interest or community groups that attempt to
represent average citizens. The participation problems we discuss also create hurdles to industry
participation, but industry and regulated entities typically devote considerable financial resources to
involvement in spite of those hurdles, and the problems we discuss therefore tend to be more
pronounced for the lay public and, to a lesser extent, public interest or community groups. See
generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 165-66 (I97i) (discussing the tendency of
diffuse groups to have greater difficulty mobilizing to participate, and the anti-democratic implications
of that tendency).
9. Among modelers, this is common knowledge. Indeed, a primary focus of modelers' work is
identifying and minimizing the limitations of models. Planners, lawyers, and other non-modelers are
often unaware of the limitations of models, however, or, even if they do have a general awareness of
those limitations, have no way of discerning how the specific limitations of models may affect public
policy choices. It is to those non-modelers that this article's extensive discussion of the limitations of
models is primarily directed.
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real world. ° Air quality planning models, like any physically based
simulation, also are unverifiable, limiting modelers' ability to assess their
reliability." Approximations, subjective choices, and errors in both
design and application are common in any modeling effort, but the
complexity of current state-of-the-science models hinders assessment of
their certainty. 2 These factors limit the reliability of modeling results,
and render model-based planning-particularly the process of making
policy decisions based on uncertain results-well worthy of public
scrutiny.
Unfortunately, engaging in such scrutiny is often prohibitively
difficult. A process based upon complex technical analyses makes
participation difficult for even model-savvy parties, let alone lay persons.
The economic inability of low-income communities to pay for modeling
expertise only exacerbates this problem. The opacity of modeling
processes can also limit the effectiveness of judicial review, depriving
would-be citizen participants of an important method of challenging
decision-making processes gone awry. 3 As a result, model-based
planning often defies public participation.
The practical consequences of such thwarted participation can be
troubling. An absence of participation can foster feelings of exclusion
and alienation, leading to distrust of regulators and of expertise-based
decision-making. Points that regulators discount or fail to anticipate may
never be explored, and this lack of exploration may lead to plans based
partly on misunderstanding of public concerns. Assumptions and
conclusions of the expert decision-makers may never be subjected to
to. M. GRANGER MORGAN & MAX HENRION, UNCERTAINTY: A GUIDE TO DEALING WITH
UNCERTAINTY IN QUANTITATIVE RISK AND POLICY ANALYSIS 68 (1990) ("Any model is unavoidably a
simplification of reality. Any real-world system contains phenomena or behaviors that cannot be
produced by even the most detailed model. Even if a model is a good approximation to a particular
real-world system and usually gives accurate results, it can never be completely exact. Careful thought
leads us to the following disturbing conclusion: Every model is definitely false.").
1I. See Naomi Oreskes et al., Verification, Validation, and Confirmation of Numerical Models in
the Earth Sciences, 263 SCIENCE 641-46 (1994).
12. See THE NORTH AMERICAN RESEARCH STRATEGY FOR TROPOSPHERIC OZONE SYNTHESIS TEAM, AN
ASSESSMENT OF TROPOSPHERIC OZONE POLLUTION: A NORTH AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 4-It (2000)
[hereinafter NARSTO] ("Unfortunately, the uncertainty in model predictions depends on a variety of
factors, including the type of prediction, the application, the uncertainties in the model input and
parameters, and the model itself. Moreover, as discussed, the methods currently available for assessing
model uncertainty are themselves uncertain."). See generally James Fine et al., Evaluating
Uncertainties in Regional Photochemical Air Quality Modeling, 28 ANN. REV. ENV'T & RESOURCES 59
(2003).
13. This increased opacity has not stopped numerous petitioners-mostly representing regulated
industries-from challenging agencies' uses of models. See generally Thomas 0. McGarity & Wendy
E. Wagner, Legal Aspects of the Regulatory Use of Environmental Modeling, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10751
(2003) (providing a comprehensive review of modeling cases). Nevertheless, judicial experience arising
out of these cases does not remove some of the inherent problems faced by any court attempting to
review a model-based decision.
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critical examination in an open public forum. Likewise, public pressure
that might lead to more environmentally protective policies may be
muted, leading regulators to adopt plans less likely to satisfy the
substantive mandates of applicable law. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, impediments to public participation undermine the
mandates of environmental laws that specifically provide for such
participation opportunities. 4
In this Article, we explore the tension between public participation
and modeling by focusing on the SIP development process. We begin by
discussing the roots of the problem, exploring the origins of legal
requirements for both public participation and modeling. We then
discuss how the use of models fits within planning processes, describing
both the ways in which planning depends upon models and the ways in
which model use impedes the public role. We offer as an example the
history of a particular SIP planning process-the development of the San
Joaquin Valley ozone plan for California's 1994 SIP' 5-to illustrate
tensions between model-based planning and public participation. We
close with recommendations for ameliorating this paradox without
excluding public concerns or compromising the sophistication and
integrity of science-led planning.
Although we focus upon the SIP development process, the problems
we describe are by no means unique to air quality planning. Throughout
environmental planning, models are ubiquitous. Likewise, public
participation is a legally required component of most environmental
planning processes. The tensions and contradictions that we describe
pervade the world of environmental planning, and the solutions we
propose apply well beyond SIP development.
14. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR: OR How THE CLEAN
AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT
SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 4-9 (198i) [hereinafter "CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR"] (describing the demise
of the "New Deal" administrative law model based on decisions by oligopolies of experts).
Thwarting participation may also, in theory, bring benefits. With fewer participants, planning
processes may proceed more quickly-particularly if those few participants all share a high level of
technical expertise. See OLSON, supra note 8, at 53-65 (discussing the efficiency advantages of small
groups). But while smaller-group processes may promise faster resolutions, they also can lead to
groupthink-particularly if the interests of those in or with access to the planning group are fairly
homogenous -and the policies insular groups create can have lower odds of fulfilling substantive legal
mandates. As a consequence, those policies can be more likely to require prompt reexamination, and
the apparent efficiency of resolutions reached without public involvement can be illusory.
15. See SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY UNIFIED AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DISTRICT, THE OZONE ATrAINMENT
DEMONSTRATION PLAN (994) [hereinafter "ATAINMENT PLAN"] Pages in the Attainment Plan are
denoted by a two-number system, with the chapter number followed by a page number. Thus, a
citation to pages 1-6 and 1-7 refers to pages 6 and 7 in chapter one. For the 1994 California State




II. THE ORIGINS OF THE PARADOX:
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, SCIENCE, AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
The roots of the modeling-participation paradox run deep within our
system of environmental laws. On the one hand, our system draws
heavily on a traditional respect for agency expertise, and that respect has
inexorably led to the use of models and exclusive decision-making. On
the other hand, our environmental laws draw upon a tradition of distrust
of government, and rely upon the interested public to influence, critique,
and even sue to overturn agency decisions. This section explores how
those traditions have evolved and become embedded within
environmental law in general and the SIP approval process in particular.
A. THE ENTRENCHMENT OF MODELING IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
I. Science and Environmental Law: The Roots of Modeling
Requirements
Environmental statutes commonly call for agencies to ground their
decisions in science.' 6 These laws assume that science will provide
answers to environmental problems and that agencies, as repositories,
generators and interpreters of technical evidence, will be well suited to
translate science into policy.'7 Our current dependence upon model-
based planning derives in part from this emphasis upon science.'8
Reliance on scientific expertise is deeply rooted in administrative
16. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (2000) (requiring
comprehensive discussion of the environmental impacts of proposed action, which necessarily means
scientific study); Endangered Species Act, I6 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(i)(A) (20o0) (requiring that listing
decisions be based upon science); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(i) (200o) (requiring science-
based water quality standards); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9605, 9621 (2ooo) (requiring science-based cleanup standards).
17. A. Dan Tarlock, Who Owns Science?, 10 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 135, 138-39 (2002).
i8. The word "science" has plural vernacular meanings. Some-in particular scientists-use the
term narrowly to refer to the process of seeking truth through a recursive Baconian process of
experimentation via observation and hypothesis testing. Others use "science" to refer to the body of
knowledge developed and not yet rejected through use of the scientific method; our high school
science classes, for example, convey information as well as methodology. Many of us also use the term
"science" to refer to "state-of-the-science" gadgetry. See, e.g., POPULAR SCIENCE, at http://
www.popsci.com/popsci/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2004) (a magazine devoted largely to technology). To
make matters more complicated, policy scholars have drawn a distinction between research science
and "mandated" or "regulatory" science. Those scholars have found that the latter form of science,
which occurs pursuant to regulatory pressures, has highly different characteristics from science
conducted in "pure research" settings. SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR 5-7 (990).
In this article, we use the term "science" to refer to both the process through which scientific
information is developed (e.g., model development, gathering observational data, and using that data
to execute and evaluate the modeled simulation) and the body of information that arises out of that
process (e.g., modeling results, such as predictions). Much of the "science" we refer to is, at least to
some extent, regulatory science. Nevertheless, we caution readers that the modeling we describe draws
heavily upon both regulatory and traditional science as well as upon information and decisionmaking
methods that are not at all scientific, as well as upon modes of decisionmaking that are not, under any
of these definitions, scientific.
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law. In the nineteenth century, proponents of the administrative state
proposed the notion that professionally expert agencies should be
isolated from politics and allowed to do their technical work. 9 The
resulting bureaucratic model, in which a closed dialogue between
scientists and policymakers was to set the course of the bureaucracy, held
sway throughout the early twentieth century and became
institutionalized, with some limitations placed on discretion, into law
with the Administrative Procedures Act."
In the late I96os and the 197Os, when Congress drafted most of our
canon of environmental laws, environmental problems seemed
particularly well suited for an expert-based decision-making approach.
Faith in science was still prevalent.' Then as now, understanding
environmental problems almost always required scientific understanding.
Not surprisingly, environmental scientists had played crucial roles in
raising public awareness of environmental problems.22 Moreover,
environmental problems seemed amenable to scientific solutions, for our
society was only beginning to realize how hard environmental problems
would be for even scientists to understand.23 It was a time when both
19. See, e.g., Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. ScI. Q. 197, 21o (1887)
("Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its
offices."); CLEAN COALJDIRTY AIR, supra note 14, at 4-6 (describing the "New Deal" administrative
model).
20. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-7o6 (2000); see Richard Posner, The Rise and Fall of Administrative Law, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 953, 953-54 (1997); STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY POLICY 22-23 (4 th ed. 1999).
21. See JASANOFF, supra note 18, at 2 (describing the bases for that faith, which continues to the
present day). Jasanoff writes:
America's preoccupation with progress through science and technology appears, at one
level, to be solidly grounded in historical achievements. A century of inventions has
enlarged our capabilities and improved our quality of life in myriad unpredictable ways. At
every turn we encounter new material indicators of progress: air bags and antilock brakes,
electronic mail, fax machines and bank cards, heart transplants and laser surgery, genetic
screening, in vitro fertilization, and a burgeoning pharmacopeia for treating mental and
physical illness. In just one generation the space program has expanded the physical
frontiers of human experience, while discoveries in the biological sciences have
revolutionized our ability to manipulate the basic processes of life so as to fight infertility,
aging, hunger, and disease.
Id.
22. Tarlock, supra note 17, at 136-37 (describing the influence of scientists/naturalists like Rachel
Carson and Aldo Leopold upon the nascent environmental movement). For a more recent example of
a scientist influencing environmental policy, see PENELOPE CANAN & NANCY REICHMAN, OZONE
CONNECTIONS: EXPERT NETWORKS IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 48-52 (2002) (describing
the role of Mostafa Tolba, the chief architect of the Montreal Protocol, an international treaty to
phase-out the use of substances that destroy protective stratospheric ozone).
23. Aldo Leopold had already suggested that the great scientific discovery of the Twentieth
Century was the complexity of natural systems, but the stunning degree of that complexity, and the
resulting difficulty of making environmental decisions, was only beginning to be understood. See Aldo
Leopold, The Round River, in A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC, WITH ESSAYS ON CONSERVATION FROM
ROUND RIVER 190 (Oxford Univ. Press ed. 1966) ("The outstanding scientific discovery of the
Twentieth century is not television, or radio, but the complexity of the land organism. Only those who
know the most about it can appreciate how little is known about it.").
[Vol. 56:9oi
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scientists and legislators could easily believe in scientific solutions to
environmental problems. 4
Perhaps as a result, scientific and technological positivism, with a
touch of naivet6, permeates our environmental statutes.25 In drafting
these statutes, Congress assumed that science would drive decision-
making and that agencies could interpret scientific information to set the
right policies. Congress also assumed that agencies could do all of this
Across a wide range of fields, our understanding of the environment was still highly simplistic.
Air pollution modelers, for example, were using simple linear relationships to associate emissions with
resultant air pollution and were not yet considering the ways in which emissions and meteorology
could interact in nonlinear, counterintuitive ways. Likewise, ecologists were still wedded to the notion
that the environment gravitated toward a stable, harmonious state. See DANIEL B. BOTKIN,
DISCORDANT HARMONIES (1990) (describing how these assumptions of stability were wrong, and how
years of subsequent research have gradually forced scientists to recognize the natural environment as a
dynamic, shifting, and unpredictable entity).
24. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal
Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 322 (i9I). Lazarus writes:
A strong national consensus in favor of environmental protection prompted the President
to create EPA, Congress to pass sweeping environmental laws, and courts to open their
doors to environmental plaintiffs. But both the public and those institutions were
remarkably unsophisticated about the demands that they were placing upon themselves.
There was little, if any, sense of the huge short-term costs associated with treating
pollution as a cost of doing business. Nor was there much awareness of the degree to which
settled expectations and lifestyles could be disrupted if the natural environment were to be
treated as more than an economic commodity. The public and governmental institutions
likewise did not truly appreciate the incalculable nature of the benefits of environmental
protection, including the scientific uncertainty associated with the measurement of those
benefits and the long term intergenerational nature of their realization. There was
especially little apprehension of how those characteristics would challenge the patience of
both those sympathetic to, and those skeptical of, the new federal programs.
Id.
25. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), for example, calls for agencies to prepare a
"detailed statement" about potential environmental effects before undertaking any action that may
significantly affect the environment, without even a hint that its drafters understood how complicated
those statements would evolve to be. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (200o). The act makes provisions for
addressing uncertainty, but its underlying assumption appears to be that in most cases information on
the environmental consequences of actions would be either available or attainable through reasonable
effort. See JASANOFF, supra note 18, at 2. The Endangered Species Act is fundamentally science-driven,
with the Fish and Wildlife and National Marine Fisheries Services' decisions to add a species to the
endangered list to be based upon solely "the best scientific and commercial data available." s6 U.S.C.
§ I533(b)(i)(A) (2000); Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why
Better Science Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029 (I997). The Clean Water Act
incorporates science-based water quality standards, and CERCLA mandates cleanup to levels based
on scientific studies of human health. 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9605, 9621 (2ooo).
26. See McGarity & Wagner, supra note 13, at 207-14 (describing multiple ways in which
Congress asked agencies to utilize science-often to the exclusion of other decision-making criteria-
in setting policy). Commentors also ascribe a host of less naive motives to the 1970s Congresses.
Richard Lazarus suggests that in a divided country craving consensus about something, environmental
protection served as a badly needed rallying point. See Lazarus, supra note 24, at 322 . For Congress to
act upon this consensus may have been laudable, but commentators suggest that in their exuberance to
show environmental leadership, Congress and President Nixon steadily escalated the stringency of
their proposed laws, eventually creating symbolic acts and leaving EPA to reap the political
consequences when implementation proved impossible. E.g., John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of
Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 242-50 (I99o); Lazarus, supra note 24, at 323 ("Congress
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quickly; the new statutes set hundreds of short-term deadlines for setting
standards or policy and for meeting environmental goals."
The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments contained some of the most
spectacular examples of scientific optimism. Congress demanded that
automobile manufacturers reduce emissions of carbon monoxide,
hydrocarbons, and nitrogen oxides by ninety percent in five years.28 It
required the newly formed EPA to identify air pollutants and to set
health-based air quality standards for those pollutants within a matter of
months. 9 It gave states three years to develop plans that would achieve
standards by 1975.30 In several instances, Congress established goals
knowing that the technology to achieve them did not yet exist;
"technology forcing" was a core element of the Act.3' Critics have called
these requirements symbolic gestures,3" and indeed very few of the
deadlines were met.33 Nevertheless, that this ambitious scheme could
even be proposed, let alone enacted, indicates a high level of faith in the
ability of agencies to make effective science-based decisions.'
made no effort to bridge the gap between the nation's aspirations for environmental protection and its
understanding of the underlying issues and its own capacity for change. The result was a seemingly
never-ending onslaught of impossible agency tasks."). Emphasis on science may have played an
especially convenient role in such legislative punting. Wendy Wagner has observed that by grounding
law in science, politically contentious value choices can be hidden behind seemingly non-value-based
technical decisions, allowing the lawmakers and decisionmakers to escape political heat. Wendy E.
Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 181, 227, 235.
Nevertheless, even if Congress acted with a certain amount of politically convenient irresponsibility,
scientific understanding of the complexity of environmental problems has developed substantially
since the 1970s, and at least some of the scientific confidence apparent on the face of those early
statutes probably was genuine.
27. Lazarus, supra note 24, at 323 ("The statutes imposed hundreds of stringent deadlines on the
agency and removed much of the agency's substantive discretion in accomplishing them. One-third of
the deadlines were for six months or less. Sixty percent were for one year or less. According to EPA's
current administrator, William Reilly, Congress and the courts had imposed 8oo deadlines on the
agency through 1989.") (internal citations omitted).
28. Id. at 324. For original language of the Clean Air Act, see Pub. L. No. 9I-604, § 6(a), i97o
U.S.C.A (84 Stat.) 1971.
29. Pub. L. No. 9i-604, § 4(a), i97o U.S.C.A. (84 Stat.) 1956, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (994).
30. Id.; Lazarus, supra note 24, at 324.
31. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256-57 (976) (noting that the Act's "requirements are
of a 'technology-forcing character' and are expressly designed to force regulated sources to develop
pollution control devices that might at the time appear to be economically or technologically
infeasible.") (quoting Train v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 421 U.S. 6o, 91 (975)).
32. E.g., Dwyer, supra note 26; Lazarus, supra note 24.
33. See Lazarus, supra note 24, at 325.
Not surprisingly, fewer than 15 percent of the Clean Air Act's deadlines were met. None of
those met pertained to compliance with environmental quality standards. Twenty years
later, many areas of the nation still have not met the NAAQS. Both EPA and Congress have
given the auto companies numerous extensions of the deadline for meeting 9o percent
reduction in emissions of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen oxides, and, twenty
years later, the companies have still not reduced nitrogen oxides by go percent.
Id. (emphasis added).
34. In part, this emphasis upon science also reflected distrust of agencies; by demanding science-
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This emphasis on science has not disappeared since the 1970s.
Legislators consistently call for scientific foundations for decisions.35
Congress may be inconsistent in its support of scientific research, and
allegations of "junk" or incomplete science are often used to disparage
the basis of any policy with which advocates do not agree, 6 but the
general tenor of this rhetoric suggests a belief among legislators and the
public that a few interlopers are trespassing in the high temple of
scientific inquiry. Science still connotes integrity and is still popularly
viewed as a necessary component of, and proper basis, for environmental
policy.37
Respect for agencies' interpretations of science has also become
deeply institutionalized within the judiciary. The judiciary does
acknowledge an obligation to carefully review the procedural integrity of
agency decision-making, and will sometimes overturn agency decisions
based on highly technical analysis." In the early 1970s, the "hard look
doctrine," which required judges to take a long, careful look at agency
based decisionmaking, Congress also sought to constrain agency discretion and force achievement of
particular goals. See CLEAN COAIJDIRTY AIR, supra note 14, at 7-8, 104 (describing the agency-forcing
role of early statutes, and the ways in which that role moved beyond the broad discretion accorded to
agencies under a New Deal administrative model).
35. Wagner, supra note 26, at 184 ("Establishing a basis for regulating pollutants, pesticides, and
toxic substances, for example, can be informed by science but cannot be completely resolved by it
because of both preventable and unpreventable limits to experimentation. Despite these limits,
Congress continues to develop laws and policies that frame multidisciplinary environmental problems
as if they could be resolved largely or exclusively by science."); id. at 223-28 (describing public
confidence in and lack of understanding of science); see Doremus, supra note 25 (discussing how the
Endangered Species Act's science-only mandate obscures non-scientific value choices). Of course,
these calls may be disingenuous; science takes time, and demands for more science prior to regulatory
decisions may be merely delaying tactics. For example, a recent effort to revise the Endangered
Species Act to require "sound science" was decried by many for being an attempt to undermine the
Act disguised as a quest for scientific integrity. See, e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists, Science
Regarding the Endangered Species Act Manipulated, at http://www.ucsusa.org/global-environment/
rsi/page.cfm?pagelD=1366 (last visited Nov. 15, 2004).
36. See Wagner, supra note 26, at 198-200. In a more recent example, EPA is currently being
accused of failing to consider relevant scientific information in setting industrial mercury emissions
standards. See, e.g., Shankar Vedantam, New EPA Mercury Rule Omits Conflicting Data Study Called
Stricter Limits Cost-Effective, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2005, at At.
3"7. See Wagner, supra note 26, at 223-28; Connie Ozawa, Science in Environmental Conflicts, 39
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 219, 224 (1996) ("As long as agency decision makers were constrained by
the technical experts' interpretations of the physical conditions and alternative actions, Congress
assumed that raw politics would be constrained.").
38. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 346 F.3d 955 (9 th Cir. 2003) (overturning EPA's approval of a
SIP because the Court disagreed with EPA's interpretation of the significance of graphs showing wind
directions on days on which high pollutant levels occurred); McGarity & Wagner, supra note 13
(describing and criticizing cases in which courts performed non-deferential review of model-based
decisions). McGarity and Wagner cite Ohio V. EPA, 784 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1986), on reh'g, 798 F.2d
880 (6th Cir. 1986), and Gulf South Insulation v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 701 F.2d 1137
(5th Cir. 1983), as prominent, but probably outlying, examples of judicial overreaching. Id. at nn.70 &
93 and accompanying text.
May 20051
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
decisions, evolved in part as a response to distrust of agency integrity.39
Even in the heyday of exacting judicial review, however, judges rarely
were willing to substitute an agency's expert judgment with their own.
Deference to agency judgment is a core element of judicial review of
environmental decisions, and judicial opinions are filled with statements
about how agencies, not judges, hold technical expertise.4'
2. Modeling, the SIP Process, and the Clean Air Act
In a legal scheme founded upon confidence in technology and
science, heavy dependence upon modeling should not be surprising.
Standardized, science-based systems are likely to appeal to policymakers
fond of expert decision-making, and models allow scientific knowledge to
be codified and standardized.4 Indeed, quantitative modeling results may
appear to technically non-savvy observers like the very pinnacle of
systematized expert decision-making."
Models also are quite useful. Policymakers often must predict
outcomes of complicated processes, and making those predictions would
be all but impossible without models. 3 Complex environmental systems
often involve more variables, data, and interdependent feedback
processes than people reasonably can organize in their minds, and
interactions within these systems may create counterintuitive, nonlinear
responses that are impossible to understand without models. Models can
organize, manipulate, and process vast quantities of data and can
simulate complex multivariable processes, and these capacities allow
them to predict the future, compare alternative possible futures, 4 test
39. See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 520-21 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (discussing the meaning of "hard look" review).
40. E.g., N. Ohio Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1143, 1148 (6th Cir. 1978) ("It is not for us to
determine in the first instance whether the Ohio SIP meets all the criteria of the statute. That
responsibility rests with the Administrator .... 'The Court is not empowered to substitute its judgment
for that of the agency."') (internal citations omitted); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d i, 36 (D.C. Cir.
1976) ("[Alfter our careful study of the record, we must take a step back from the agency decision. We
must look at the decision not as the chemist, biologist or statistician that we are qualified neither by
training nor experience to be, but as a reviewing court exercising our narrowly defined duty of holding
agencies to certain minimal standards of rationality.").
41. PHILIP M. ROTH ET AL., THE ROLE OF GRID-BASED, REACTIVE AIR QUALITY MODELING IN
POLICY ANALYSIS: PERSPECTIVES AND IMPLICATIONS, As DRAWN FROM A CASE STUDY 46 (1989)
("Modeling is a codification of current knowledge.").
42. See MARTIN GREENBERGER ET AL., MODELS IN THE POLICY PROCESS: PUBLIC DECISION MAKING IN
THE COMPUTER ERA (1976) (stating that models represent "another phase in the continuing attempt by
quantitative researchers to apply systematic analysis and scientific procedures to the understanding of
policy problems and the making of public decisions"); West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 867-68
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting the high degree of deference courts grant expert decisionmaking in general
and modeling in particular).
43. See NARSTO, supra note 12, at 4-3 (describing the photochemical air quality models as the
"only prognostic tool available to the policy-making community").
44- See also Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 332 (D.C. Cir. 198i) ("Realistically, computer
modeling is a useful and often essential tool for performing the Herculean labors Congress imposed on
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the ramifications of assumptions, and contribute to improved
understanding of system interactions. These powers are invaluable in
planning efforts.
Models also can perform these functions relatively cheaply and with
minimal social or environmental cost. Policymakers rarely can perform
real-world experiments; large-scale experiments upon the environment
are generally prohibitively time-consuming and expensive, and the threat
of human injury or irreparable environmental harm makes some
experimentation ethically suspect at best.45 Models avoid these problems
by performing their tasks in controlled settings, without experimentation
upon the actual environment. Gathering model input data can require
extensive effort-indeed, data gathering is often the most expensive and
time-consuming task in a modeling study-but with adequate input data,
models can produce predictions remarkably quickly. Furthermore,
modeling decision stakes are often orders of magnitude greater than
actual modeling costs, with billions of dollars, as well as the health of
46
millions, depending upon local emissions control decisions. As a result,
the financial costs of modeling, while often quite large in actual dollar
terms, can pale in comparison to the costs of other planning methods.47
The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments did not explicitly call for the
use of models in the SIP process."5 However, it required EPA to set
EPA in the Clean Air Act.").
45. Of course, even with the benefit of modeled predictions the environmental outcomes of
regulatory policies often will be unpredictable; to some extent, all policies are experimental. Models,
however, can still play a vital role in excluding from the scope of real-world testing regulatory systems
that are especially likely to be harmful; even if every policy is to some extent a test, not all policies
deserve real-world testing. See Carl J. Walters & C.S. Holing, Large-scale Management Experiments
and Learning by Doing, 71 ECOLOGY 2060, 206O-68 (I99o).
46. EPA has estimated that compliance with the Clean Air Act and the 199o Clean Air Act
Amendments has cost hundreds of billions of dollars, and that economic benefits of the Clean Air Act
are even higher. EPA, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, ES-6 (I99o), available at
http://www.epa.gov/air/sect8l2l812exec2.pdf (last visited May 3, 2004); EPA, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 1990 TO 20IO, ES-ii (I999), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/I99O-
20O0/capis3o.pdf (last visited May 3, 2004); see infra Part IV.D (discussing the consequences of
polluted air in the San Joaquin Valley). Of course, modeling by no means guarantees better decisions,
but even increasing the odds of better decisions can translate into substantial economic gain.
47. Computer-based simulation can be at least an order of magnitude cheaper than learning by
doing. For example, the San Joaquin Valley Air Quality Study included a model development and
application, as well as intensive data gathering field campaigns, for a total cost of less than $20 million.
POLICY COMMITTEE, SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY AIR QUALITY STUDY, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD AND
SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY UNIFIED AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DISTRICT, SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY AIR QUALITY
STUDY POLICY-RELEVANT FINDINGS 3 (1996). In contrast, emissions control costs determined, in part,
by the modeling study cost several hundred million dollars or more.
48. Philip Roth et al., Tropospheric Ozone, in KEEPING PACE WITH SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING:
CASE STUDIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 57 (Myron F. Uman ed., 1993) ("The development of
models capable of simulating the dynamics of atmospheric processes that lead to ozone formation
began about I97o. By 1973, the EPA had committed its research efforts to supporting continued
development of the Urban Airshed Model. The model saw very limited application-solely in the Los
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national health-based ambient air quality standards and required states
to devise and implement the SIPs that will achieve those standards.49 To
devise those SIPs, state planners needed to predict the outcomes of
control strategies, and they could best do this with models. Thus, models
rapidly became a part of SIP development and review.
For example, tropospheric ozone-one of the first air pollutants for
which EPA set air quality standards, and the pollutant upon which this
paper's case study" focuses-forms in the atmosphere when emissions of
nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons ("precursor pollutants") react
chemically in the presence of heat and sunlight." The chemical
transformations and transport processes involved are exceedingly
complex,52 and predicting future concentrations requires at least a
conceptual model of the relationship between precursor pollutant
emissions and ozone concentrations. Since predicting ozone attainment
was an early statutory requirement, the use of models was a practical
necessity from the outset.
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments turned the practical necessity
of modeling into an explicit legal requirement, calling repeatedly for the
use of models. For example, they required demonstrations that the SIP
would in fact achieve air quality goals ("attainment demonstrations").
[The SIP must] provide for attainment of the ozone national ambient
air quality standard by the applicable attainment date. This attainment
demonstration must be based on photochemical grid modeling or any
other analytical method determined by the Administrator, in the
Administrator's discretion, to be at least as effective. 3
EPA cannot approve an ozone SIP if it does not demonstrate attainment,
and as a result, SIP development is now legally as well as practically
required to be a model-dependant process.54
Courts have occasionally recognized the manipulability of models,
but they have also been instrumental in their adoption. Even prior to the
1990 amendments of the Act, judges repeatedly upheld agency decisions
based on modeling results. In one of the earlier and more extensive
Angeles Basis-during the mid-I97O's; more widespread and intensive application began in 1979 and
has continued to this day.")
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409-7410 (20o0).
50. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone-Final Decision, 15 Fed. Reg.
13,008-I, 13,009 (EPA, 1993) (describing the early history of the ozone standards, which first were set
in 1971).
51. See JOHN H. SEINFELD & SPYROS N. PANDIS, ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY AND PHYSICS 164-73,
299-302 (1998) (providing a detailed description of ozone photochemistry).
52. Roth et al., supra note 48, at 39.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 751Ia(c)(2)(A); see Sierra Club v. EPA, 356 F.3d 296, 304-06 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(interpreting this requirement).
54. This does not mean, of course, that air quality planners rely solely upon models. Planners
instead typically rely on a range of types of technical evidence, and while in some processes models are
of crucial importance, in others they play minor roles.
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discussions, the D.C. Circuit explicitly acknowledged the limitations of
models as flawed predictive tools, and also discussed in detail the
potential problems with allowing a model to obscure the human factors
in decision-making."5 Nevertheless, it unequivocally concluded that
modeling was an important component of decision-making under the
Clean Air Act. 6 The court noted that "[rjealistically, computer modeling
is a useful and often essential tool for performing the Herculean labors
Congress imposed on EPA in the Clean Air Act."57
Other courts have provided similar endorsements, often without the
D.C. Circuit's caveats.' Judicial deference to modeling has not been
limitless; courts have repeatedly asserted that models must bear some
rational connection to reality and that EPA must explain both the
models' functions and the assumptions." Nevertheless, most cases that
55. Sierra Club v. EPA, 356 F.3 d at 304-06.
Such models, despite their complex design and aura of scientific validity, are at best
imperfect and subject to manipulation as EPA forthrightly recognizes. The results
ultimately are shaped by the assumptions adopted at the outset, and can change drastically
for a given range of input data if key assumptions are adjusted even slightly. The accuracy
of the model's predictions also hinges on whether the underlying assumptions reflect reality,
which is no small feat in this volatile world.
Id. (citations omitted).
56. Id.
57. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298,332 (D.C. Cir. t981).
58. New York v. U.S. EPA, 716 F.zd 44o, 443-44 (7th Cir. 1983) (rejecting New York's
contention that EPA had used the wrong model); Conn. Fund for the Env't v. EPA, 696 F.zd 169, 177
(2d Cir. t982) ("[Tihe Agency claims it lacks a model that would enable it to predict accurately the
effects of such secondary formation, and on this issue we must defer to the Agency's technical
expertise .... We think it would be unwise to order the Agency to consider effects it cannot accurately
measure...."); Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147, 158-59 (2d Cir. t982) (also rejecting the contention
that EPA had used the wrong model); see also tooo Friends of Md. v. Browner, 265 F.3d 216, 229-30
(4th Cir. 2001) (holding that EPA may rely on older modeling during an SIP revision if it believes that
older modeling shows the revision will attain NAAOS compliance); Air Pollution Control Dist. of
Jefferson County v. EPA, 739 F.2d to7i, io83-84 (6th Cir. 1984); Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621
F.2d 797, 805-o6 (6th Cir. I98O) (upholding EPA's choice to use a model rather than actual monitoring
data); Sierra Club v. EPA, 356 F.3d at 304-06 (upholding EPA's authority to tweak its model results);
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1051-53 (D.C. Cir. 200); Appalachian Power Co. v.
EPA, 135 F.3d 791, 802-06 (D.C. Cir. 1998); New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574, 58o (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(upholding EPA's decision not to grant credence to a model used by Pennsylvania).
59. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co., 249 F.3d at 1054 ("EPA has 'undoubted power to use
predictive models' but only so long as it 'explain[s] the assumptions and methodology used in
preparing the model' and 'provide[s] a complete analytic defense' should the model be challenged.")
(quoting Small Refiners Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1983));
Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("If we [judges] are to earn our keep,
however, judicial deference to the agency's modeling cannot be utterly boundless; we must reverse the
agency's application of the generic air dispersion model as arbitrary and capricious if there is simply no
rational relationship between the model and the known behavior of the hazardous air pollutant to
which it is applied."); see also Lands Council v. Forester of Region One of the U.S. Forest Serv., 395
F.3 d 1019, 1032 (9th Cir. 2004) ("The Forest Service's heavy reliance on the WATSED model in this
case does not meet the regulatory requirements because there was inadequate disclosure that the
model's consideration of relevant variables is incomplete .... We hold that this withholding of
information violated NEPA, which requires up-front disclosures of relevant shortcomings in the data
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address the use of models-even those in which EPA's decisions did not
survive judicial review-use language of extreme deference."
As a result, models have become practically and legally entrenched
in air pollution planning.6' Nonetheless, as Part III of this Article
discusses, models have limitations that have significant implications when
juxtaposed with statutory mandates to facilitate public participation.
B. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
I. Origins of Public Participation Provisions
The early environmental statutes were founded upon faith in
science, but they also were deeply imbued with distrust of government.
6 2
In the late r96os, Congress may have viewed science as the proper basis
for environmental decision-making and government agencies as the
entities best suited to implement policy, but the notion that those
agencies would always act in the public interest was under increasing
attack. The work of Rachel Carson and Ralph Nader, in combination
with the generalized Vietnam War-era climate of distrust, left the public
with little faith that agencies would be fully committed to environmental
protection.63 Critics charged that agencies were prone to capture by
or models.").
For a comprehensive summary of cases reviewing model-based decisions, see McGarity &
Wagner, supra note 13. McGarity and Wagner conclude that, in some cases, courts have been overly
skeptical of model-based decisions, but that in general courts appear, despite a profusion of cases
characterized by "tedious, technical nitpicking," to have shown a healthy understanding of the
importance and also the limits of models, and have demanded reasoned explanations but not
perfection of agencies.
6o. See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 867-68 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting the high degree
of deference courts grant to model-based decisions); New York, 852 F.2d at 58o ("It is well established
that when a court is reviewing predictions within an agency's area of special expertise, at the frontiers
of science, the 'court must generally be at its most deferential.'... Acceptance or rejection of a
particular air pollution model and the results obtained from it are interpretations of scientific evidence.")
(emphasis added).
61. In addition to legislators and judges, legal scholars have shown a high level of faith in the
ability of models to address air pollution problems. Richard Revesz and Jonathon Remy Nash, for
example, have proposed that emissions trading regimes could be automated through a website linked
to a model that would immediately compute the trades' consequences for pollution distribution.
Though Revesz and Nash acknowledge the limitations of the model they propose using, their article
nonetheless evinces an extremely high level of optimism about the ability of models to predict quickly
and effectively compliance outcomes. See Jonathon Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and
Geography: Designing Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional for Pollutants, 28
ECOLOGY L.Q. 569,573 (2001).
62. See CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR, supra note 14, at 4-8 (discussing this distrust, and suggesting that
the specificity of environmental statutes' mandates arose partly out of distrust).
63. Lazarus, supra note 24, at 322.
Nor were the late i96os and early i97os a time susceptible to the type of candid dialogue
between citizen groups and business, Congress and the President, or scientists and
economists that would have been required to begin to reach consensus on these issues. The
civil rights and antiwar movements had polarized the nation. In the aftermath of powerful
denunciations of the chemical and auto industries and government by activists Rachel
Carson (Silent Spring (5962)) and Ralph Nader (Unsafe at Any Speed (I965)), the
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regulated entities or were likefy to undermine their missions through a
series of political compromises. ' In an attempt to check these tendencies,
Congress inserted numerous participation provisions designed to allow
public participants to ensure that the regulators were doing their jobs.
These provisions were not entirely unprecedented. The APA
codified notice and comment rulemaking, and it provided interested
private parties the right to submit comments and seek judicial review of
agency decisions. Agencies did not need to agree with public
comments, 66 but they did generally need to create a paper trail
documenting their reasoning, and challengers could have unreasonable
or illegal agency actions overturned. 67
The environmental statutes of the 1970s significantly enlarged the
scope of these public rights. In addition to the rulemaking, adjudication,
and judicial review provisions of the APA, many statutes required public
hearings and created detailed procedural and reporting requirements.
These requirements obliged agencies, and in some situations industry, to
provide the public with information about what they were doing and
why, and allowed public participants to find out when agencies were
failing to take enforcement action.69 Statutes also set forth detailed
procedures for environmental planning and decision-making, again
forcing agencies to take specific steps or risk litigation.7 °
credibility of government and business on health and safety issues was exceedingly low.
Id. Lazarus notes further, "Simply put, EPA was not trusted." Id. at 316.
64. Id. at 316 (describing Marvin Bernstein's theories of capture and Joseph Sax's worries that
agencies would buckle to persistent political pressure and bargain away environmental protection).
65. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 7o6(2)(A) (2000); see Michael I. Jeffery, Intervenor Funding as the Key to
Effective Citizen Participation in Environmental Decision-Making: Putting the People Back in the
Picture, i9 ARiz. J. Ir'L. & COMP. L. 643, 649-50 (2002) (providing a quick summary of the ways in
which the APA facilitates public participation). The primary participants in APA rulemaking, and
thus the primary beneficiaries of the notice-and-comment and judicial review requirements, are
probably the regulated entities rather than the public. See Rena L. Steinzor, Toward Better Bubbles
and Future Lives: A Progressive Response to the Conservative Agenda for Reforming Environmental
Law, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11421 (2002) ("By the time a rule crawls, belly down, across the finish line,
those responsible for writing it have heard every fact, opinion, and threat that a large army of outside,
especially industrial, constituencies can think to make.").
66. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000).
67. 5 U.S.C. § 7o6(2)(A) (2ooo). But see CLEAN COAI/DIRTY AIR, supra note 14, at 6 (noting that
under a New Deal model, an agency is "to be insulated from judicial review") (emphasis removed).
68. NEPA, for example, is almost entirely devoted to providing information to the public. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-437oe (2000). For other examples of reporting requirements, see 33 U.S.C. § 1315
(mandating state water quality reports); id. § 1318 (requiring permittees to submit reports); and 42
U.S.C. § 7619 (i994) (requiring air quality monitoring and reporting).
69. See NRDC v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 397 (5th Cir. 1974) ("The Amendments embraced the
concept of 'citizen enforcement' of antipollution laws.... The public information requirements play a
crucial role in assuring effective citizen enforcement. They are designed to ensure that 'citizen
enforcers' will have access to any and all information they will need in prosecuting enforcement suits
or in deciding whether to bring them.").
70. Frances Irwin & Carl Bruch, Public Access to Information, Public Participation, and Justice, in
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Perhaps most importantly, several statutes contained citizen suit
provisions.7' The Clean Air Act, for example, provides that
any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(i) against any person.., who is alleged to have violated (if there is
evidence that the alleged violation has been repeated) or to be in
violation of (A) an emission standard or limitation under this chapter
or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to
such a standard or limitation,
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is
not discretionary with the administrator, or
(3) against any person who proposes to construct or constructs any new
or modified major emitting facility without [the required] permit.... ."
Citizen suit provisions created a powerful check against agency
indiscretion, providing public participants with a powerful legal tool to
back up earlier efforts at involvement and participation.73 An agency
faced with the possibility of citizen suits ignores credible public comment
at its own peril. Moreover, if the agency fails to fulfill its regulatory
duties, it may find its role usurped.
Although distrust may have been a primary motivation for the
creation of these provisions, it is not the sole reason for public
involvement in environmental planning. Many public participation
mechanisms function collaboratively. Notice and comment rulemaking,
for example, allows agencies to incorporate public suggestions in a
process that is not necessarily adversarial.74 Often participants wish no
more than to inform, persuade, or even praise; their primary purpose
may be to help, rather than compel, the agency to do its job.75 Indeed, an
STUMBLING TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY 511, 527 (John C. Dernbach ed., 2002); e.g. National
Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000); National Forest Management Act, 16
U.S.C. § x604 (2000); Endangered Species Act § 7, r6 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000).
71. E.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994); Endangered Species Act, I6 U.S.C. § 1540(g)
(1994); see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR, supra note 14, at 8-9 (discussing the function of these provisions).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1994).
73. See Virginia v. Browner, 8o F.3d 869, 88o (4th Cir. 1996) ("The comment of an ordinary
citizen carries more weight if officials know that the citizen has the power to seek judicial review of
any administrative decision harming him.").
74. See Jeffery, supra note 65, at 649-50 (describing how informal rulemaking provides
opportunities to influence rules at the developmental stage).
75. See id. at 648 ("Meaningfully implemented, citizen participation encourages government
accountability, ensures continuation of a participatory democracy and can even, in an environmental
context, stimulate inventive and socially acceptable answers to environmental problems"); Irwin &
Bruch, supra note 70, at 571 ("Many environmental statutes rely on public participation to improve
the decisionmaking process and to build public support for the final decision."); Anne Simon, Valuing
Public Participation, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 757, 760. Simon writes:
One fairly obvious, but also quite significant, benefit [from encouraging more "permeable"
decision-making processes] is the promotion of genuine participation, which is a value in
itself. The second is that such permeability can allow for substantively new ideas and new
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early collaborative dialogue between the agency and public participants
is often far more informative and effective than later participation
through adversarial litigation7
Accordingly, agencies have developed additional formalized
procedures for seeking collaborative input. Subject to the limitations
imposed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA),77 agencies
often use advisory committees-groups composed of regulated and
interested parties-in the preliminary stages of developing proposed
rules.'8 Agencies may also formalize similar procedures through
negotiated rulemaking. 9 Whether or not these procedures are a positive
development-some critics praise them for pre-empting conflict,s but•8I
others argue that they promote cronyism or capture" -they have become
common, and provide another important mechanism for interested
groups to influence agencies' technical decisions.
2. Public Participation and the SIP Process
Like many environmental planning efforts, the SIP process allows, at
least on paper, public participants numerous access points to influence
plan development. In practice, agencies often make extensive use of
advisory committees in SIP planning, allowing an additional avenue for
interested parties to influence the planning process."
Section iio of the CAA directs that "[e]ach state shall, after
reasonable notice and public hearings, adopt and submit to the
connections to enter regulatory processes and to affect the agency's scientific and policy
deliberations. Third, real permeability may mobilize more or different or better government
resources than would have been brought to bear on a particular problem if the regulatory
process were left simply to trundle along on its own.
Id.
76. See Simon, supra note 75, at 762-63 (arguing that surprises and objections are inherent in
regulatory planning, and that incorporating them at the outset is preferable to holding them at bay as
long as possible). See also EPA, Improved Science-Based Environmental Stakeholder Processes: A
Commentary by the EPA Science Advisory Board 8 (2oo), available at www.epa.gov/sab/pdf/
eccmoloo6.pdf.
77. 5 U.S.C. app. § I (1994).
78. Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM.
L. REV. I, 11 (1998).
79. 5 U.S.C. § 561-590 (994); Croley, supra note 78, at I11.
8o. E.g., Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. I, 30 (1982);
see William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millenium: Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion
of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1351-54 (997) (summarizing the early literature's
overwhelmingly favorable discussions of negotiated rulemaking).
81. E.g., Funk, supra note 8o, at 1383-87; see also Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The
Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (997) (arguing that
negotiated rulemaking doesn't actually deliver many of the benefits its proponents promised). Indeed,
the FACA and the Sunshine in Government Act are both designed to limit the ways informal
procedures allow important decisions to be made without public participation or notice. Croley, supra
note 78, at 117-18 n.347.




Administrator... a plan which provides for implementation,
maintenance, and enforcement of such primary standard in each air
quality control region (or portion thereof) within such State.""3 The act
also states that "[e]ach implementation plan submitted by a State under
this chapter shall be adopted by the State after reasonable notice and
public hearing," 84 and requires that the plan "provide for consultation
and participation by local political subdivisions affected by the plan."
'5
States may revise their SIPs, but again only after notice and public
hearing. 86
Once the state has completed its proposed SIP, EPA must review it.
EPA can accept the plan or, if the plan fails to meet statutory
requirements, either order the state to resubmit a new plan or reject the
plan outright and develop its own.8" SIP approval or disapproval is
considered rulemaking, and thus is governed by the APA's public notice
and comment requirements.m Section 553 of the APA provides:
[A]fter notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through
submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without
opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the relevant
matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a
concise general statement of their basis and purpose.
89
Failure to comply with this requirement is grounds for invalidation of
EPA's approval of the SIP.9°
Section iio also includes reporting requirements; emitting sources
are to submit "periodic reports on the nature and amounts of emissions
and emissions-related data from such sources," and those reports "shall
be available at reasonable times for public inspection."9' These
requirements provide for further public participation by facilitating
public monitoring of SIP implementation and potentially providing
information to support citizen suits. Public participants may file such
suits under the Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision, and indeed public
interest groups have filed numerous lawsuits seeking to enjoin the EPA
83. 42 U.S.C. § 741o(a)(I) (1994).
84. Id. § 741o(a)(2).
85. Id. § 741o(a)(2)(M).
86. Id. § 741o().
87. Id. § 741o(k). EPA may also approve only a portion of a SIP, allowing EPA to proceed with
implementing planned emissions controls while the planning agency endeavors to remedy other
components of the plan, such as the technical basis of the attainment demonstration. See, e.g.,
Approval and Promulgation of Ozone Attainment Plan and Finding of Failure To Attain; State of
California, San Francisco Bay Area, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,340 (Sept. 20, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
Pt. 52) (providing such a partial approval).
88. See Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 17o n.4 (6th Cir. 1973).
89. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994).
90. See Buckeye Power, 481 F.2d at 170-71.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 741o(a)(2)(F) (1994).
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from approving or disapproving state SIPs.92
Judicial review of agencies' compliance with prescribed procedures
under the CAA, as with other environmental statutes, can be exacting.
An outright failure to complete a required procedure is often grounds for
invalidating the agency's action.93 Failure to provide accurate or clear
information to the public, for example, can hamstring public
participation, and may be grounds for invalidation of an agency's
decision.'
The CAA thus calls for multiple stages of public participation in the
SIP planning process. In addition to informal interactions, public
participants may comment on the plans as the states develop them. It
may comment again in accordance with the APA when the federal
government considers whether to approve the SIP.95 Finally, it may
monitor the implementation and enforcement of the regulations created
by the plans. With redundant opportunities for involvement, and with the
judiciary alert to any failure to follow prescribed procedure, transparency
is a legal mandate.
III. MODELS AND THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS
In theory, the Clean Air Act and other environmental statutes that
emphasize both science-based decision-making and public participation
should create a workable regulatory system of checks and balances.
Decisions should be made primarily by the agencies on technical bases.
96
Through reporting requirements, notice and comment periods, and
citizen suit provisions, however, potential public participants ought to
have opportunities to become informed and involved. Should an agency
ignore cogent public critiques and select a course of action inconsistent
with substantive mandates, public participants can sue to enjoin plan
implementation.
Models can disrupt the balance between expert decision-making and
public involvement. The limitations of models create uncertainty and
92. For a summary of such litigation arising out of air pollution in the San Joaquin Valley, see
Central Valley Air Quality Coalition, Legal Actions, at http://www.calcleanair.org/legal-actions.htm
(last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
93. See Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. EPA, 836 F.2d 777, 788-89 (3d Cir. 1987); Buckeye
Power, 481 F.2d at 170-71.
94. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 353-54 (D.C. Cir. i98i). But see Conn. Fund for the
Env't v. EPA, 696 F.2d i79, 185-86 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that a lack of clarity in Connecticut's plan,
although troubling to the court, was not grounds for overturning the state's adoption of the plan).
95. Conn. Fund for the Env't, 696 F.2d at 185. The SIP development process is not as inclusive as
some environmental planning processes; for example, SIP approval does not require preparation of an
environmental impact statement.
96. See Ozawa, supra note 37, at 223-25 (commenting that Congress wanted decision makers
"constrained by the technical experts' interpretations of the physical conditions and alternative
actions" in order to reduce "raw politics," and describing how an idealized process should work).
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necessitate subjective judgment, both in model design and in the
interpretation of results. Model-based planning decisions are thus well
worthy of public review, but, unfortunately, models' complexity and
opacity create obstacles to such critique. Thus, model-based decision-
making can fail to comport with a traditional rational-expert ideal while
also restricting effective public participation. This section explores this
problem, focusing first on the limitations of models and then on how
those limitations impede public involvement in planning.
A. LIMITATIONS OF MODELS
i. Uncertainty
Many of the problems with model-based planning arise out of the
uncertainty associated with any modeling study. The following discussion
describes several sources of such uncertainty.
a. Inherent Limits of Simulation
Air quality models, like all models, are fundamentally simulations,
and as simulations, they are inherently limited in their representation of
the real world.97 Modelers devote tremendous energy to identifying and
reducing such uncertainty, but no model can incorporate all real data or
simulate all of the processes that might influence an outcome. Because
every model is necessarily an approximation of reality, models'
predictions unavoidably contain some error."
b. Prediction
Using models to predict the future compounds this inherent error.'
Planners typically develop air quality plans over a span of years, and
expect their plans to achieve results years after planning and
implementation occur." Predicting future outcomes, however, is
impossible to do with certainty.' ° Modelers must base their predictions
on future economic, meteorological and political conditions, on complex
chemical and physical interactions, all subject to a host of other
97. See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 605 F.2d 506, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
("Any model is an abstraction from and simplification of the real world."); ALBERT EINSTEIN,
GEOMETRY AND EXPERIENCE 190 (1953) ("As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are
not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality.").
98. NARSTO, supra note I2, at 4-3 ("Because air quality models are imperfect representations of
the real atmosphere, their output must have some level of error.").
99. See generally E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL is BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATTERED 212
(1973) ("[I]t is the planners, more than perhaps anyone else, who would like nothing better than to
have a machine to foretell the future.").
too. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407, 7410 (requiring development of plans that demonstrate future
compliance). This predictive function is not unique to air quality planning, of course; throughout
environmental planning, planners use modelers to predict future conditions.
IoI. See Oreskes et al., supra note II, at 643 (stating that "even if a model result is consistent with
present and past observational data, there is no guarantee that the model will perform at an equal
level when used to predict the future").
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potentially unanticipated factors.' °2 The further into the future the model
must project, the more uncertain results are likely to be.'" In recent
years, air pollution modelers have made efforts to address this
uncertainty by simulating several sets of future year conditions to
produce a composite of prediction scenarios and by assigning
probabilities to future realizations. 4 Though an important step forward,
such probabilistic description of alternative futures is not yet common
practice.
c. Complexity in Model Formulation
Air quality models seek to simulate complicated processes, and this
complexity also leads to uncertainty." The chemistry that creates high
levels of ozone, for example, involves non-linear interactions that
produce surprising and counterintuitive results.' 6 Likewise, relationships
between economic output, technological change, and pollutant emissions
can defy simple explanation." This complexity creates a greater number
of potential errors within the model simulation.
102. See Fine et al., supra note 12, at 68.
Important assumptions used to estimate future emissions pertain to the rates used for
population and economic growth and for land use conversion, forecasted changes in driving
patters, and the anticipated effectiveness and rates of implementation of emissions control
technologies. Inevitably, these assumptions will lead to some error. None of these
assumptions can account for unanticipated gradual changes, such as the rise in popularity of
sport utility vehicles and light-duty trucks during the 199os, or abrupt changes, such as a
sudden increase in crude oil prices that leads power producers to switch from oil to natural
gas fuel.
Id.
103. See generally WILLIAM ASCHER & HAROLD D. LASSWELL, FORECASTING: AN APPRAISAL FOR
POLICY-MAKERS AND PLANNERS (1978) (examining the accuracy of forecasts developed using models).
lo4. See, e.g., Christian Hogrefe & S. Trivikrama Rao, Demonstrating Attainment Of the Air
Quality Standards: Integration Of Observations and Model Predictions into the Probabilistic
Framework, 51 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. Ass'N Io6o (2OO1).
105. See Fine et al., supra note 12, at 63.
A PAQSM is a mathematical representation of physical and chemical processes occurring in
the atmosphere and at the atmosphere/land interface; the model includes emissions,
diffusive and advective transport, chemical transformation, and deposition.... In addition
to emissions and atmospheric processing, it represents the physical system comprised of
topography (e.g., mountains), surface characteristics (e.g., land use and land cover), and
meteorology (e.g., winds, temperatures, and clouds). The PAQSM domain may range from
an urban airshed to a regional to a continental-scale area.
Id.
io6. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RETHINKING THE OZONE PROBLEM IN URBAN AND REGIONAL AtR
POLLUTION I (I99I) ("NOx reductions can have either a beneficial or detrimental effect on ozone
concentrations, depending on the locations and emissions rates of VOC and NOx sources in a region.
The effect of NOx reductions depends on the local VOC/NOx and a variety of other factors."). For a
description of the complexities involved in creating ozone, see SEINFELD & PANDIS, supra note 5i, at
299-302.
107. See Fine et al., supra note 12, at 68.
io8. KENNETH DEMERJIAN ET AL., A NEW APPROACH FOR DEMONSTRATING ArTAINMENT OF THE
AMBIENT OZONE STANDARD: MODELING, ANALYSIS, AND MONITORING CONSIDERATIONS 11-8 (1995).
As greater attention is given to simulating the dynamics of individual processes, model
complexity increases. Attending increased model complexity are (a) increased difficulty in
May 2005]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Models have improved since the early days of air quality planning.
As simulation models have evolved, they have become increasingly
complex; this complexity has reduced the extent to which models
oversimplify the real world."° Current models use more monitoring data,
greater computing power, improved and expanded algorithms, and more
efficient, accurate mathematical solution methods than did their
predecessors."' Nevertheless, models' skill in simulating ozone
concentrations has not increased commensurately,"' and significant
limitations remain for both the mathematical representations and
applications of air quality models." ' Additionally, due to the time and
effort involved in developing or updating an air quality model, usually no
single "state-of-the-science" model contains a formulation depicting the
most modern scientific understanding."3 As a result, the difficulty of
modeling complex processes remains a source of uncertainty.
d. Input Data Limitations
Modeling simulations are also limited by the availability and
completeness of input data."4  Modelers cannot construct their
simulations based upon complete descriptions of the real world, and
instead often must use sparse and uncertain data."5 Flaws and
incompleteness in these data sets further add to the separation between
simulating each individual process correctly, (b) the potential for greater cumulative
uncertainty (while imprecision may increase, bias may be reduced) and (c) increased
computational demands. Thus, the potential for uncertainty increases after a certain point,
rendering overall acceptance of the model more difficult.
Id.
I09. For discussions of the growth in complexity and adoption of air quality models by the
regulated community, see ROTH ET AL., supra note 41, and Roth et al., supra note 48.
I io. For a discussion of recent PAQSM improvements, see NARSTO, supra note 12, ch. 4.
i ii. See id. at 4-9 ("In terms of simple measures, the skill of operational air-quality models to
simulate surface 03 concentrations does not seem to have improved substantially, despite increases in
model sophistication and complexity.").
112. See id. at 4-5 ("AQMS [air quality modeling systems], despite two decades of improvement,
still contain significant limitations in their formulation and application.").
113. See Armistead Russell, Regional Photochemical Air Quality Modeling. Model Formulations,
History, and State of the Science, 22 ANN. REv. ENERGY & ENv'T 573-74 (1997).
There are, at present, a number of regional, photochemical air quality models. Although
they are all based on solving the same basic equations, they have different evolutionary
paths, attributes, and applications .... If one were to suggest an order of complexity and
scientific comprehensiveness, the Eurlerian, multi-scale/nested models with multiple layers,
plume-in-grid treatment, and cloud dynamics would be considered as approaching the state
of the science, though none of the models contains all of the most modem representations
of the science.
Id.
i14. See generally id. at 560 ("Inputs to regional air quality models can be broadly grouped into the
following categories: meteorology, emissions, topography, atmospheric concentrations, and grid
structure.").
115. See, e.g., NARSTO, supra note 12, at 4-6 (noting that fine-scale processes are often accounted
for only approximately in ozone models).
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model inputs and real-world conditions. " '
The same complexity that theoretically might allow for more
accurate simulations can compound these input data problems. '17
Intensive field studies may be necessary to provide observational
databases sufficiently robust to execute models and evaluate their
performance. Air districts, however, cannot afford to generate such data
on a routine basis. Typically, they can only monitor one or a few ozone
episodes"8 comprehensively enough to provide modeling input data, and
they therefore must base their selection of an ozone event to model
partly upon data availability."9 SIP planners should, in theory, base their
simulations on worst-case ozone events, but the few actual episodes for
which data are available may not capture natural variability. As a result,
those data may be neither spatially nor temporally representative of the
conditions in need of analysis.'
Data limitations can also limit the ability of modelers to determine
how well their models are working. For example, air quality models
provide output in the form of predicted pollutant concentrations for
large areas over extended periods of time.'2 ' Monitors, however, measure
concentrations at points in space; no monitor has yet been deployed that
can measure air quality at the volumes represented by the grid system of
116. See Fine et al., supra note 12, at 68 ("Observational data collected to initialize the modeling
system, provide boundary conditions, and evaluate model performance have uncertainties due to
limited characterization of their spatial and temporal variability. Observational data also have
uncertainties caused by monitoring equipment, user error, or monitoring network design."). Monitors
also may be sited to measure peak, rather than representative, concentrations. NARSTO, supra note
12, at 4-8 (stating that "some VOC and NOx monitors have been sited to obtain maximum source-
oriented concentrations and hence are clearly not representative of grid-cell averages").
117. See Fine et al., supra note 12, at 65 (noting that the more complex, three-dimensional
"Eulerian" models require more complete input data to initialize the modeling system and to evaluate
model performance).
118. An "ozone episode" or "ozone event" is a period of particularly high ozone concentrations.
II9. The planning process reviewed in our case study involved full PAQSM simulation of one
episode that occurred August 2-6, 199o. The episode did not represent the most severe observed
ozone conditions; four times over the previous three years, the air district had measured
concentrations of 170 ppb or higher. ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at 1-2; see also CALIFORNIA AIR
RESOURCES BOARD, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF SAQM IN CENTRAL CALIFORNIA AND ATrAINMENT
DEMONSTRATION FOR THE AUGUST 3-6, 1990 OZONE EPISODE (1996).
120. See Fine et al., supra note 12, at 73.
With few exceptions ... neither the modeling systems nor the air quality planning efforts
using modeling tools have incorporated representations of variability. At the modeling
system level, emissions and meteorology are not characterized probabilistically. At the
planning level, the few simulated ozone episodes may not represent the myriad conditions
capable of causing violations of ozone air quality standards.
Id.
121. See id. at 69 ("Measurements taken at one or several points within a grid cell typically
represent volumes on the order of tens of cubic meters. Modeled concentrations are grid-cell averages
for volumes ranging up to several hundred cubic kilometers."); BCCA Appeal Group v. NRDC, 355
F.3d 817, 832 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting this incommensurability problem, and deferring to EPA's choice
to measure compliance at grid rather than measuring point scale).
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a modeling domain. Therefore, to evaluate model performance,
modelers must compare volume-averaged predictions with point
measurements that may not be representative of the modeled volume.'22
Such differences between the forms of model predictions and
observations gathered in the real world confound the evaluation of
model performance.
e. Opacity
Although the complexity of models may improve their
representation of the real world, it also increases their opacity, hindering
modelers' efforts to detect and correct errors. Complexity makes it
difficult to "see" what happens within the model by making it more
difficult to detect compensating errors or biases within the simulation.'23
Complexity also can prevent formal "Gaussian" error propagation
analysis.'24  Analytical error propagation is tractable when the
mathematical relationships are relatively simple and the variables are not
interdependent, but air pollution models often involve covarying input
variables, which often are related through complex mathematical
functions, and complex and incommensurate uncertainties.'25 As a result,
mathematical error analysis is often impossible."6 Some methods do exist
for exploring uncertainties in photochemical air quality simulation model
(PAQSM) outputs, but no one has yet figured out how to make practical
use of them for decision-making.' 7 Consequently, the complexity of the
models can leave modelers without effective methods for formally or
informally evaluating the effect of input errors on model predictions, and
quantitative and comprehensive information about the reliability of
modeling results is quite limited and incomplete, if available at all.
2. Subjectivity
Models are limited by more than just inherent uncertainties in their
formulation and input data."' Modeling is fundamentally a very human
122. See NARSTO, supra note 12, at 4-8 (discussing the incommensurability problem).
123. Compensating errors are errors that offset each other, thereby making a model appear more
accurate than it really is.
124. See MORGAN & HENRION, supra note io, at 183 ("For all except the simplest cases, such as
linear combinations of normal variables, exact analytic methods for propagation of uncertainty are
intractable or require elaborate numerical integration ....").
125. An example of incommensurability involves the use of observed parameters to evaluate the
accuracy of model-calculated parameters. For example, grid-based models produce grid-cell average
ambient pollutant concentrations, whereas observed pollutant concentrations represent one or several
monitoring points. Thus, these two values describe the same parameter- ambient pollutant
concentrations-but represent different spatial scales. See NARSTO, supra note 12, at 4-8 (discussing
incommensurability and methods for managing it).
126. See MORGAN & HENRION, supra note Io, at 175-76 (defining Gaussian error analysis); id. at
172-219 (providing a general discussion of the analysis of error in model outputs due to input errors,
including both exact analytical and approximation techniques).
127. See Fine et al., supra note 12, at 98 (stating that such an approach should be developed).
128. GREENBERGER ET AL., supra note 42, at 84 ("Like any tool, its effectiveness is governed by the
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process, and the assumptions, beliefs, and objectives of the modelers
affect the accuracy of model predictions and the effectiveness of model-
based planning."9 To some extent, subjectivity is a direct result of
uncertainty; modelers have to fill in information gaps with their own
judgments. In other ways, however, the subjectivity provides an entirely
new source of model limitations, for, despite their best efforts to exercise
good judgment, modelers' subjective decisions can compound
uncertainty problems and lead to results that are neither objective nor
accurate. The following discussion highlights several important sources
of subjectivity in modeling.
a. Model Selection
The choice of a modeling system often involves subjective judgment.
Different models produce different results, and some are better than
others at simulating certain processes or quantifying types of risk.'30 Since
all air quality models are inherently uncertain and difficult to validate or
verify, however, determining whether a model is acceptable for use can
be challenging.'3' The choice of a model will depend at least in part upon
the modelers' beliefs about which kinds of error are most likely to be
problematic and about what levels of risk and error are, or should be,
socially acceptable.'32
Regulators often seek, through formal guidance, to reduce the
subjectivity associated with model selection. EPA and the California Air
skill and expertise of its user. Conversely, its use and development can help build skill and expertise.").
129. See generally Dura Auto. Sys. of Ind., Inc. v. CTS Corp., 285 F.3d 6o9, 615-16 (7th Cir. 2002)
(noting that modeling inherently involves the exercise of professional discretion, and refusing to allow
expert testimony from a scientist who used modeling results without having knowledge of the way that
professional discretion was exercised).
130. See M. LUNDEN ET AL., DEPT. OF ENERGY, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE AIR QUALITY MODELING
EFFORTS IN SOUTHWEST WYOMING, VII-2 to VII-3 (1999) (discussing the trade-offs of using point source
dispersion versus gridded modeling formulations); Russell, supra note i13, at 542-50 (discussing
different formulations in use and their relative benefits). Modelers also may have to choose when a
model is ready for use; development of a model is generally an iterative process, and modelers often
must decide when deadlines prevent further improvement of the model. See ROTH ET AL., supra note
41, at I ("At any juncture a decision to apply a model is a decision to take advantage of the model's
capabilities at its current stage of development."); JAMES FINE, THE ENDS OF UNCERTAINTY: AIR
QUALITY SCIENCE AND PLANNING IN CENTRAL CALIFORNIA 298 (2003), available at http://www.osti.gov/
energycitations/product.biblio.jsp?osti-id=822267 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ernest Orlando
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory) [hereinafter "THE ENDS OF UNCERTAINTY"] (quoting Scott
Nester, Planner at the SJVUAPCD ("[W]e're under a sanctioned timeline to produce a plan that
includes modeling. In essence, we don't have the luxury of time, we don't have unlimited resources.
We're going to go with what we've got when it comes down to it.")).
131. McGarity and Wagner conclude that courts have showed relatively little deference to agency
selections of particular models. See McGarity & Wagner, supra note 13, at 10759.
132. See Fine et al., supra note 12, at 70 ("If more than one algorithm is available and appropriate,
choosing one inevitably means accepting some uncertainties over others."); Oreskes et al., supra note
I I, at 642 (noting that sometimes more than one model can produce an apparent fit with observational




Resources Board (CARB), for example, issue guidance on what models
to use, how to use them, and what constitutes acceptable performance.'33
The criteria, however, also are the product of policy choices; they
represent compromises between the level of performance regulators
believe is needed and the level they believe, based on past experience, is
possible.'34 Thus, even when standardized guidelines help decide which
models are used, the process of model acceptance through performance
evaluation depends upon accepted political and social norms.'35
Furthermore, these evaluations of possible and actual performance may
be skewed by the fact that models are often "tuned" in an attempt to
improve the fit between modeled outputs and observational data.' This




Perhaps the most obvious source of subjectivity is the need for
models to incorporate assumptions. Modelers lack complete data and are
not omniscient. They must make assumptions about present, future, and
even past environmental conditions, about interactions between physical,
social and economic systems, and even about human behavior.8 The
133. See, e.g., EPA, GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF MODELED RESULTS TO DEMONSTRATE ATTAINMENT OF
THE OZONE NAAQS (1996); EPA, GUIDELINE FOR REGULATORY APPLICATION OF THE URBAN AIRSHED
MODEL (I99I); EPA, GUIDELINE ON AIR QUALITY MODELS (REVISED) AND SUPPLEMENT A (1987); EPA
AND CALIFORNIA AIR RES. BD., PROTOCOL FOR DETERMINING THE BEST PERFORMING MODEL (1992).
134. See NARSTO, supra note 12, at 4-7 (noting that the basis for selecting performance standards
"appears to be historical" (i.e., they reflect the range of model performance that air quality models
have typically achieved for [ozone])).
135. More useful evaluative criteria for determining the acceptability of a given modeling
application for decision-making would consider what is intended to be learned by the modeling effort.
See Fine et al., supra note 12, at 77 (discussing how such need-based criteria could work).
136. Modelers "tune" a model by adjusting it to produce outcomes more consistent with expected
results. While the practice can produce more realistic outcomes, it also can mask both deficiencies in
the model and flaws in modeling assumptions.
137. See Fine et al., supra note 12, at 90 ("In general, model tuning should be avoided. Scientific
principals should determine how best to represent atmospheric processes and to develop model
inputs."); Oreskes, supra note I I, at 643 (stating that "models almost invariably need additional tuning
during the so-called verification phase").
138. See McGarity & Wagner, supra note 13, at 1o763 ("Since models are placeholders for reality,
they necessarily involve assumptions about the real world."). The processes of gathering data and
transforming data into a form suitable for model use are also likely to involve subjective judgments,
and because modelers often do not gather their own data, the modeler may not even know that these
judgments have taken place. See Interview with Lynn Terry, Deputy Executive Officer, CARB (Sept.
12, 2001). Ms. Terry oversees plan development and a staff of air quality modelers. She spoke of her
reservations about modeling input data on anticipated population and economic growth and land use
changes, which are provided by councils of government based upon their own models:
I have concerns about [COGs'] models being black boxes. Whereas for air quality models
we have plenty of people who know the ins and outs and can run them independently, we
just haven't had the resources to look at what they're doing and what they're giving us.




level of air pollutant emissions, for example, is connected to overall
economic activity, so modeled simulations must incorporate assumptions
about economic growth. Driving patterns also affect pollutant emissions,
and air quality simulations therefore must incorporate predictions about
what, where, and when people will be driving.'39 These and many other
assumptions may be informed by past experience, but ultimately
modelers must make some subjective judgments, even if only to assume
that past experience will be repeated.4 ° As a result, any modeling
prediction is partly the product of the intuition and judgment of the
modeler.
c. Results Communication
Finally, modelers may introduce subjectivity into the planning
process through their means of communicating their results. 4' Modeling
predictions, and the caveats that should go with those predictions, are
not likely to be inherently comprehensible by either planners or the
public. Moreover, if non-modelers are to understand the uncertainties
associated with a modeled prediction, they may need to know something
about the modeling process, an understanding gained only through the
modeler's description. Determining what to include in that description,
however, introduces an element of subjectivity. If predictions are
provided without associated discussion of assumptions and uncertainties,
modelers will implicitly convey an air of certainty, and will leave non-
modelers without information necessary to evaluate the reliability of
modeling results.'" If, however, the modelers choose to describe in some
detail the limitations of their predicted results, that description still may
emphasize selectively the uncertainties believed to be most important or,
at least, most amendable to quantification. Some information and
experiential knowledge will be lost in the translation, and the
communication of results will introduce one more element of subjectivity
(and, indeed, uncertainty) into the modeling process.
139. The EPA provides guidance and tools for estimating past, present and future motor vehicle
emissions. The primary tool of choice is yet another model, MOBILE (currently up to version 6),
which can be found at http://www.epa.gov/otaqfm6.htm (last visited on Apr. 8, 2004). For EPA
guidance on developing motor vehicle emissions estimates, see EPA, Procedure for Emission
Inventory Preparation- Volume IV: Mobile Sources (1992), at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/invntory.htm.
(last visited Mar. 7, 2005). For an excellent review of the MOBILE model, see NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD, MODELING MOBILE SOURCE EMISSIONS (2000), available at
http://books.nap.edu/catalog/9857.html. (last visited Mar. 7, 2005).
140. See generally Fine et al., supra note 12, at 68.
141. See GREENBERGER ET AL., supra note 42, at 8i ("The modeler often dominates the model.
Therefore, the modeler is in the powerful role of mediator between model and decision maker. A
modeler's expertise and authority, which both may be enhanced or acquired by the model itself, is
often as or more persuasive than the model.").
142. See generally Robert Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk
Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103, 158-61 (noting a similar problem, and its anti-democratic
implications, with quantitative risk assessment).
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Even if modelers do try to communicate uncertainty, their words
may fall on unreceptive ears. The decision-makers who use the modeling
results, rather than the modelers, often lack interest in uncertainty
assessment and communication. Highlighting uncertainties associated
with the technical basis for decisions can make the job of defending
decisions more difficult, and decision-makers-and the attorneys who
will ultimately represent them-may be reluctant to hear information
that might undermine the certainty of their decisions. 143
d. Underprediction: the Outcome of Uncertainty and
Subjectivity
If modeling was only uncertain, but still objective, we might expect a
range of outcomes, with some models overestimating air pollution gains
and others producing underestimations. Instead, air quality models have
consistently overestimated air quality gains, and most ozone SIPs,
despite predictions of compliance, have not yielded attainment.'" The
obvious skewing is not random, suggesting that there is bias inherent in
the modeling results or the translation of those results to decisions. Such
skewing may result from modelers' reluctance to force difficult policy
choices, from modelers' chronic underestimation of anticipated
emissions, from failures in rule enforcement, or other causes. But
whatever the cause, the unfortunate reality is that air quality models
persistently predict cleaner air than is actually achieved.
B. IMPLICATIONS OF MODEL LIMITATIONS ON PLANNING PROCESSES
As a result of these limitations, model-based planning, even when
conducted by talented and dedicated modelers and planners, cannot
comport with a classical vision of unbiased, politically disinterested
expert-based planning, and instead is well worthy of public involvement,
oversight and critique. Unfortunately, some of the same characteristics
that make model-based planning uncertain and subjective also limit
public involvement.
i. Complexity and the Black Box Problem
The complexity of models is a primary obstacle to participation.
143. Commenting on an early draft of this paper, Steve Ziman wrote, "Modelers are willing to
accept what is politically ok, and the decision-makers will use any answer so long as it is the answer
they want." He stated that the problem of uncertainty communication derives from "decision-makers
who don't want to acknowledge the limitations and factor them into the use of [modeling] results."
Steve Ziman, comments on draft of this Article (on file with the authors).
144. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (discussing continuing problems with
nonattainment); DEMERJIAN ET AL., supra note Io8, at II-Io ("It is crucial to recognize that the history
of air quality projections using PAQSMs is one of consistently overestimating the reductions in peak
ozone concentrations that are to be realized in a specified period of time."); THE ENDS OF
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 13o, at 301 (quoting Evan Shipp, meteorologist at the SJVUAPCD: "I have
some experience outside of the [San Joaquin] Valley. I have an idea of the way the SIP planning goes,
because I've been through three or four SIPs. We didn't make attainment in any one of those SIPs.").
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Whereas an expert, through dedicated study, can come to appreciate the
nuances of modeling and modeling results, a lay-person cannot be
reasonably expected to comprehend the inner workings of models
sufficiently to engage in meaningful critique. Unless she receives a
cogent explanation, in lay terms, of the model's use, she will be left with
the choice of simply accepting or rejecting the modeling results. 4 ' The
model itself will remain a black box, with its inner workings concealed
and the process by which it produces results beyond the scope of
debate.'46
Effective communication of modeling issues might ameliorate these
problems, but such communication rarely occurs.147 Explaining the uses
of models is challenging, and even if planners genuinely attempt to
explain models to the public, providing such an explanation can be
difficult. The complexities of models are hard to discuss in simple terms.
The chances of modelers being sufficiently technically savvy, diligent,
patient, and creative to effectively explain models are slim, especially
when they are working under time constraints or when their supervisors
do not request this addition information.
2. Concealed Uncertainties
In addition to making the planning process less approachable, the
use of models conceals uncertainties. Apparently precise model
predictions may not be qualified by any discussion of a possible error
range; even if modelers are able to create a range-of-error prediction-
and often they are not-this information does nothing to enhance pubic
understanding if it is not disclosed.' 4 Moreover, a simple output
prediction may be unaccompanied by specific discussion of the myriad
sources of uncertainty that affect model inputs and model processes, and
a non-savvy observer may have no way of finding the sources of
145. See SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FirFU BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICYMAKERS I (199o)
(noting that some people will distrust processes they do not understand).
146. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at 158-62.
147. Often, planners will have limited incentive to engage in such communication, for the process
may proceed more smoothly if potential adversaries do not understand models. See id. at 132, 16o
(observing that technical decisionmaking processes can exclude the public and "focus government
power in the hands of the few who can understand or participate in the process"). This problem is
especially acute where planning processes have followed a decide-announce-defend model, in which
the agency decides its proposed course of action behind closed doors rather than in collaboration with
public participants and then seeks only to defend its choice. See id. at i6O-61 (describing decide-
announce-defend processes); Judith Hendry, Decide, Announce, Defend: Turning the NEPA Process
into an Advocacy Tool Rather than a Decision-Making Tool, in COMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING Ioo (Stephen P. Depoe et al. eds., 2004) ("This
'decide, announce, defend' strategy undermines the intent of NEPA by viewing public participation as
an end rather than as a means to decision making and the NEPA process as merely an instrument to
validate a priori decisions."). However, while exclusionary motivations may exacerbate the problems
we describe, problems occur even when planners attempt to facilitate or solicit public involvement.
148. See infra Section IV (discussing insufficient disclosure of uncertainties).
May 2005]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
uncertainty.49 Finally, even if the sources of error are apparent, an
observer may have difficulty connecting modeling uncertainty to decision
risks; they may not know, for example, whether a particular uncertainty
is likely to lead to over- or under-regulation.
3. Concealed Judgments and Policy Choices
In addition to concealing uncertainty, the complexity of models
prevents publit. participants from knowing the subjective decisions and
policy choices made by planners and modelers during the modeling
process. Public participants may be unaware, for example, of the criteria
used to select a "representative" event for simulation,' ° even though
they might question whether that event was sufficiently representative.
Public participants also may not know the details of assumptions about
future economic growth or about the effectiveness of untested emissions
controls.'5' Modelers routinely use their judgment to make corrections
during a modeling simulation, but public participants not savvy about
modeling methods will be unaware of the influence of the modeler.'52
Judgment and policy choices must enter the modeling process at several
stages, but a simple prediction of attainment may be unaccompanied by
meaningful discussion of the assumptions upon which it is based.
4. Relocation of Negotiation and Decision-making
Due to lack of public awareness, debates about the implications of
uncertainties, judgments, and policy choices associated with modeling
tend to be relocated to forums with technically savvy participants.'53 In
scoping meetings with the lay public, such discussions are unlikely to
occur or to be effective, for participants rarely have the scientific
knowledge necessary to engage the agency in a productive dialogue.
Within the technically sophisticated advisory groups that often assist air
quality planners, however, such discussions are possible, and indeed are
far more likely to Occur.'54 Unfortunately, those technical advisory groups
149. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at 158-62 (discussing the implications of concealed uncertainties).
I5o. Modelers typically predict future plan performance by simulating how the proposed plan
would fare if a past meteorological event repeats itself. The past event is referred to as the
"representative" event.
I. See, e.g., infra Part IV. Among modelers the authors spoke to, there is a common belief that
applicable law does not allow for model uncertainty information to be provided. We disagree with that
conventional wisdom; in fact, EPA's current modeling guidance specifically states that modelers
should attempt to obtain uncertainty information and provide it to decisionmakers. Requirements for
Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 58 Fed. Reg. 38,816, 38,840-41 (July
20, 1993) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 260, and 266). The confusion may result from the fact
that that same guidance expressly declines to provide the decisionmaker with any directive about how
to use the uncertainty information. Id. As a result, decisionmakers may be reluctant to receive from
modelers information that they don't know how to utilize.
152. See, e.g., infra Part IV.
153. See, e.g., id.
54. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at t30-31.
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are not a representative cross-section of the public; industry, which has
the time and money to develop the requisite level of expertise, and other
regulators are disproportionately likely to be present.' 5 As proxies,
regulators may try to represent the full spectrum of public interests, but
when members of the general public or public interest groups'6 are not
present, concerns unanticipated by the regulators may never be raised.'57
Additionally, regulators, who are typically trained to play a balanced
role, may be reluctant to advocate unrepresented stakeholder interests.
Where dialogue about uncertainties, judgments, and policy choices does
occur, it is likely to be within a closed group, and some public concerns
may receive insufficient attention.
5. A Confluence of Participation Problems: the Signal-to-Noise
Problem
In practice, participation problems often coincide and may combine
to foreclose public dialogue about important planning decisions. The
signal-to-noise issue provides one example of this problem. One way to
establish just how reliable a model needs to be is to compare a model's
signal-that is, the needed or predicted level of change in pollutant
concentrations-with its noise, which, in modeling parlance, refers to the
error range of the prediction.'5 For example, a model may predict that
emissions controls will produce a central estimate peak i-hour
concentration of ii9 ppb (parts per billion), but the prediction might
have an error range, using a 95 percent confidence interval, of +/- 20 ppb.
Now suppose that EPA's regulatory standard requires that the peak I-
hour ozone concentration not exceed 120 ppb. In one sense, the model
has predicted compliance; the I i9 ppb concentration is below the
standard. In another sense, however, compliance may be illusory, for
values above the standard fall within the prediction's expected range of
error. The prediction, in effect, is that the concentration is quite likely to
be between 99 ppb and I39 ppb, with a greater likelihood of an outcome
near the center of that range and with a significant, troubling likelihood
155. See id. at 132; see, e.g., infra Part IV (describing the imbalanced composition of advisory
committees).
156. Public interest groups may, of course, have agendas that are not consistent with, or only
partially representative of, the diverse interests of the general public. See generally OLSON, supra note
8 (discussing the limitations of groups as proxy representatives of public interests); THEODORE J. LowI,
THE END OF LIBERALISM 86-95 (1969) (raising similar doubts about the ability of interest groups to
represent the general public). But even if public interest or community groups are imperfect public
representatives, their presence can make the decisionmaking more representative than if composed
only of regulators and private industry representatives.
157. See Simon, supra note 75 (noting that often the public surprises regulators with its concerns,
and that these surprises are often important contributions to the decision-making process).
158. Unfortunately, the comparison of signal with noise is not formally required as part of model
performance evaluation. Instead, regulatory guidance for PAQSM performance evaluation relies upon
comparison of predicted and observed ozone.
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that the outcome will violate the standard.'59
Nothing in the Clean Air Act instructs planners on how to deal with
this scenario.' The act requires planners to demonstrate compliance but
does not specify the requisite level of confidence to be ascribed to the
demonstration. Likewise, EPA's current regulatory guidance suggests
that using a best estimate is appropriate, but expressly declines to
endorse this approach. 6, In lieu of clear legal guidance, the response to
uncertainties becomes a policy choice. It is, quite obviously, a choice in
which the public has an enormous stake, since ultimately it concerns the
level of risk people are willing to accept."' Nevertheless, if uncertainty is
shrouded by the modeling, technically savvy participants will be the only
ones discussing the decision. For the public, the dialogue and the policy
choice will be concealed.
C. AFFECTED GROUPS
To some extent, models make participation more difficult for
everyone. They present obstacles of time, finances and expertise even to
environmental and industry groups with technical staff. However, the
burden does not fall upon all parties equally, 6' and the effects on three
rather different groups merit particular concern.
I. Planners
The first affected group is planners. Planners are responsible for
translating modeling into policy. Although they often work closely with
modelers, they don't always understand the details of modeling, and in
planner-modeler communications information is often lost. This lack of
understanding obviously can have detrimental consequences for planning
efforts; planners may fail to compensate for uncertainty, or fail to
consider substituting their own, potentially better-informed, policy
judgments for those of the modelers.
Information regarding assumptions and uncertainty that is not
conveyed to or understood by the planners is even less likely to reach the
public. Typically it is the planners, not the modelers, who prepare the
159. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at 158-59 (emphasizing that the public should receive information
about error ranges); see also Granger Morgan, The Neglected Art of Bounding Analysis, ENVTL. ScI. &
TECH. 162A-i6 4 A (Apr. II, 2001).
16o. The Clean Air Act requires a demonstration of attainment, but what that means in terms of
certainty is far from self-evident.
161. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 58 Fed.
Reg. 38,816,38,840-41 (EPA, July 20, 1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 26o & 266).
162. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at 158-62.
163. See generally Croley, supra note 78, at 119-35. Croley hypothesizes that cost and complexity
will deter participation by those who lack money, and that regulated industries' heightened interests in
rulemaking processes will lead to greater participation. Croley then analyzes existing data on
participation in administrative processes and concludes that the overwhelming majority of
participation does come from regulated industry. Id; see also Kuehn, supra note 142, at 130-32.
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documentation available for public review, and who review and respond
to public criticism. If planners are unaware of uncertainties and
concealed policy choices, the public dialogue will be limited by ignorance
on all sides.
2. Judicial Review
The second key affected group is judges. A judge who would object
to the way a model was used must find flaws so serious that the model
use was either procedurally defective or substantively arbitrary and
capricious, and is unlikely to make such a finding unless she is confident
in her understanding of the agency's use of the model.' 64 Such
understanding is difficult for a time-pressed, non-scientifically expert
judge to develop, and, unsurprisingly, judicial objections to uses of
models are rare."
To some extent, the rarity of such objections is appropriate; our
administrative law system is predicated on the notion that judges should
not usurp the role of technical experts.' 66 Moreover, to the extent that
public participants are advocating more stringent regulation, those
participants may welcome limited judicial review, for in practice most
litigation against model-based decisions has been instigated by
industry.'6 ' Nevertheless, hamstrung judicial review also has troubling
ramifications. Judges are important guarantors of a reasonable
administrative process, and while they are expected to show deference to
agency judgment, that deference should not arise out of ignorance or
confusion.' Likewise, if judges only partially understand model-based
decisions, they may be overly receptive to criticisms of those decisions,
and agencies may find their actions overturned even where deference
would be appropriate.'6 Where the opacity of modeling undermines
164. Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(explaining the circumstances under which a judge will overturn the use of a model).
165. Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 28 F.3 d 1259, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1994), stands as a rare example of
judicial willingness to invalidate the use of a model for substantive insufficiency; Appalachian Power
Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1031, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 2ooi), and Lands Council v. Forester of Region One of the
U.S. Forest Serv., 395 F.3d 1019, 1031-32 (9th Cir. 2004), provide similarly rare examples of a remand
because of insufficient explanation of a model. See generally McGarity & Wagner, supra note 13
(documenting cases in which model-based decisions have been overturned, and observing that courts
in general have accorded model-based decisions deferential review).
I66. See, e.g., New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("It is well established that
when a court is reviewing predictions within an agency's area of special expertise, at the frontiers of
science, the 'court must generally be at its most deferential.' . . . Acceptance or rejection of a particular
air pollution model and the results obtained from it are interpretations of scientific evidence.")
(emphasis added).
167. See McGarity & Wagner, supra note 13 (summarizing cases).
168. See Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n, 28 F.3d at 1265 ("If we are to earn our keep, however, judicial
deference to the agency's modeling cannot be utterly boundless.").
169. As McGarity and Wagner point out, clearer discussion of modeling limitations can also
facilitate reversals by judicial panels motivated by hostility to the agency's policy goals. McGarity &
Wagner, supra note 13, at 10771. Nevertheless, they argue that clearer discussions will generally
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judges' ability to understand decision-making processes, that opacity will
limit judicial capacity to separate the rational from the irrational.
3. Economically Disadvantaged Communities
The poor are especially impacted.'7" The ability to critique a model
requires a level of education, time and expertise unlikely to be found in
the average layperson."' Such a layperson might be able to educate
himself and thus understand and criticize the model, or, far more
plausibly, might retain an expert or attempt to participate through the
proxy services of an advocacy or lobbying organization. But either
method of participation requires time or money; for the person who lacks
both, a model-based decision-making process will remain inaccessible.'72
In air quality planning, this lack of accessibility is deeply problematic.
The existence of a nexus between air pollution planning and
environmental injustice is a matter of substantial research and debate.
While many studies document connections between air pollution and
disparately harsh effects upon poor and/or minority groups, the ties
between race, affluence, and exposure are not clear for the pollutants
that planners have been persistently unable to address-ozone and
particulate matter. Several studies suggest that poor and minority
populations are particularly likely to live in areas not meeting ambient
air quality standards, but these studies often use county-level attainment
data, and thus treat as uniform areas where pollutant concentrations may
in fact vary widely on a local scale. '73 Some local studies indicate that,
provide agencies with greater insulation from, rather than increased vulnerability to, judicial reversals.
170. See generally Kuehn, supra note 142. Kuehn discusses similar problems with quantitative risk
assessment, another commonly used form of modeling, and argues that increased use of quantitative
risk assessment will exacerbate environmental injustice.
The result of reliance on risk assessment, therefore, is a process that is both less
democratic-because understanding and critiquing risk assessments are beyond the
technical and financial resources of almost all citizens-and more oligarchic, because it
tends to focus government power in the hands of the few who can understand or participate
in the process. Much of the support for regulatory reform, such as risk assessment and cost-
benefit analysis, may be viewed as an attempt to shift the basis of regulation away from
democratic modes of public decision making and toward more technocratic, expert-based
modes.
Id. at 132 (citations omitted).
171. See id. at 130-31 (discussing the difficulties faced by a layperson seeking to understand or
critique a quantitative risk assessment).
172. See id. at 131 (noting that agency staff tend to doubt the accuracy of citizen information, and
prefer dealing with technically knowledgeable participants). Low-income communities are likely to
contain few people with the expertise necessary to understand why a proposed SIP might be worth
criticizing. Since very few people have the technical training or time to critique a model on their own,
those seeking to criticize a model must hire experts. But experts are expensive, and low-income
communities have few avenues for purchasing such representation.
173. See, e.g., AM. LUNG ASS'N OF CAL., IN THlE SPOTLIGHT, at http://www.californialung.org/
spotlight/envjustice.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2004). The website states:
Children living in low-income communities of color are also exposed to higher levels of
ozone air pollution. Ozone forms when emissions from motor vehicles, power plants and
other industries react with sunlight. Nearly 62 percent of African American children, 7o
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even though ozone-precursor emissions are concentrated in urban areas,
the highest ozone concentrations tend to occur downwind in more
suburban and affluent areas. ' On the other hand, one of the most
problematic effects of ozone is exacerbation of asthma symptoms, and
asthma rates are typically higher in the poor urban areas with large
minority populations. Thus, even if exposure levels are not tied to race or
affluence, the effects of exposure may be skewed.
Regardless of whether poor and minority populations bear a
disproportionate share of the impacts of unsuccessful air quality
planning, the inescapable reality is that millions of poor people and
people of color do live in areas with heavy air pollution.'75 These
populations thus have strong stakes in air pollution planning, and when
plans fail disadvantaged groups -particularly the children and the
elderly-suffer. I, 6 For these reasons, minority and low-income individuals
ought to have the opportunity participate meaningfully in SIP planning
processes, and potential barriers to their participation are highly
problematic.
Agencies have several incentives to compensate for this potential for
exclusion. Many agency staff take very seriously the obligation to involve
and protect at-risk communities.'" In addition, agencies are under
executive '  and, potentially, judicial directives to consider the
percent of Latino children, and 70 percent of Asian American children live in areas that
exceed the ozone standard, compared to less than 51 percent of white children.
Id.; see also Feng Liu, Who Will Be Protected by EPA's New Ozone and Particulate Matter Standards?,
ENVjL. SCI. & TECH. 32A- 39A (Jan. I, 1998) (employing a county-level analysis and concluding that
disparate impacts do exist); CAIIEPA's OFFICE OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT & AM. LUNG
Ass'N OF CAL., AIR POLLUTION AND CHILDREN'S HEALTH, at http://www.californialung.org/
downloads/dieseloio5oi/ ALA-OEHHA-children.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Air
Pollution and Children's Health].
174. See, e.g., Feng Liu, Urban Ozone Plumes and Population Distribution by Income and Race: a
Case Study of New York and Philadelphia, 46 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASS'N 207-15 (1996); AM. LUNG
ASS'N, TRENDS IN AIR QUALITY 4 (2002) (noting that "the highest ozone concentrations are typically
found at suburban sites because of the downwind transport of emissions from urban sites"), available
at http://www.lungusa.org/data/aqp/AQ i.pdf.
175. See, e.g., AM. LUNG Ass'N OF CAL., supra note 173.
176. See generally Kuehn, supra note 142, at 124 (noting that low-income, minority populations
generally include more children and that such populations also tend to be subjected to a wide range of
other health stresses, which in turn can increase vulnerability to environmental pollution); AIR
POLLUTION AND CHILDREN'S HEALTH, supra note 173.
177. See ERIC MARSH, STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT & PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AT THE U.S. EPA:
LESSONS LEARNED, BARRIERS, & INNOVATIVE APPROACHES (Jan. 2001), available at www.epa.gov/
publicinvolvement/pdf/sipp.pdf (describing efforts EPA has made to increase inclusiveness).
178. Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income
Populations, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. I, 1994). States endorsed similar policies rhetorically; the
California Air Resources Board, for example, trumpets its intent to incorporate environmental justice
concerns into its policymaking, and promises more extensive outreach to ensure inclusive decision-
making processes. See ARB's Community Health, at http://www.arb.ca.gov/ch/programs/programs.htm
(last visited May 14, 2004).
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environmental justice effects of their decisions.'79 These legal mandates,
however, are only likely to provide constraints upon agency actions in
situations involving either manifestly racial intent or egregiously
disparate impacts; most ozone planning processes are unlikely to involve
injustice stark enough to invite judicial remedy, '8' and indeed may
involve situations where impacts are shared relatively equally by all
segments of the general population. As a result, and as the following
section illustrates, models can have their most exclusionary effects upon
those who can least afford to be excluded, and who have few remedies
for that exclusion.
IV. MODELS AND PLANNING IN THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY
A. INTRODUCTION
In the early 199os, state and local regulators, in accordance with the
Federal Clean Air Act, began developing the San Joaquin Valley's (SJV)
portion of California's SIP. They faced a daunting challenge. The
topography and geography of the Valley create a natural sump for air
pollution, the Valley had a well-documented human-caused air quality
problem, and population was expected to double in just two decades.''
The modelers and planners had the resources for success, however. An
eighteen million dollar, multiple agency, multi-stakeholder research
effort had generated SARMAP, a state-of-the-science model.I82A robust
observational database supplied the model's input data."" The planning
teams and advisory committees included highly qualified experts who
had several decades experience dealing with air quality science and
planning elsewhere in California.
179. Although judicial enforcement of disparate impact environmental justice claims remain a
theoretical possibility, few such claims have achieved success. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J.
Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D.N.J. 2OO1); Brendan Cody, Note, South Camden Citizens
in Action: Siting Decisions, Disparate Impact Discrimination, and Section z983, 29 Ecology L.Q. 231
(2oo2) (noting that the series of South Camden decisions leaves potential plaintiffs with substantive
rights but no mechanism for enforcement, forcing them to rely on EPA's willingness to implement
regulations it has shown little inclination towards enforcing).
I8o. See Cody, supra note 179.
181. The California Department of Finance projects 7.3 million residents in the SJV by 2040. MARY
HElM ET AL., COUNTY POPULATION PROJECTIONS WITH AGE, SEX AND RAcE/ETHNIC DETAIL (t998),
available at http://www.dof.ca.gov/HTML/DEMOGRAP/Proj-age.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
182. ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note i5, at I-6 to 1-7.
183. The observational database was generated using routine monitoring stations augmented by
intensive measurements gathered during field campaigns conducted in July and August, 1990. CAL.
AIR RES. BD. & SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY UNIFIED AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DIST., SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY
AIR QUALITY STUDY POLICY-RELEVANT FINDINGS 4 (1996) ("During the field study, researchers took
continuous measurements of air pollutants and/or weather indicators at almost 400 surface and upper
air monitoring sites. When the analysis of these data indicated that a high ozone episode might be
building, the routine monitoring was augmented by aircraft flights and weather balloon releases from
25 sites .... ").
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Nevertheless, the planning effort failed. Though the models and
planners predicted attainment of the ozone standard by i999, '84 and
though their plans did succeed in generating significant emissions
reductions, air quality improvements have been slow,' and air quality in
the Valley still has not met federal or state standards. Recently, EPA
designated part of the SJV as a "severe" nonattainment region, with a
deadline for meeting the standard pushed back to 201o.' 86 At the request
of air quality regulators in the Valley, EPA then further downgraded the
Valley's status to "extreme.' ', 8  Moreover, this failure occurred in a
disappointingly undemocratic fashion. Despite the Clean Air Act's
mandate for public participation, the planning process involved only
regulators and advisory groups composed primarily of industry
representatives and technocrats from other government agencies. Public
interest groups, community groups, and individual members of the public
were mostly uninvolved.
In this section, we explore the story of the i99os planning process
and the ways in which models affected that process. We do not suggest
that successful planning could have occurred without models.
Nevertheless, we conclude that the model used to inform planning was
limited in several respects and ultimately failed to deliver reliable
predictions. Further, the ways in which planners used the modeling
results had the unfortunate impact of rendering the process both opaque
and inaccessible for public participation.
The story of the San Joaquin Valley thus illustrates many'sS of the
184. ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at ii, 1-2 (994).
I85. EPA concluded in 2ooi that there was "no significant" trend in peak ambient ozone
concentrations in any of the major cities of the SJV. OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND
STANDARDS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL AIR QUALITY AND EMISSIONS TRENDS
REPORT, SPECIAL STUDIES EDITION, 2003 APPENDIX A, TABLE A-16 (2003): OFFICE OF Ant QUALITY
PLANNING AND STANDARDS, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL AIR
QUALITY AND EMISSIONS TRENDS REPORT 141, r50, 170 (2003) (Bakersfield, Fresno, and Stockton
figures, respectively). The SJVUAPCD has a slightly different interpretation of progress.
SJVUAPCD, DRAFt 2002 AMENDMENT TO THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY OZONE PLAN 2-10 (2001)
("[T]here has been no improvement in decreasing annual maximum [for one-hour ozone]. However,
there has been considerable improvement in other statistics, particularly in the number of days and the
number of hours over the standard."). In the 2001 Triennial Progress Report, the SJVUAPCD
presented expected peak day concentration metrics that suggested considerable progress.
SJVUAPCD, CALIFORNIA CLEAN AIR ACT TRIENNIAL PROGRESS REPORT AND PLAN REVISION 1997-99 4
(Mar. 15, 2001) ("The [Expected Peak Day Concentration] for 17 of the 23 sites in the SJV [Air Basin]
decreased (some by only one part per billion), five out of 23 increased, and one site had data for only
1999.").
186. Clean Air Act Reclassification, San Joaquin Valley Nonattainment Area; Designation of East
Kern County Nonattainment Area and Extension of Attainment Date; California; Ozone, 66 Fed.
Reg. 56476 (Nov. 8, 200i).
187. Mark Grossi, Valley Seeks "Extreme" Air Polluter Designation, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 19, 2003, at
At, available at http://www.fresnobee.com/local/politics/story/7916689p-87934O7c.html.
I88. The San Joaquin Valley's story does not illustrate all of the problems discussed in Section III;
we offer this story to provide concrete examples of some potential problems rather than a thorough
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problems that can occur when planners must rely upon sophisticated
modeling.
B. THE SETTING AND THE STAKEHOLDERS
I. Geography and Pollution
West-bound drivers who navigate the passes of the Sierra Nevada
descend through pine and oak-covered foothills, winding to the floor of
California's Great Central Valley.' 89 Once covered with a lush mix of
wildlife-rich wetlands and Serengeti-like plains,1" the Central Valley's
broad, flat floor now supports growing cities, hundreds of small towns,
major highways, and millions of acres of agriculture. It is a huge area; the
entire Central Valley is approximately 450 miles long and 40 to 6o miles
wide, and the San Joaquin Valley-the focus of this case study-alone
includes eight counties covering approximately 27,000 square miles, an
area bigger than New Jersey. 9'
2. People, Economy, and History
The San Joaquin Valley has 3.3 million people living in several
major cities and in surrounding rural communities. 92 This population has
grown dramatically during the past few decades; more than half of the
current residents arrived after I970.193 Demographers expect growth to
continue, with the total population more than doubling by 2040.19
A high and growing percentage of that population is non-
Caucasian.'95 Projections from the California Department of Finance
indicate that by 2040 nearly 70 percent of the population will be minority
(Hispanic, Black, Asian, Pacific Islander, or American Indian).' 96 Many
of the Valley's residents also are relative newcomers to America; the
sampling of all the issues that may arise.
189. California Almanac, at http://www.netstate.com/states/geography/ca_.geography.htm (last
visited May 14, 2004).
19o. See MARK ARAX & RICK WARTZMAN, THE KING OF CALIFORNIA 46-86 (2003) (describing the
earlier history of the San Joaquin Valley and the draining of Tulare Lake); Mark Grossi, Rescuing the
San Joaquin, FRESNO BEE, June 20, 1999, at A1, available at http://www.fresnobee.com/man/
projects/savesjr/mainbar.html.
191. See Counting California, at http://countingcalifornia.cdlib.org (last visited May 14, 2004).
192. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population of Counties by Decennial Census, at
http://www.census.gov/population/cencounts/cai9oo9o.txt. For a description of one rural community
with many residents not counted in the U.S. Census, see JENNIFER SHERMAN ET AL., FINDING INVISIBLE
FARM WORKERS: THE PARLIER SURVEY 10 (1997).
193. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 192.
194. See note I81,supra.
195. The SJVUAPCD has a higher percentage of people who consider themselves Hispanic or
Latino than the San Francisco Bay Area or California overall. Note, however, that the U.S. Bureau of
Census considers Hispanics to be of any race. This assumption makes it difficult to estimate the
percentage of minorities in the SJV, because Hispanics may be considered white in the 2000 Census.
See U.S. Census Bureau, Hispanic Origin, at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/meta/long-68188.htm.
196. HElM ET AL., supra note 18s.
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Central Valley always has been a magnet for immigration, and for over a
century its fields have lured agricultural laborers from all over the world.
The Central Valley economy remains heavily dependant upon an influx
of laborers from Mexico and elsewhere.' 97
Relative to their fellow Californians, people in the SJV are poorer,
less employed, and less educated.' The median household income in the
SJV was $32,353 in 1997, which was I8 percent lower than the California
median of $39,595 and 37 percent below the San Francisco Bay Area
median of $51,687.' 9 More than twice as many people in the SJV live in
poverty as in the Bay Area.2"
This poverty derives largely from low wages and high
unemployment, occurring in spite of the Valley's spectacular agricultural
productivity. The SJV is the nation's most productive agricultural region,
producing $14.5 billion in agricultural products in i99920° Kern County is
the single most productive petroleum-producing county in the nation,
though its productive deposits are almost gone."' But these industries,
197. See DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE 218-27 (I985).
198. Based on data from the 2000 Census, there were 42 and 49 high school graduates per 100
people in California as a whole and in the San Francisco Bay Area, respectively, but only 32 per oo in
the SJV. Similarly, California and the Bay Area respectively have 13 and 18 college graduates per too
people, whereas in the SJV only 7 in too people have a college degree (calculated using county-
specific data from U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census, County Quick Facts, at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/). In addition, several indicators suggest that SJV residents have less
education and less access to health care than other Californians. They have fewer physicians and
hospital beds per capita, less adequate prenatal care, and a higher rate of births to adolescent mothers.
KENNETH W. UMBACH, A STATISTICAL TOUR OF CALIFORNIA'S GREAT CENTRAL VALLEY, Figs. 24, 25, 27,
29 (1997), available at http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/o9/.
199. 2o0o Census, County Quick Facts, supra note 198. One economic study of the SJV found that
real per capita income has declined from $21,700 in 1990 to $20,9oo in 2000 (in 20o0 dollars). TAPAN
MUNROE ET AL., EcONoMIc FORECAST FOR CALIFORNIA'S GREAT CENTRAL VALLEY 47 (2OO1), available at
http://www.greatvalley.org/publications/list.aspx.
200. 2000 Census, County Quick Facts, supra note 198. Poverty is defined by the U.S. Census in
terms of family income thresholds and as a function of household size and composition. For example, a
family consisting of a mother, father, two children and great-aunt had a poverty income threshold of
$21,665 in 2001. For a detailed definition, see the U.S. Census website, at http://www.census.gov/hhes/
poverty/povdef.html (last visited on Apr. 16, 2003).
201. NICOLAI KUMINOFF ET AL., THE MEASURE OF CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE 65 (2000), available at
http://aic.ucdavis.edu/pubs/moca.html.
202. No studies of petroleum employment exist for the SJV. James Parsons, a cultural geographer,
called petroleum the "kicker" in the regional economy, but other evidence suggests the petroleum
industry has done relatively little to create local jobs or wealth. Compare James Parsons, lecture, A
Geographer Looks at the San Joaquin Valley, 1987 Carl Sauer Memorial Lecturer (Apr. 30, 1986),
available at http://geography.berkeley.edu/ProjectsResources/Publications/Parsons-SauerLect.html
(contains slight revisions), with note 206, infra.
Kern County is the most productive county in California, generating two-thirds of all California
petroleum. In 1999. oil wells in Kern County produced over 5oo,ooo barrels of oil per day. The county
ranks behind only Texas (1. 4 million barrels per day), Louisiana (. 3 million barrels per day) and
Alaska (I million barrels per day) as the nation's most productive region. Although oil production in
Kern County has declined steadily since peak production of 424 billion barrels in 1985, it accounted
for 20o billion barrels, or 68% of the state's total production, in 2005. Cal. Dept. of Conservation,
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although vital to the region's economy, have not created regional wealth.
Unemployment in the SJV averaged 13.9 percent from 1990 to 2000,
almost double the California average of 7 percent. 3 Even for those who
are employed, the Valley's industries do not provide the same abundance
of high-wage employment as California's coastal areas. 4 Low-wage
agricultural jobs dominate employment in the SJV Though quite
visible, petroleum productionprovides relatively little employment in the
region, even in Kern County2
Although failing to bring widespread affluence, the San Joaquin
Valley's economy has traditionally provided great wealth to a select few,
a wealthy elite that has aggressively defended its good fortune.2"
Historically, businesses were closely connected to the power structure,
allowing the usually non-white poor °8 to be exploited and denied-
California Crude Oil Production Drop Continues (Jan. 28, 2003), at http://www.consrv.ca.gov/index/
news/2003%2oNews%2oReleases/NR2oo2-o2_OilandGasReport.htm; Ed Wilson et al., California Oil
and Gas Production Report (2003), available at http://www.consrv.ca.gov/DOG/pubs-stats/
pub_index.htm.
203. See MUNROE ET AL., supra note 199, at 12.
2O4- See id. at 15 ("Population-driven and cost-driven development activities that draw people and
businesses to the [San Joaquin Valley] for the low cost of doing business and the low cost of living
have created substantial economic growth through construction and retail jobs. Yet population-driven
and cost-driven development have not created many of the high paying jobs that increase real per
capita income (a key indicator of rising affluence in a region).").
205. In 2oo0, the University of California Agricultural Issues Center provided a comprehensive
assessment of the economics of agriculture in the SJV. The report estimates that agriculture
represented 32 percent of total income ($2o billion) and 37 percent of the jobs (466,519) in the SJV.
KUMINOFF, supra note 201, at lo7. Another estimate for 200o employment confirmed the importance
of farm employment and noted that employment in other sectors may also be due to agriculture.
MUNROE ET AL., supra note 199, at 7 ("Farming dominates the Central Valley economy with annual
production of over $16 billion per year. Direct farm employment in the region constitutes 12 percent
of total jobs; and addition 28 percent are in farm-related industries.").
2o6. Using census data and industrial classifications from a study sponsored by the Western States
Petroleum Association, we estimate that 5,400 jobs in Kern County were directly petroleum-related in
1999. See T. ANTHONY QUINN, THE SAN FRANCIsCO BAY PETROLEUM INDUsTRY: ECONOMIC IMPACT,
COMMUNITY VALUE (Apr. 2001), available at http://www.wspa.org/issues/ei.htm. This does not include
2,000 jobs at service stations. This total comprises only four percent of total employment in the county,
and a comparison of these numbers with, for example, the 6,ooo employees of the Internal Revenue
Processing Center in Fresno suggests that the petroleum industry does not play a major job-creating
role.
207. See, e.g., ARAx & WARTZMAN, supra note I9O (chronicling the rise of the Boswell family
empire, and describing how some other enterprising men also managed to make spectacular fortunes
in the valley).
208. With the brief exception of the real-life Tom Joads of the Great Depression, the Valley's
agricultural laboring class was almost never white. Growers tried importing one group after another,
with the rest of the nation rarely paying close attention except when the laborers were Dust-Bowl
refugee Okies. WORSTER, supra note 197, at 218-27. The growers finally settled upon Mexican laborer
to be what Worster describes as "the persistent presence, the dominated class, the despised race, the
men and women who made the water empire a success." Id. at 221. Similar demographic patterns
persist to this day; poverty rates remain higher for non-whites. E-mail from Deborah Reed, Public
Policy Institute of California, to authors (May 17, 2004) (containing a spreadsheet summarizing census
data showing poverty rates for different racial groups in San Joaquin Valley Counties).
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sometimes violently-safety and better pay.2" The Grapes of Wrath and
Cesar Chavez's boycotts represent just two of the many social and
cultural events that have helped turn San Joaquin Valley poverty and
repression into American legend, and scholars have long described the
Valley as a dystopian counterpoint to Jeffersonian democratic ideals."'
The dynamics of the past have become somewhat ameliorated."'
Nevertheless, the San Joaquin Valley remains a place where pro-business
leanings are a distinctive mark of the political culture," ' where
traditionally disadvantaged groups continue to comprise a
disproportionate percentage of the poor,213  where illegal labor
exploitation persists, and where efforts at environmental regulation have
often been thwarted in collisions with economic power. 4 The Valley's
current air quality planners are not the heirs of Steinbeck's villains; we
have no reason to suggest that the actors in the processes we describe
acted out of anything other than good faith. 5 Nevertheless, any
209. See, e.g., ARAX & WARTZMAN, supra note 190, at 137-76 (chronicling some of the labor battles
in the San Joaquin Valley's fields). The violence was not exclusively directed at the laborers; Arax and
Wartzman also describe incidents of vandalism and intimidation instigated by labor organizers.
210. JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH (1939); WORSTER, supra note 197, at 296-97
(discussing Chavez's strikes); see also CAREY MCWILLIAMS, FACTORIES IN THE FIELD: THE STORY OF
MIGRATORY FARM LABOR IN CALIFORNIA (Santa Barbara ed., 1971). In his particularly dark account,
Worster writes that
contrary to traditional rural ideals, a pronounced system of class relations, and of raw
exploitation of one class by another, existed out there ... the flowering of the West was,
and had to be if the dreams of absolute environmental conquest were to become reality, the
work of a dominated underclass of hired men and women.
WORSTER, supra note 197, at 217. Arax and Wartzman describe a somewhat more benign, but still
damning, history of paternalistic but still exploitative management-laborer relations somewhat
reminiscent of conditions in the Jim Crow South. ARAX & WARTZMAN, supra note 19o, at 137-76, 256-
85.
2t . For example, assimilation of Latinos into California politics has vastly improved. See Luis
ARTEAGA, THE LATINO VOTE 2000, at http://www.lif.org/civic/vote_2000.2.html (Oct. 2000) (examining
patterns in Latino political participation, and discussing reasons why that participation remains
somewhat low).
212. See Gary Polakovic, California's Smog Story is Tale of 2 States, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2001, at
B I (discussing both increasing focus on Latino-specific issues and the continuing pro-business climate
of the San Joaquin Valley and several other areas of inland California).
213. E-mail from Deborah Reed, supra note 208 (summarizing census data on race and poverty);
see DEBORAH REED, PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA, FALLING BELOW THE POVERTY LINE (Mar.
2002), at http://www.ppic.org/main/commentary.asp?i=249 (noting racial disparities in poverty levels);
Rollie Smith, Colonias in the San Joaquin Valley and the Q House, available at www.greatvalley.org/
htniomldocs/colonias.ppt (discussing disproportionately high poverty in small Hispanic communities).
214. Andy Furillo, Toiling Under Abuse: the Farmworkers' Struggle Goes on, SACRAMENTO BEE,
May 20, 2001, available at http://www.crlaf.org/200ibee.htm.
215. See Mark Grossi et al., Last Gasp, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 15, 2002, at I ("Valley air district staff
members have been pleading the dirty-air case for years ...."), available at http:l/www.fresnobee.com/
special/valley-air/parti/storyi/. Last Gasp is the cover story of a special section providing an
impressively comprehensive and insightful account of the San Joaquin Valley's air quality problems. In
both public hearings and in interviews to support this case study research, planning staff have been
consistently cooperative, earnest and forthcoming about the many challenges that they face.
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understanding of current patterns of political participation, and of the
political climate within which planners make their decisions, must be
informed by the area's historic political culture.
3. The Pollution Problem
A combination of topography, meteorology and human-caused
emissions creates among the nation's worst ambient air quality
conditions in the San Joaquin Valley.16 Prevailing winds from the San
Francisco Bay Area, home to io million people, blow east, carrying their
emissions into the Central Valley."' Once past the Coastal Mountain
Range, the winds gather more pollution from the Valley's growing cities
and towns. Local automobile traffic adds more emissions, as does the
steady stream of cars and trucks on highways 1-5, 1-8o, and State Route
99 .2n8 Industry - particularly agriculture"9  and petroleum - also
contributes. Nature supplies windblown dust and "biogenic" pollutant
emissions. Once in the Valley, all of this pollution can stagnate for
several days at a time," ° with the mountains that surround the valley
limiting its means of escape."
Climate makes matters worse. The entire Central Valley, for much
of the year, is swelteringly hot. In Fresno, the average maximum daily
temperature in July is 9 8.6F,"
' and the SJV averages 4o days per year
hotter than IooF.23 The sun also is unrelenting; on summer days
216. Id.; San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District, The Air Quality Mission,
available at http://www.valleyair.orglGeneralinfo/aboutdist.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
217. In the Attainment Plan, the SJVUAPCD placed great stress on these out-of-region sources,
repeatedly discussing studies that predicted that regulatory violations would occur in the northern SJV
even if within-valley sources were nonexistent. ATrAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at v-vii, 2-17 to 2-18,
3-It to 3-12, 5-I to 5-3. Others are skeptical about how much the valley's air pollution problem can be
blamed upon upwind sources. See Mark Grossi et al., Don't Blame San Francisco, FRESNO BEE, Dec.
15, 2003, at 5 ("Experts on both sides of the Coastal Range agree the Bay Area's smog is not the key
to the Valley's dirty-air problems. It never has been.").
218. See ATrAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at ii. Mobile sources contribute 47 and 40 percent,
respectively, of NOx and reactive organic gas (ROG) emissions estimated for I99o. Passenger autos
and light duty trucks (which include SUVs) contribute 2o and 27 percent of total NOx and ROG
emissions, respectively. See SJVUAPCD, DRAFT 2002 AMENDMENT TO THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY
OZONE PLAN (2002).
219. See Mark Grossi, Agriculture a Leading Polluter, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 15, 2002, at 15; Mark
Grossi, Cows Rival Cars as Smog Producers, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 15, 2002, at I7.
220. This case study discusses a period of elevated ozone concentrations observed in the San
Joaquin Valley. Such several-day events are referred to as "ozone episodes."
221. See GREAT VALLEY CENTER, THE STATE OF THE GREAT CENTRAL VALLEY OF CALIFORNIA 6,
available at http://www.greatvalley.org/publications/pub-detail.aspx?pld=78 (Apr. 4, 2001) ("The
geography that defines the Valley and which contributes to many of its positive attributes also creates
a collection point for air pollutants that originate from both from within the Valley and from the San
Francisco Bay Area."); Last Gasp, supra note 215.
222. See Cal. Dept. of Finance, Table A-5: Average Maximum, Minimum, and Annual
Temperatures (2001), available at http://countingcalifornia.cdlib.org/matrix/c28.html.




thunderheads often build over the Sierra Nevada, but skies in the Valley
usually remain cloudless. Heat and sunlight accelerate the chemical
processes that lead to high ozone concentrations,224 and the San Joaquin
Valley is thus a natural ozone-generating region."5
The Valley has experienced high ozone levels for years, and
dangerously high ozone levels had become regular phenomena even
before scientific studies began in earnest in the mid-I98os. 6 In i98o, for
example, a relatively sparse monitoring network measured 64 and 124
days, respectively, violating the federal and state ozone standards."7 To
put these conditions in perspective, the federal ozone standard allows for
an average of one violation per year of the i-hour concentration
threshold of 0. 12 ppm..2
The resulting pollution is unsightly. On summer days, smog engulfs
the Valley in an ugly brownish haze and migrates eastward into the
Sierra Nevada mountain range, obscuring the otherwise spectacular
vistas of Yosemite, Kings Canyon and Sequoia national parks and
damaging the health of forests on the Sierra Nevada's slopes." 9
% 2oProgress.pdf.
224. See EPA, Plain English Guide to the Clean Air Act, at http://www.epa.gov/airl
urbanair/ozone/what.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2004) (providing the following heuristic equation for
ozone formation: NOx + VOCs + Heat + Sunlight = Ozone. In reality, the relationships are more
complicated and nonlinear, but these are indeed the vital ingredients.).
225. Ozone is not the San Joaquin Valley's only air quality problem. Especially in winter, the
valley also has frequent violations of federal and state standards for particulate matter. See Last Gasp,
supra note 215; see also Air Resources Board, Top 4 Measurements and Days Above the Standard,
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/adam/cgi-bin/db2www/adamtop4b.d2w/start (providing air quality
data summaries by air basin or county) (last visited June 26, 2005).
226. Whitten et al., Application of the Urban Airshed Model to Kern County: Final Report I
(1985) ("During the three years form r982 through 1984, concentrations at the Edison monitoring
station exceeded the NAAQS for ozone (o.I2 ppm) on 19, 17, and 23 days, respectively."); see
SJVUAPCD, Amendment to the SJV Ozone Plan and Severe versus Extreme Nonattainment Area,
public workshop, Jan. 8, 9 and 16, 2002, slide numbers I, 12 and 13, available at http://
www.valleyair.org/Workshops/postings/oI-i6-o2/2002% 2oAmendment%2oPresentation.pdf; DONALD
BLUMENTHAL ET AL., SOUTH SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY OZONE STUDY: DRAFr FINAL REPORT iii (1985) (report
prepared by the Western Oil and Gas Association).
227. See California Air Resources Board (providing California state standards), at http://
www.arb.ca.gov/adamlcgi-binldb2www/adamtop4b.d2w/start (last visited Mar. 5, 2004).
228. EPA, National Ambient Air Quality Standards, at http://www.epa.gov/air/criteria.html (last
visited Mar. 5, 2004).
229. See SIERRA NEVADA ECOSYSTEM PROJECT, FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, ch. 9, at 136 (1996),
available at http://ceres.ca.gov/snep/pubs/web/vi/cho9/v-cho9_oi.html.
Southern airsheds on the west side [of the Sierra Nevada] are heavily impacted in spring,
summer and fall by ozone and small particles derived from Central Valley sources and have
some of the poorest air quality in the nation.... Extensive ozone damage occurs to
sensitive tree species in the southwest and central-western slopes.... Visibility is severely
degraded for much of the western slope during spring, summer and fall by fine particle
sulfates, nitrates, and smoke transported from the Central Valley.
Id.; Mark Grossi et al., Smog Lurks Even Up High, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 15, 2002, at 6; Polakovic, supra




The pollution is also costly and dangerous. Ozone is a photochemical
oxidant, and it reduces crop productivity and damages ecosystems.3'
Ozone also aggravates, and may contribute to the onset of, asthma; and
asthma rates in the San Joaquin Valley are astronomical.23' Non-
asthmatics also suffer; high ozone levels can place anyone at risk, causing
temporary irritation, shortness of breath, and, if exposures are repeated
over the long term, scarring of lung tissues and exacerbation of chronic
health problems."'
4. The Regulators
Federal, state, and local authorities all have responsibility for
managing air quality in the SJV. The jurisdictional boundaries between
these separate authorities are complex and not entirely intuitive, and
although the regulators endeavor to work together, planning processes
remain complicated by some balkanization of authority. 33 The interplay
of federal and state law further complicates the process. While federal
law primarily drives SIP planning, provisions of the California Clean Air
Act also affect the choices of air quality regulators.
EPA sets the air quality standards that regions must meet,
determining the ultimate goals of the SIP process. 34 EPA also directly
regulates some pollutant sources, and the nature of its regulations can
have profound effects upon the ability of local entities to meet the
federal air quality standards.35 In the Central Valley, for example, EPA's
regulations on small engines and interstate trucks have crucial effects
upon regional air quality.23 6 EPA also has the ultimate authority to
approve or reject state air quality plans, and thus controls the final
decision-making step in the air quality planning process. 37
The California Air Resources Board CARB) is California's
statewide air quality management agency. 3 It is responsible for
230. See ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at 1-1 ("It is estimated that the Valley's agricultural
crop losses exceed $150 million due to exposure to ozone.").
231. Rob McConnell et al., Asthma in Exercising Children Exposed to Ozone: A Cohort Study, 359
THE LANCET 386 (2002), available at http:l/www.niehs.nih.gov/centers/2002News/news4.htm (finding
increased asthma risk among children who exercised in areas with high ozone concentrations. The
study was jointly conducted by researchers from the University of Southern California, The National
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, and the California Air Resources Board); Barbara
Anderson, Asthma Steals Joys of Childhood, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 15, 2002, at 7.
232. See ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at i-i, iii; Barbara Anderson, Dirty Air Puts Everyone
at Risk, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 15, 2002, at i i.
233. See San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District, The Jurisdictional Puzzle,
available at http://www.valleyair.org/Generalinfo/aboutdist.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
234. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000); ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at 1-4.
235. See 42 U.S.C. § 7 511(b) (2000); ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at ii-iv.
236. ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note s5, at ii-iv.
237. 42 U.S.C. § 741o(k); ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at 1-4.
238. See generally California Air Resources Board, at http://www.arb.ca.gov/homepage.htm (last
visited Jan. L4, 2004).
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integrating local plans developed by individual air districts into the
state's SIP, and then for submitting the state's SIP to EPA.239 Like EPA,
it also directly regulates some statewide emissions sources, such as
pesticides,' ° and uses its expertise to assist local air districts in their
planning efforts.
The San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District
(SJVUAPCD) is the primary local entity responsible for air quality
protection. Regional air districts like the SJVUAPCD are responsible for
developing the portions of the state SIP that address regional stationary
and mobile source controls.24' In addition, in coordination with local
transportation planning agencies, the local air districts are responsible for
developing transportation management controls.42 Ultimately, the
controls developed by the local agencies must be integrated by CARB
into the state SIP and then approved by EPA.43
Because of the region's geography, the SJVUAPCD isn't the only
local air district with de facto regulatory authority over San Joaquin
Valley air quality. The Bay Area Air Quality Management District and
air quality management districts in the northern part of the Central
Valley set their own policies, and prevailing winds ensure that those
policies affect air quality in the SJV.24
In practice, some of these functions are somewhat integrated. Both
CARB and EPA personnel generally play advisory roles throughout the
local air districts' planning processes. 45 Because EPA has the power to
reject the state SIP, its advice carries significant weight, and local
agencies tend to involve CARB and EPA throughout the planning
process rather than risk disagreement at the process's end.246 EPA and
239. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(a), 741o(a) (20o0); AT-rAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at 1-4.
240. ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at ii, iv.
241. Id. at 1-4. As a practical matter, the SIP development efforts by local agencies must account
for many regulations that are beyond those local agencies' power to implement or control.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See id. at ii, v-vii ("[I]t is clear that the San Francisco Bay Area and the Sacramento Valley
Air Basins are responsible for a significant portion of the ozone in the San Joaquin Valley .... For the
air quality to improve in the Valley, the BAAQMD needs to acknowledge its responsibility as a
transporter of pollutants."). But see Don't Blame San Francisco, supra note 217 (questioning the
extent to which San Francisco Bay Area emissions can be blamed for the San Joaquin Valley's
pollution problems).
245. ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at 1-6.
The District's ozone model. . . was developed in partnership with the EPA, state and local
government and industry. Many parties that contributed funds have participated in
directing a study of an appropriate ozone event in the development of a photochemical grid
model appropriate for the San Joaquin Valley.... The model was developed in accordance
with the EPA and the ARB modeling guidelines, and with the active participation of both
agencies.
Id.
246. Interview with Carol Bonnenkamp, Environmental Engineer, EPA, in Oakland, Cal. (July 19,
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CARB also supply technical expertise; in the 199os, for example, CARB
personnel carried out the SJVUAPCD's modeling effort.47 The local
authorities also have the ability to lobby CARB and EPA if state or
federal source regulations could be changed to better promote
compliance." s Nevertheless, the SIP planning process remains primarily
dependant on work done by the local agencies, although those local
agencies must make decisions based partly upon the projected success or
failure of the regulatory policies of other entities.49
Discussion of the air quality regulators in the SJV would be
incomplete without some mention of the regulated industry, for some
industries have traditionally been heavily involved in Valley air quality
regulation. Regulated industry associations funded early air quality
research in the SJV."° The associations continue to fund research, and
many personnel from regulated industries have been advisors in planning
processes."' Both the Valley's traditionally pro-business regulatory
climate and realistic fears of industry-funded legal challenges have given
regulators reason to proactively involve industry in the regulatory
process.252 Thus, many industry representatives wear multiple hats in the
planning process, serving as advisors, commentors, and, potentially, as
2ooi). Ms. Bonnenkamp described her early and continued involvement in the SJV SIP process:
[Y]ou're working with [the Air District] to try to negotiate how quickly you can respond [to
deadlines in the Act]. We're trying to figure out what [the Air District] is trying to prove
with the modeling. It sounds like it would be straightforward, but it's not. You have
meetings with the State, local agency and any consultants just to flesh out what we see as
the issues, where we're going to go, and how it's going to shape up.
247. ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at 5-8 to 5-14. CARB and SJVUAPCD list modeling
"caveats" and "concerns" separately, and throughout the plan CARB is described as conducting the
simulations. See, e.g., id. at 5-I ("According to the ARB analysis ... ").
248. See ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note S (repeatedly emphasizing the need for state and federal
controls). But see Mark Grossi et al., A History of Delays, FRESNO BEE, Dec. I5, 2002 at 3 (noting that
local regulators have also lobbied federal and state authorities to delay regulation), available at 2002
WL 206854.
249. See Last Gasp, supra note 215 ("Officials at the San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control
District hasten to say they have no control over 6o% of the problem-vehicles, which are regulated by
federal and state officials.").
250. See BLUMENTHAL ET AL., supra note 226.
251. See infra note 264 (showing the membership of the SJVUAPCD's technical and policy
advisory committees).
252. See A History of Delays, supra note 248 ("Environmentalists say the Valley air district also
has buckled in the face of political flak, especially from industries."). The involvement of the Western
States Petroleum Association (WSPA) exemplifies how the threat of litigation provides impetus for
seeking early participation of industry. WSPA partially funded SARMAP development, and WSPA
representatives served on the advisory committees, requested specific modeling runs, and submitted
comments upon the Attainment Plan (all within public view; we do not mean to imply that WSPA's
involvement was clandestine or improper). When EPA rejected one element of that plan that the
WSPA had specifically sought and obtained from SJVUAPCD, it sued; that lawsuit is ongoing. See
infra note 283 (describing EPA's revocation of the exemption for petroleum facilities on the west side




C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE 1994 AIR QUALITY PLAN
I. Early Research and Planning Efforts in the SJV
Air pollution problems in the Central Valley did not begin in the
199os; early travelers noted the region's pervasive dust problems,54 and
even in the late 197os and early 198os air quality measurements revealed
that the region's air quality was frequently violating state 255 and federal
standards.56 Industry-funded air quality research commenced in the early
I98OS,257 eventually leading to the San Joaquin Valley Air Quality Study
(SJVAQS), an inter-agency, multi-stakeholder, well-funded study
intended to produce a state-of-the-science air quality model and
supporting observational database.258 Unfortunately, a lack of sufficient
regulatory interest, as well as the need to gather more data to understand
the problem, delayed early and effective regulation. 59
253. Steve Ziman, a representative of Chevron-Texaco and a participant on the SJVUAPCD's
Technical Advisory Committee, explained:
The Technical Committee, for which I am one of the industry representatives, has been
responsible for management of the design, development, and implementation of the studies.
Field programs, data analysis, and so forth. All of these things which then become the basis
for carrying out SIP development. Our role ends nominally at the point at which decisions
are made as to how a control strategy will be adopted for the SIP. At that point, my role
changes to that of representing the industry in the formal and informal proceedings that
lead to final adoption. We will comment on the strategies, the individual measures within
the strategies, etc.
Interview with Steve Ziman, Senior Staff Scientist, Air Issues, and Technology, Chevron-Texaco, in
Richmond, Cal. (July 12, 2001).
254. Last Gasp, supra note 215, at 2 ("Pioneer William Brewer gazed across the Valley in the i9th
century and saw haze and dust-lots and lots of dust. 'Dust fills the air.... It covers everything,'
Brewer wrote in his journal. 'I cannot conceive of a worse place to live."').
255. The California Clean Air Act of 1988 established state air quality goals for ambient
concentrations of the criteria pollutants. Clean Air Plans (CAPs) are required when observations
reveal violations. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 4o91 I. Models need not be used to support these plans,
nor are planning or attainment deadlines established in the CCAA. Instead, attainment must be
reached by "the earliest practicable date," and precursor emissions must be reduced by five percent
annually. If five percent reduction is deemed infeasible, then all "feasible measures" are to be
implemented in an "expeditious" manner. Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 40913,40914.
256. See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
257. See BLUMENTHAL ET AL., supra note 226.
258. CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD AND SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY UNIFIED AIR POLLUTION
CONTROL DISTRICT, SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY AIR QUALITY STUDY POLICY-RELEVANT FINDINGS (1996)
[hereinafter SJVAQS POLICY-RELEVANT FINDINGS]. The SJVAQS's model, called SARMAP, was
used as the basis for the 1994 Ozone Plan. ATrAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15. at v.
259. See A History of Delays, supra note 248 ("The Valley's last 30 years are littered with accounts
of the federal government issuing proposals, edicts and threats to clean up the air, only to accept
delays and compromise after meeting resistance. Industries, local elected officials and even state
regulators have had a hand in the process."); Decades of Dirty Air in the San Joaquin Valley, FRESNO
BEE, Dec. 15, 2002, at 4 (providing a timeline of regulatory actions, and discussing repeated delays,
extensions, and missed deadlines); Polakovic, supra note 212 (describing how a pro-business climate,
combined with decreasing legislative interest in air-quality protection, has led to ineffective air quality
regulation in several areas of California). In 1982, California did approve an ozone control plan for the
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2. The 1994 Plan
In 199o, Congress enacted major amendments to the Clean Air Act.
By setting forth planning and air quality improvement deadlines for
areas not meeting the ozone standard, these amendments mandated the
planning processes of the 199os. For "serious" nonattainment areas such
as the SJV, an attainment plan was due by November 15, 1994, and the
plan was to "demonstrate," through modeling, that the ozone standard
would be achieved by i999.26 ' Failure to meet the planning deadline
meant costly sanctions, including the loss of federal funds for highway
construction and stricter permitting rules for any industry with potential
26,
pollutant emissions.
Efforts to meet the 1994 planning deadline had, as a practical matter,
begun with the I98os air pollution studies and initial attainment plans,
but the coordinated planning effort officially kicked off in i99i, when
several county air districts merged to form the SJVUAPCD.262 Working
closely with CARB, the SJVUAPCD assembled the policy advisory and
technical advisory committees that would oversee the research effort and
subsequent planning process.6 3 Primary responsibility for planning rested
San Joaquin Valley, but even while approving it, EPA predicted, correctly, that it would not achieve
federal ozone standard. Decades of Dirty Air in the San Joaquin Valley, supra.
260. 42 U.S.C. § 7511 (a)(i) (setting attainment deadlines), (c)(2) (setting planning deadlines for
serious nonattainment areas), (c)(2)(A) (requiring the use of models); see ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra
note 15, at I-i. Despite the fact that most of the major planning efforts in the valley were driven
primarily by federal law, the first post-Clean Air Act Amendments air quality management plan in the
SJV was required by a state statute. SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY UNIFIED AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DISTRICT,
i991 AIR QUALITY ATTAINMENT PLAN I-I (1992). In i991, the newly-created SJVUAPCD adopted an
air quality management plan pursuant to requirements of the CCAA. Id. at 1-4. The plan called for
"all feasible" measures to reduce air pollutant emissions, id. at i-i, and was essentially a stop-gap
document, functional only until a new plan could be constructed using improved scientific
understanding and planning tools provided by the SJVAQS. Id. at 1-4.
261. One penalty for failure to promulgate an approved plan is a "conformity lapse." The San
Joaquin Council of Governments (SJCOG) described some of the consequences of such a lapse:
If the SJVUAPCD cannot develop an approved plan to meet the air quality standards, or if
SJCOG can not show that we conform to the approved air district plan, federal
transportation funds will be withheld. Even locally funded transportation projects on
federal highways will be halted. Over $56 million in projects are at risk in San Joaquin
County alone.
SJCOG website, at http://www.sjcog.org/sections/RACM/index.php; see A History of Delays, supra
note 248 ("In the Valley, about $2.2 billion in projects would be jeopardized by a missed smog
deadline."); ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note I5, at 1-3 to 1-4 (describing possible federal sanctions).
262. See Decades of Dirty Air in the San Joaquin Valley, supra note 259 (stating that the
SJVUAPCD was formed following pressure upon the county air districts by federal and state
regulators).
263. By design, the scientific research and development plan tasks were to be formally
disconnected. SJVAQS POLICY-RELEVANT FINDINGS, supra note 258, at 7. The disconnect was
planned for two important reasons: first, timelines did not match, because model improvements were
to continue well beyond plan submission deadlines; and second, planners were concerned about
perceived or real conflicts of interest, because industrial research sponsors also expected to incur
hundreds of millions of dollars in plan compliance costs. Id. ("Participants also agreed not to defer air
quality planning and control activities until the completion of the study, thereby averting questions
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with the SJVUAPCD itself, with substantial technical and policy
assistance from CARB and some input from EPA.
a. The Advisory Committees
Neither advisory committee was representative of the public as a
whole. 6' Both were composed exclusively of government employees and
about the motivations of local and industrial groups participating in the study."); see also THE ENDS OF
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 130, at 268 (quoting Interview with John DaMassa, Chief, Modeling &
Meteorology Branch, CARB Planning & Technical Support Division (May 22, 2001)) ("[T]he
Technical Committee was involved with review and decisions regarding all of the technical aspects of
the study. The Policy Committee... reviewed expenditures, progress, any decisions that needed to be
made, the schedule, all of the policy level details. They controlled the budget.").
264. SJVAQS POLICY-RELEVANT FINDINGS, supra note 258, apps. B and D, at 27, 29. The
following table lists the members of the Policy and Technical Committees overseeing the SJVAQS:
SJVAQS Polic Committee
Name Organization
Doug Vagim (Chair, 1995-) CARB
Jaqueline Schafer (Chair, 1993-1994) CARB
Jananne Sharpless (Chair, 1985-1993) CARB
Gordon Duffy (Chair, 1983-1985) CARB
Pauline Larwood (past member) Kern County Supervisor
May Kay Shell Kern County Supervisor
Judy Andreen (past member) Fresno County Supervisor
Dave Howekamp EPA Region IX
Phil Brady U.S. Department of Defense
Brenda Mohn U.S. Department of Defense
Les Clark Independent Oil Producers Agency
Bill Brommelsiek Chevron U.S.A.
Catherine Reheis WSPA
Dave Crow SJVUAPCD
Bill Harper Shell Oil (CalResources)
John Torrens Pacific Gas & Electric
Manuel Cunha Nisei Farmers League
Peter Mueller Electric Power Research Institute
Jon Kennedy U.S. Forest Service
Jan Bush BAAQMD
Tom Nichols National Park Service
Jack Lagarias CARB Board Member
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representatives of private industry; their membership did not include any
representatives of public interest advocacy organizations."' The technical
advisory team was even less representative; it was composed exclusively
of regulators and industry representatives.
b. The Modeling and Plan Development Process
With its research and planning teams in place, the SJVUAPCD
began the process of developing its attainment plan. Sub-groups set
Valerie Nera State Chamber of Commerce
Kennan Beard Beard Land Development
Merlin Fagan California Farm Bureau
Donald Gordon Agricultural Council of California




Andrew Ranzieri (Chair) CARB
Dick Thuillier Pacific Gas & Electric Company
Paul Solomon Pacific Gas & Electric Company
Steven Ziman Chevron U.S.A.
Alan Hansen Electric Power Research Institute
Carol Bohnenkamp EPA Region IX
Robin DeMandel BAAQMD
James Sweet SJVUAPCD
Linda Chester (former member) Kern County APCD
John Vimont (former member) EPA
Philip Roth (Principal Investigator) Envair
John Watson (Principal Investigator) Desert Research Institute
APCD Air Pollution Control District
BAAQMD = Bay Area Air Quality Management District
CARB = California Air Resources Board
CCEEB = California Council for Environmental and Economic Balance
EPA = Environmental Protection Agency
SJVUAPCD = San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District
WSPA = Western States Petroleum Association
265. Id. The few elected officials on the Policy Committee were charged, of course, with
representing the public. Given the San Joaquin Valley's traditionally pro-business climate, however,
and the history of anti-regulatory lobbying by local elected officials, see A History of Delays, supra
note 248, we do not assume that a local elected official will necessarily be a strong clean air advocate.
[Vol. 56:9oi
TECHNOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY
about developing a modeling approach-which meant deciding on a
modeling system to be used and on an ozone event to simulate-
estimating emissions, identifying emissions reductions options, and
simulating those reductions using the model.
Typically, modelers attempt to demonstrate future compliance by
assessing how future air quality would fare if a past meteorological event
repeated itself after implementation of proposed emissions controls.
66
Modelers also use that same event to test the model itself; by improving
the model's simulations of that past event, they attempt to assure
themselves of its ability to predict future outcomes. The past event is
generally an extended period of unfavorable weather for air quality-
that is, weather that represents a worst-case scenario for generating
ozone pollution.26 The planners settled upon a particularly severe week-
long pollution event in August i99o,26 and then began preparing the
input data to perform a modeling simulation of that event. 69 The
Technical Committee worked with planners to develop a modeling
protocol that described the event and the modeling components to be
used.270
Once the simulation dates were specified, planners at the
SJVUAPCD and CARB's Planning and Technical Support Division
266. ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at 2-10 ("The purpose of the ozone model is to predict the
effect of changes in emissions on ozone level. But before a model can be used for that purpose, it must
be shown to be valid for the area. This has been accomplished by simulating an observed episode of
high ozone levels.").
267. See id. at 1-5 to 1-6. In fact, the event simulated had a peak observed ozone concentration of
o.i6o ppm, but the design value (the fourth-worst ozone level observed over the previous three-year
period) for the region was 0.17 ppm. See id. at 1-2. Thus, the event simulated was not as severe as the
"worst" ozone conditions observed. Furthermore, the SAQM modeling simulation computed peak
ozone values of 0.142 ppm, which is o.o18 ppm (iI%) below the observed peak during the simulated
event, and 16% below the design value. See John DaMassa et al., Performance Evaluation ofSAQM in
Central California and Attainment Demonstration for the August 3-6, 199
o 
Ozone Episode, 71, 72-74
(1996). Therefore, the task of "demonstrating" attainment with the modeling was made easier by
modeling ozone conditions that were not as severe as the worst conditions observed.
268. Warm and stagnant wind conditions allowed pollutant concentrations to build until peak
ozone concentrations of nearly o.i6o ppm were observed. See also DaMassa et al., supra note 267, at
17-22 (describing the meteorology and air quality during the ozone event). Domain-wide, ozone peaks
were observed in and near Fresno and Bakersfield on the last two days of the event. Id. For a
discussion of the chemical transformations and physical processes associated with the high ozone
events observed in August, 199o, see Betty K. Pun & Christian Seigneur, A Conceptual Model for
Ozone Formation in the San Joaquin Valley, Dec. 15, 1998, at 3-1 to 3-12 (chemical transformations),
4-I to 4-8 (physical processes); ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at 2-10 to 2-11; see also Donald E.
Lehrman et al., Meteorological Analysis of the San Joaquin Valley Air Quality Study, Atmospheric
Utilities, Signatures, Predictions and Experiments (I996).
269. ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, app. C (Modeling Protocol); id. ch. 2, at 2-10 to 2-11
(describing of the simulation of the August 4-6, 199o ozone episode).
270. ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, app. C at C-4 (presenting the modeling protocol and
describing plans for two basecase simulations: July 27-29 and August 3-6 in 199o; only the August
episode was reported in the Plan).
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went about compiling baseline data for the modeling. 7' They attempted
to identify, locate, and quantify all emissions sources that had existed in
1990. They also attempted to do the same for all sources anticipated to
exist, in the absence of further controls, in i999.72 Once the sources were
located and quantified, the group "mapped" them, translating emissions
data, as well as information about ambient meteorological conditions,
into geo-coded formats the model could accept as input.273
The group's work involved constant dialogue and consultation with
industry, local and state governments, and in some instances
consultants. '74 The inventory group also published and made publicly
available its draft emissions inventory, and that draft inventory received
careful scrutiny from regulated industries and the SJVAQS Technical
Committee.75
Somewhat concurrently, CARB and SJVUAPCD planners
identified potential future emissions controls. Essentially, this group's
task was to identify and develop potential new "rules" and to estimate
resultant emissions reductions."6 The planners provided quantitative
estimates of emissions reductions, timelines for when those reductions
271. See DaMassa et al., supra note 267, at 44-53 (describing modeling inputs preparation,
including meteorology, emissions and boundary and initial conditions).
272. See ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at 2-I ("To develop a strategy to provide healthy air,
the District relies on preparation of inventories that identify the sources of emissions and their
contribution to local air pollution."); id. at app. D (describing the preparation of emissions estimates);
id. ch. 3 (discussing emissions controls already planned, and their air quality effects. Pages 3-1 to 3-4,
notably Table 3-2 on page 3-2, identify anticipated emissions reductions, and model simulation results
3-4 to 3-14 of the "1999 Base Case.").
273. Interview with James Sweet, Air Quality Planner, SJVUAPCD, Fresno, Cal. (June 20, 2001).
Mr. Sweet explained the process of information exchange between himself, analysts at CARB, and
consultants:
[Tlhe way the emissions inventory worked at that time, all we could do is send up submittals
to ARB. ARB put it into their system. They then had to send that information off to Alpine
Geophysics to get the gridding done. They sent that back to ARB. We got ARB staff in the
modeling section to do the summary reports for us so we could do QA. We then had to
contact the emissions sections and Alpine to figure out why the numbers weren't what we
expected, produce a recommendation for change, send it back to ARB. That was our
process.
Id.
274. See THE ENDS OF UNCERTAINTY, supra note 130, at 262-73 (describing the networks involved
in the production of the Attainment Plan).
275. See id. at 272-73 (describing the iterative process of developing and checking the "approved"
inventory, and public notice steps that hindered modifications to the inventory).
276. See ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at 4-2 to 4-13 (describing proposed local rules), 4-13 to
4-t6 (describing proposed state and federal rules). Both EPA and CARB provide guidance for
developing rules. For example, EPA's "Bluebook" and "Little Bluebook" provide guidance for use by
air districts in developing rules that meet federal requirements for inclusion in SIPs. See OFFICE OF AIR
QUALITY PLANNING, EPA, ISSUES RELATING TO VOC REGULATION CUTPOINTS, DEFICIENCIES AND
DEVIATIONS-CLARIFICATION TO APPENDIX D OF Nov. 24, 1987 FEDERAL REGISTR (1988) (the
"Bluebook"), available at http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/bluebook/; Rulemaking Office, Air Division,
Region IX, EPA, Guidance Document for Correcting VOC and Other Rule Deficiencies (2001) (the
"Little Bluebook"), available at http://www.epa.gov/Region9/air/sips/littlebluebook2ooI.pdf.
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would be achieved, and estimates of how much the reductions would
cost.277
Once the modelers had chosen their modeling event, and once the
planners believed they had run out of time to continue improving the
emissions inventory, the modelers began executing the modeling
simulations. Their first task was to determine the adequacy of the model
itself, which they did by evaluating its ability to simulate observations
gathered during the August 199o ozone event. The modelers had not
completed model performance evaluation to their satisfaction when time
constraints necessitated initiating the planning simulations.78 The
simulation was sufficiently accurate to meet EPA and CARB guidelines
for model approval, however, and, with the knowledge the models
necessarily do imperfect work, the modelers decided to proceed with
simulating the 1999 predictions.279 Using the approved emissions
inventories and the emissions reduction options developed by the control
rules group, the modelers predicted air quality in the absence of
additional emissions controls and using various combinations of
proposed rules, with the goal of finding a set of rules sufficient to
efficiently achieve compliance. 2
Again, regulated groups were heavily involved. The planners and
281modelers consulted the advisory committees throughout this process,
277. The SJVUAPCD, CARB, neighboring air districts, and transportation planning agencies are
all involved in identifying, promulgating and implementing emissions control rules. See ATrAINMENT
PLAN, supra note 15, at iii-vi (discussing federal, state and other air districts' responsibilities).
278. Id. at 2-10 to 2-13, 5-13 ("Full performance evaluation of the model has not been
completed.").
279. See Interview with Steve Ziman, supra note 253.
We had [SARMAP] developed for [the SJVAQS] and we were comfortable to the extent
that we could be. But, we were also uncomfortable because in the midst of trying to do a
reasonable performance evaluation we were forced by the agency to drop everything and
just do the SIP because of the time frame. And, so we never finished the evaluation to the
degree it should have been done.
Id.
280. See ATrAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at 1-7 (describing the process of using the model to test
proposed rules); id. at 3-4 to 3-5 (describing simulations that assumed that no controls beyond those
already approved would be imposed); id. at 4-1 to 4-2 (describing further modeling including proposed
rules). Rather than testing rules randomly, the modelers began by running tests designed to determine
whether they should primarily target their efforts at reducing NOx or VOC emissions. Id. at 2-16 to
2-17. They concluded that they could more efficiently reduce ozone levels by targeting NOx emissions.
Id. They also determined that they would achieve most of their emissions reductions through existing
or already-approved rules; according to the attainment plan, the proposed new rules would play a
relatively minor role in achieving compliance. Id. at 4-2.
281. Unfortunately, SJVAQS meeting minutes and other documentation are not available;
SJVUAPCD staff informed one of the authors that CARB had accidentally recycled the boxes
containing those records. Two SJVAQS technical committee members-James Sweet, the modeling
specialist at the SJVUAPCD, and Andrew Ranzieri, manager of the Planning and Technical Support
Division (i.e., modeling division) at CARB-also oversaw the modeling effort for the Attainment Plan
development, so there was extensive overlap between the technical committee and agency modelers
and planners. When commenting on an early version of this paper, James Sweet further described the
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and the Western States Petroleum Association requested specific
modeling runs.5 2 When the modeling runs predicted compliance even
without controls on petroleum facilities on the west side of the SJV,
controls on those facilities were excluded from the plan.2s3
The SJVUAPCD predicted that both existing and future rules would
achieve substantial emissions reductions, and it identified several
"contingency" measures."" Nevertheless, a model attainment
"demonstration" was not possible until modifications were made to
boundary conditions values (i.e., assumptions about upwind air quality
conditions)R5 Few involved in plan development were particularly
challenges associated with documenting for public review the technical efforts of the staff.
Technical Committee meetings were typically six to eight hour working meetings, which
were not documented by detailed minutes but rather by updated version of the related
planning or analysis document that reflected discussions.... Since the Technical Committee
meetings were frequently working sessions or presentations of updates by contractors,
minutes cannot effectively capture the proceedings.
Letter from James Sweet, Air Quality Planner, SJVUAPCD, to James Fine (July I5, 2004) (on file
with author).
282. Memorandum from David Crow et al. to SJVUAPCD (Nov. 14, 1994) (describing the request
for the modeling run, which WSPA made at the Nov. 3 Board meeting); Interview with Steve Ziman,
supra note 253 ("[SJVAQS participants] agreed that the sponsors of the study had the right to ask for
modeling runs to be made to address certain issues. And we took that up in 1994 when the San
Joaquin Valley had to decide whether or not to implement NOx controls on sources on the west side
of the valley.").
283. In this modeling simulation, the anticipated NOx reductions from oilfields in the areas west of
Interstate 5 in Kern, Kings and Fresno Counties were not included and the simulation still showed
attainment, so the SJVUAPCD concluded that the oilfield reductions were "not needed to reach the
federal ozone standard." ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note i5, at 4-34. Consequently, the final plan does
not call for implementation of rules 4305, 4702 and 4703 at west side oilfields. Furthermore, staff at the
SJVUAPCD saw little reason to seek inclusion of these controls in the Attainment Plan because they
were already included amongst the list of control measures to be implemented in pursuit of the state
ozone standard. See SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY UNIFIED AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DIsTRICT, I99i AIR
QUALITY ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 26o, at 7-9t. A coalition of environmental groups subsequently
filed a lawsuit that led EPA to overturn this federal exemption. See Revisions to the California State
Implementation Plan, San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District, EPA, 40 C.F.R. Part
52 (2002); Earthjustice, San Joaquin Valley Oil Industry Seeks Oil Pollution Exemption, July sO, 2002,
available at http://www.earthjustice.org/news/display. html?ID=399. The Western States Petroleum
Association then sued seeking to have the exemption reinstated, and several environmental groups
have intervened in the lawsuit. Earthjustice, supra. The controls ultimately were imposed pursuant to
state law requiring imposition of "every feasible measures" to control emissions. SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY
UNIFIED AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DisTRicT, I99I AIR QUALITY ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 260, at
1-2.
284. ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at 4-I to 4-23 (describing control measures, including
summary tables at 4-19 to 4-23); id. at 4-24 to 4-30 (describing contingency measures, including a table
at 4-30 listing contingency measures).
285. Id. at ii ("The model has predicted a District-wide attainment of the federal ozone standard
by i999."). In an interview at the SJVUAPCD, Mr. David Jones said:
Initially, the modeling didn't show attainment. When we were contemplating what else we
could do, the decision was made to change some of the boundary conditions and some of
the wind patterns. When they did that, all of the sudden we were down below 0.120 ppm.
Interview with David L. Jones, Planning Director, SJVUAPCD, in Fresno, Cal. (June 20, 20oI). The
decision to change boundary conditions occurred only after extensive dialogue amongst staff at
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confident in this assertion; many were skeptical about the ultimate
efficacy of the rules they had selected.26 With deadline pressure
remaining intense, however, the planners felt obliged to use the modeling
as the basis for their plan.287
c. Approval of the Plan
In October 199o, the SJVUAPCD made the draft plan available for
public comment and held a public workshop.29 A hearing followed, but
public comments, other than statements from those already involved to
some extent in the process, did not. The minutes from subsequent board
hearings reveal an almost complete absence of participation from public
interest groups or from the general public, and ver little specific
criticism of the plan except from regulated industry.! The interests
involved in the hearings were similar to those already represented in the
advisory and technical •m i 90
SJVUAPCD, CARB and EPA. E-mail from James Sweet, Air Quality Planner, SJVUAPCD, to
James Fine (July 17, 2004) (on file with author). Though the change had the convenient result of
facilitating the modeled attainment demonstration, staff at the SJVUAPCD note that the intent of
these changes was to "let the model speak for itself," rather than to tinker with assumptions until the
model produced desired results. Id.
286. See THE ENDS OF UNCERTAINTY, supra note 130, at 274.
I'm pretty big on model performance evaluation. Every model should be challenged. In fact,
I would like it if, when you pop up a model result, decision-makers would ask, "Why should
I believe this modeling?" When asked if decision-makers posed that question for the 94
Ozone Plan, he replied, "No. They didn't. Hardly anyone asked that question. Most people
don't want to know. They just want the result."
Id. (quoting Don McNerny, Supervisor, CARB Planning and Technical Support Division.) "[Ihf
someone was going to bet me a thousand dollars that the plan was going to attain, I would have said,
'You've got to give me long odds."' Interview with Michael Scheible, Deputy Executive Officer,
CARB, in Sacramento, Cal. (Sept. i8, 2001).
287. See THE ENDS OF UNCERTAINTY, supra note 130, at 298 ("[W]e're under a sanctioned timeline
to produce a plan that includes modeling. In essence, we don't have the luxury of time, we don't have
unlimited resources. We're going to go with what we've got when it comes down to it.") (quoting Scott
Nester); Interview with Lynn Terry, supra note 138 ("As ARB staff, we tend to be pragmatic; to say,
'Our basic framework is use the best science you have and meet the deadline.' Those are the two
fundamental goals. So when you come to the Board with a SIP, the Board is assured that, with these
drop-dead dates we have to do the SIP, we've used the best information we have.").
288. Crow et al., supra note 282, at 1-2.
Due to time constraints imposed by the ARB's scheduled SIP adoption hearing dates of
November 9 and Io, the District held one Valleywide workshop on October 21, 5994, at the
District's central office in Fresno. The Public Notice for this hearing was published on
October 3, 1994, in newspapers in the eight county area. However, because the District was
awaiting modeling results from ARB, the Plans were not made available to the public until
October Is. Therefore, the additional hearing recommended for November 14, 1994, will
afford the Board and the public a minimum of 30 days for review of the document. It will
also allow the Board to adequately consider testimony concerning the Plan.
Id.
289. See generally Last Gasp, supra note 215 (stating that "bureaucrats have hardly heard a peep
from the public in the board room").
290. See id.; San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District, Action Summary, Minutes
for the Governing Board Meeting, Nov. 3, 1994 (Nov. 14, 1994) [hereinafter Action Summary, Minutes
for the Governing Board Meeting, Nov. 3, 1994]; San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control
May 2005]
HA STINGS LA W JO URNA L
Following the public comment period, the SJVUAPCD made
limited changes to the plan, submitting it on November 3, 1994, to the
SJVUAPCD Board of Directors for final approval.29' Unlike the advisory
committees, the Board of Directors is not a technical body; most of its
members are locally elected political representatives. 9 This non-
technical review might have provided an opportunity for public
advocacy, at least through representative proxies, but the board had little
time to conduct a meaningful review. With the compliance deadline
looming, and EPA and CARB reviews still pending, the technical staff
urged a rapid approval in order to avoid the penalties that would result if
the plan were not approved by November 15.293 The Board held two
meetings to discuss the plan, but the only public discussion came from
regulators and industry representatives."M Even the board's decision to
exempt the west side petroleum facilities from regulation provoked no
meaningful public comment. 95
The Board of Directors complied with the staff's request for a quick
decision and approved the final attainment plan on November 14, 1994.96
CARB submitted the plan for EPA approval almost immediately
thereafter.2"
3. The Contents of the Plan
Ultimately, the SJVUAPCD Attainment Plan called for a host of
District, Action Summary, Minutes for the Governing Board Meeting, Nov. 14, 1994 (Dec. 15, 1994)
[hereinafter Action Summary, Minutes for the Governing Board Meeting, Nov. 14, 1994].
291. See Action Summary, Minutes for the Governing Board Meeting, Nov. 3, 1994, supra note
29o; Action Summary, Minutes for the Governing Board Meeting, Nov. 14, 1994, supra note 290.
292. See ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, cover page (listing members of the Governing Board).
293. Crow et al., supra note 282.
The Federal Clean Air Act Amendments (FCAAA) of 199o require the District to submit
an Attainment Demonstration Plan by Nov. 15, 1994. Failure to submit an Ozone
Attainment Demonstration Plan which complies with the provisions of the FCAAA can
lead to sanctions including the imposition of a 2 to i emissions offset ration on the District
and the loss of federal highway funds.
Id.
294. Action Summary, Minutes for the Governing Board Meeting, Nov. 3, I994, supra note 290;
Action Summary, Minutes for the Governing Board Meeting, Nov. 14, 5994, supra note 290.
295. Action Summary, Minutes for the Governing Board Meeting, Nov. 14, 1994, supra note 290.
This absence of comment may be due, in part, to the fact that the modeling runs that facilitated this
change were not even requested until the November 3 meeting, and the modeling results were not
available until just before the November 14 meeting. Crow et al., supra note 282.
296. Action Summary, Minutes for the Governing Board Meeting, Nov. 14, 1994, supra note 290.
297. CARB, Air Resources Board Approves the State Implementation Plan (SIP), Nov. 15, 1994.
The California Air Resources Board today approved and submitted to United States
Environmental Protection Agency a plan designed to meet federal ozone standards as
required by the 199o Clean Air Act .... This schedule will allow U.S. EPA to approve
California's plan before the harsh FIP [Federal Implementation Plan] is due to be
implemented on February 15, 1995.
Id. EPA did not approve the SIP until 1996. See Environmental Protection Agency, Approval and




rule changes, and the SJVUAPCD predicted that those changes, in
combination with existing rules and anticipated policy decisions by
CARB and EPA, would meet the federal ozone standard by i999 .* 8 The
planners sought to reduce both NO, and VOC emissions by regulating a
wide range of industrial activities.2" The planners also placed heavy
reliance upon emissions reductions from rules imposed by other
regulatory entities,3" and in particular assumed that declining emissions
from upwind areas would provide an important boost toward
compliance."0 '
The plan quite deliberately did not, however, provide for much
margin of error. The SJVUAPCD exempted the petroleum facilities on
the west side of the Valley from regulation under the SIP, believing that
it could not legally justify controls that were not essential to obtaining a
modeled attainment demonstration."'2 Similarly, it did not impose any
controls designed to provide a margin of error, instead describing
controls beyond those necessary to achieve a hairs-breadth compliance
margin as "excessive."'" The plan noted that efforts to improve the
model would be ongoing, 4 and included some contingency rules to be
developed if further regulation proved necessary. 5 Although the
contingencies could provide some flexibility in the event that the plan did
not succeed, the plan still created very little margin for error.
298. ATrAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15 , at 4-30.
299. See id. at 4-2 to 4-13 (describing proposed local rules).
300. Id. at 3-I (showing anticipated emissions reductions from rules already adopted, as of 1994,
both within and outside the district's jurisdiction); id at 4-1 (anticipating that existing federal, state,
and local controls would help facilitate attainment).
301. Id. at 4-28 (predicting improvement in boundary conditions based upon statewide emissions
reductions).
302. See supra notes 283-84 and accompanying text; Interview with James Sweet, supra note 273.
Mr. Sweet explained how the District's mission is to plan for no more than the emissions reductions
needed to reach the federal ozone goal. "We want the model to tell us what we're supposed to do. To
accomplish our mission, which is to clean up the air without doing more than we need to do, without
doing anything that is inappropriate." Id. In an email to the authors, Mr. Sweet suggested that
California Health and Safety Code sections 39602 and 40727 prevented the SJVUAPCD from going
any further. E-mail from James Sweet, Air Quality Planner, SJVUAPCD, to James Fine (July 17,
2004) (on file with author). Those code sections prohibit the state from including in a SIP regulations
that are not "necessary" but do not define what "necessary" means in the context of uncertain
predictions. See Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 39602, 40727 (2000). The authors believe that given the
uncertainty surrounding the modeled predictions, the SJVUAPCD could reasonably have concluded
that emissions control strategies providing for a margin of error were necessary to ensure compliance.
303. See ATrAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at 6-1.
304. Id. at 1-7 (predicting that strategy adjustments based upon model improvements would be
minor); id. at 6-3 to 6-4.
305. Id. at 4-24 to 4-30. One of the proposed "contingency rules," however, is merely a
commitment to study additional transportation control measures. Id. at 4-24. The SJVUAPCD stated
that "[s]ince the District has included all measures currently known to be feasible in its attainment
demonstration, these measures have not undergone the review afforded the proposed control
measures. Accordingly, their description and estimated reductions are subject to revision." Id. See
generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7502(c)(9), 751 ia(c)(9) (2000) (requiring contingency measures).
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4. Uncertainty in the Plan
The attainment plan was based upon a host of uncertain model
inputs. Because of deadlines and revisions to emissions estimates, the
existing emissions inventory was known to have several uncertainties and
omissions. Model predictions were known to be uncertain, but nobody
knew how the uncertainties impacted predictions of future conditions.""
Together with assumptions about politics and engineering, unknowable
future economic conditions introduced a further element of uncertainty;
the planners simply had no way of predicting the economic boom that
would create staggering levels of growth in upwind areas, and instead
predicated their planning upon the assumption of declining levels of
pollution from upwind activity.3" Additionally, like any model,
SARMAP's usefulness could be compromised by erroneous or
incomplete input data or by the inherent limitations created by basing a
model upon just one potentially non-representative weather event.
On top of all of these uncertainties, the model itself, like all models,
was a limited tool,"' and the Attainment Plan noted several ways in
which the modelers viewed their tool as flawed.3" The modelers
acknowledged that in the absence of tight deadlines they might have
been able to generate a superior model.3'0
All of these uncertainties threatened the reliability of the model
prediction of attainment by 1999, but the plan's uncertainty discussions
were far from comprehensive. The plan includes some blanket
generalizations about the pervasiveness of uncertainty in modeling, but
its discussion of particular sources of uncertainty was too general to
allow a reader to discern how those uncertainties were managed or what
economic and public health risks they might pose.3"' The authors omitted
discussion of some important sources of uncertainty, such as the
contingent relationship between emissions reductions and rule
enactment or economic growth. They addressed other sources of
uncertainty in more detail, but without substantive discussion clarifying
how those uncertainties might affect the result.3 '2 A reader, even if able
306. See supra notes I 17-20.
307. See ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at 4-28 (predicting improvement in boundary
conditions).
308. Id. at 5-7; see supra Part III.A.i.a.
309. ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at 5-7 to 5-12.
310. Interview with Steve Ziman, supra note 253; THE ENDS OF UNCERTAINTY, supra note 130, at
298 (quoting Scott Nester).
311. ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at 4-30 ("a number of uncertainties remain to be
evaluated"); id. at 5-7 to 5-8 (providing general discussion of uncertainty, but not indicating how that
uncertainty could affect regulations or compliance); id. at 6-2 to 6-3.
312. Id. at 5-8 to 5-9 (providing a list of "modeling caveats" but again not clarifying the ultimate
significance of these caveats); id. at 5-9 to 5-io (discussing "concerns" about boundary conditions, but
not doing so in terms that allow a reader to understand the implications of these concerns). One
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to understand the source of uncertainty, would have had no way of
knowing whether it was likely to lead to overestimation or
underestimation of actual pollutant levels, and a planner would have
been without guidance about how to address model uncertainty when
setting policy.
Where the Attainment Plan did identify both the existence and
likely effects of major sources of uncertainty, it actually misconstrued the
significance. The SJVUAPCD stressed that the model appeared to
overestimate the amount of ozone created from precursor emissions.3"3
Concerned about these overestimates, the SJVUAPCD wrote:
[t]he model replicated the observed levels of ozone using an emissions
inventory that is known to have under estimations and omissions. This
means that the model produced too much ozone either from the
emissions inventory or from other supporting inputs such as the
boundary conditions.... If the problem is not related to boundary
conditions, but is related to the emissions inventory, then the model is
overestimating the amount of ozone formed per ton of precursors
produced. This would constitute a more severe problem challenging
the validity of the basic model formulation. It would also have the
effect of making the model predict future year ozone concentrations
higher than it should."4
The model was indeed overestimating ozone formed per ton of
precursor emitted, but this flaw did not "have the effect of making the
model predict future year ozone concentrations higher than it should."
Rather than leading to overestimations of future concentrations, and
concomitant over-regulation, this model flaw could lead to
underestimation of future ozone levels. Recall that the modelers'
objective is to show, using modeling, that planned controls will cause
needed decreases in peak ozone levels. If ozone production is assumed to
be overly sensitive to precursor emissions,3"5 it may also appear,
incorrectly, to be overly responsive to emissions reductions, and the
effectiveness of future emissions controls will actually be
overestimated.35  As a result, the model could underestimate, not
overestimate, the amount of regulation necessary to achieve
exception to this statement is the plan's discussion of spatial resolution. The plan suggested that
insufficient spatial resolution might lead to overprediction of ozone levels, causing the plan to call for
more regulation than was necessary. Id. at 7-2. Subsequent events, however, indicate that such
overregulation has not been a problem.
313. Id.at 5-It.
314. Id.
315. Sensitivity here refers to the extent of change in predicted peak ozone in response to changes
in model inputs, such as estimated emissions.
316. In effect, the model was assuming that all the emissions came from a subset of the actual
sources. Accordingly, it would have overestimated the effect of reducing emissions from that subset of
sources, and would not have accounted for continuing emissions from unaddressed sources.
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compliance."7 Although the plan discussed the model's ability to
overproduce ozone, it failed to address this possible consequence.
As a result, the plan, though involving potentially crucial sources of
uncertainty, did little to clarify their significance, and where it discussed
uncertainty it did so in highly technical or even misleading terms.
D. DISAPPOINTING RESULTS
The Attainment Plan included a modeling prediction that the region
would attain the federal ozone standard by 1999.,8 The planning effort
led to several effective emissions controls, and the region has achieved
significant emissions reductions."9 Nevertheless, unhealthy levels of
pollution remain. In 2000, the SJVUAPCD monitoring network
measured ozone concentrations that exceeded the federal and state
standards on 30 and 114 days, respectively.3 " The region averaged over
30 annual violations of the federal standard from 1999 through 2002,
despite the considerable emissions reductions.'
317. Alternatively, the model may actually be insensitive to changes in emissions. This latter
possibility is due to the nonlinear and variable response of ozone to emissions. See SEINFELD & PANDIS,
supra note 5I, at 299-302 (describing the chemical process of ozone creation).
318. ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note I5, at ii.
319. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 2002 Almanac Data: Projected Emissions Inventory: San Joaquin Valley
Unified APCD, at http://www.arb.ca.gov/emisinv/emsmain/emsmain.htm; SJVUAPCD, Amended
2002 and 2oo5 Rate of Progress Report of the San Joaquin Valley 1-7 to 1-9 (2002), available at
http://www.valeyair.org/Workshops/postings/I-23-o3/2002%2oand%22005%2oRate %200f%20 Progress.pdf;
SJVUAPCD, EMISSIONS INVENTORY SUMMARY DATA, at http://www.valleyair.org/AirQuality-Plans/
EmissionInventory.htm.
320. SJVUAPCD, DRAFT 2002 AMENDMENT TO THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY OZONE PLAN (2002). See
also CARB summary data, at http://www.arb.ca.gov/adam/cgi-bin/dbswww/adamtop4b.d2w/start.
321. Figure I shows ozone observed trends in the San Joaquin Valley (solid line) compared against
projections from the Attainment Plan. The data are derived from CARB's website, at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/adam/cgi-bin/db2www/adamtop4b.d2w/start. The dotted line reflects the
Attainment Plan goal of meeting the federal ozone standard by 1999.
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The consequences of these persistent violations have been severe.
Ozone aggravates, and may contribute to the onset of, asthma, and
childhood asthma rates in the SJV are now I6%, well over the national
average of 5.5%. 32 Severe respiratory ailments affect I0% of the overall
population.323 No study has strictly tied these numbers to air pollution in
general or to ozone in particular, but at the very least the region's smog
appears to be an unneeded irritant to an already vulnerable population."4
Poor environmental quality can drive residents to more rural and less
polluted areas, thereby increasing commutes and, ironically, vehicle
emissions, while decreasing the quality of life. 25 Even in apparently more
idyllic areas, the pollution persists; the ugly smog migrating into Sequoia
National Park now causes repeated violations of the federal ozone








F-- Observed ' " Planned
322. See Grossi et al., supra note 215 (noting that the percentage of children with asthma is higher
than anywhere else in the state); Asthma Steals Joys of Childhood, supra note 231.
323. Grossi et al., supra note 215.
324. McConnell et al., supra note 231; Anderson supra note 231 (quoting researchers about the
link between ozone and particulate matter and asthma).
325. See Grossi et al., supra note 215.
Paul Price, 38, a California State University, Fresno psychology professor, drives 45 minutes
from his pine-surrounded Oakhurst home to his job on the Valley floor. He does it for his 8-
year-old son, Joseph. The boy's asthma was almost out of control when they lived within a
15-minute drive of the Fresno State campus.
Id. For scholarly treatments of the relationship between urban sprawl and public health, see Howard
Frumpkin, Urban Sprawl and Public Health, 117 Public Health Reports 201-17 (2002). For promising
work regarding human exposure to vehicle emissions, see J.D. Marshall et al., Intake Fraction of
Primary Pollutants: Motor Vehicle Emissions in the South Coast Air Basin, 37 ATMOSPHERIC ENV'T
3455-68 (2003).
326. Grossi, supra note 229 ("In 1998, Sequoia violated the eight-hour federal ozone standard 30
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may raise business costs, driving out existing businesses and deterring
new ones from locating in the Valley.327
In 2001, EPA reclassified part of the Valley as a "severe non-
attainment area."3s In December, 2003, the SJVUAPCD Board went
one step further and voted to request a voluntary reclassification to
"extreme" non-attainment.3 9 EPA approved the request in April, 2004.330
This reclassification has several implications for the region, including a
longer timeline to plan for and meet the ozone standard.33' Whereas the
1994 Attainment Plan claimed it would achieve the standard by 1999, this
recent decision delays the attainment deadline until 2010.33
Meanwhile, 'environmental activists, largely inactive in the 199os
planning efforts, have joined the San Joaquin Valley's air pollution
planning debates. The Center for Race, Poverty, and the Environment
has campaigned to increase environmental regulation of agriculture,333
and both the Sierra Club and the Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund have
become active participants -and litigants-in San Joaquin Valley air
quality controversies.3" Whether their involvement will make a
significant difference in future planning efforts remains to be seen; the
failure of the plans developed without public-interest-group participation
does not imply success with their involvement.335 But at the very least,
times at the Lookout Point monitoring station.").
327. Mark Grossi, "Worst" Designation Could Hurt Valley, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 15, 2oo2, at 4
(discussing the potential for an "extreme" air pollution designation to increase costs, deterring
businesses from locating in the Valley).
328. EPA Clean Air Act Reclassification, 40 C.F.R. Part 8i (2001); Ozone, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,476
(Nov. 8, 2001); Earthjustice, Facing Lawsuit, EPA Reclassifies California Central Valley Air Pollution
as "Severe," Oct. 23, 2001, at http://www.earthjustice.org/news/display.html?ID=253.
329. Grossi, supra note 187.
San Joaquin Valley air authorities Thursday made the historic request to join Los Angeles
as the country's worst offenders of federal smog rules. No region ever has asked to be
downgraded into the so-called 'extreme' polluter category, which has been occupied only by
Los Angeles for 13 years. State and federal governments are expected to quickly approve
the request, which averts $36 million in annual fines for the business community. The status
also will push the cleanup deadline from 2005 to 20io and prevent a federal takeover of
smog reduction plans in the Valley next year. Oil, agriculture, manufacturing and other
industries supported the decision.
Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2000) (outlining penalties for severe and extreme nonattainment areas
that fail to meet their compliance deadlines).
330. EPA, U.S. E.P.A. Reclassifies Valley Air to Extreme, Apr. 9, 2004, at httpj/yosemite.epa.gov/.
331. See 42 U.S.C. § 751i(a)(I).
332. See id.
333. Agriculture a Leading Polluter, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 15, 2002, at 15.
334. See Mark Grossi, Kevin Hall: The Unlikely Environmentalist, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 15, 2002, at
18; Central Valley Air Quality Coalition, Legal Actions, at http://www.calcleanair.org/legal-actions.
htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2004).
335. Recent events suggest that a rift between planners and the public is ongoing. In 2003, local
supervisors launched "Operation Clean Air," which, according to one reporter, commentators at a
public meeting generally characterized as a "sincere-but-hurried push from local politicians, businesses
and industry to clean up the San Joaquin Valley's murky air." Mark Grossi, Push for Clean Air Focus
of Hearing, FRESNO BEE, May 8, 2003, at Ai. Critics of the effort voiced familiar themes about
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their presence should help ensure the inclusion of a broader diversity of
viewpoints in the planning process.
E. CRITIQUING THE PLANNING PROCESS
The 1994 Ozone Plan predicted attainment by 1999. The region did
not attain the ozone standard by 1999, however. Thus, the modeled
prediction was wrong; in that simple sense, the planning process did not
succeed. Despite the enormous public health consequences of this
failure, very few people questioned the process publicly, and those who
did raise concerns were not representing environmentalists or at-risk
community groups. The 1994 planning process thus represents a failure
both of expert-based planning and of public participation, and provides a
real-life context for revisiting many of the previously-discussed problems
created by model-based planning.
i. Models, the San Joaquin Valley, and the Shortcomings of
Technocracy
The SJV ozone planning process exemplifies the ways in which a
seemingly objective and simple outcome-a public report predicting
attainment-in fact can conceal a host of uncertainties and policy
choices.
The emissions predictions were based upon estimates-informed
estimates, but estimates nonetheless-about future political conditions,
the efficacy of future rules, the strength of future economies, changes to
future driving patterns, and a host of other factors 336 Simulations were
conducted using representations and input data that the modelers knew
to be uncertain. SARMAP was also vulnerable to errors arising from
insufficient input and evaluative data, the impossibility of fully simulating
real-world events, and the inherent difficulties of verifying a complex
model. Additionally, modelers were well aware of specific flaws in the
modeling construct, but they misinterpreted the implications of some of
those flaws.337
Given the uncertainties, planners had no choice but to incorporate
assumptions and judgments into the planning process. SJVUAPCD and
CARB staff had experience in estimating when future emissions controls
would be imposed and how effective those controls would be, but their
assessments still necessarily incorporated judgments about future
political and economic conditions and human behavior.338 Likewise, the
exclusion, suggesting that the effort was insufficiently inclusive of the public and would probably
create a "quasi-government agency" intent upon soaking up public money. Id.
336. See supra Part III.A.I (discussing uncertainties in the modeling).
337. See supra Part IV.C.4 (discussing the Attainment Plan's uncertainty discussion, and the errors
in that discussion).
338. See ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, chs. 3-4 (predicting the effectiveness of current and
future controls, many of which were not yet fully drafted, and all of which would need to be effectively
May 2005]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
modelers' assessment of 1999 boundary conditions was dependent on
their judgments about future conditions in the San Francisco Bay Area;
those judgments were necessarily based in part on subjective assessments
of economic prospects.339 Unfortunately, as is often the case with air
pollution modeling," some judgments appear to have led to
overoptimistic predictions.
In the SJV the use of models relocated some value choices, hiding
them within the black box modeling process. For example, the relatively
simple model output - a prediction of compliance - emerged without any
meaningful discussion of the uncertainties associated with that
prediction."' Accordingly, any discussion of the appropriate level of
certainty-in modeling terms, the appropriate ratio of signal to noise-
was effectively curtailed.342 The choice to regulate only to the minimum
extent necessary to achieve a modeled prediction of compliance was a
policy decision with potentially major implications, but the terse and
non-comprehensive discussion of uncertainty in the plan relegated
consideration of the implications to the technical realm.343
We know, or should know, that planning agencies must use
subjective judgment, that politics will sometimes enter scientific decision-
making processes, and that honest, well-intentioned experts will make
mistakes. Public participation and judicial review provisions are checks
upon such subjectivity and potential fallibility, and also serve the
normatively desirable function of allowing public participation in policy
choices with potentially significant public effects.3" During the process of
reviewing and approving the Attainment Plan, however, these checks
went unutilized.
enforced to achieve results).
339. See ATrAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at 4-28 (assuming improving boundary conditions).
340. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing chronically overoptimistic predictions).
341. Any discussion that did occur was mostly confined to the SJVAQS Technical Committee and
to dialogue between modelers and planners at the SJVUAPCD and CARB. Commenting on an early
draft of this paper, Steve Ziman stated that lack of characterization and explicit management of
modeling uncertainties in decision-making is due to a lack of leadership from the EPA, whose formal
guidance does not encourage estimation of uncertainty ranges or probabilities with modeling
predictions.
Indeed, the EPA's guidance does equivocate on the advisability of probabilistic determinations,
ultimately declining to require or prohibit them. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. As a
result, modelers typically default to simple deterministic modeling demonstrations, in which models
are used to indicate that an attainment plan offers one plausible path toward attainment of air quality
standards, but are not used to estimate the probability of attainment.
342. See supra Part III.B.2.e (discussing signal-to-noise ratios).
343. Indeed, the modeling process appears to have hidden this choice not merely from the public,
but also from the planners themselves. SJVUAPCD staff believed that they would be unable to legally
defend any "over-regulation," that is, any regulation beyond that necessary to attain a modeled
prediction of compliance. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
344. See supra Parts II.B and II.C; JASANOFF, supra note 145, at I i.
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2. Models and the Absence of Inclusion
Public participants had, in theory, several ways to engage in the SJV
planning process, but none occurred.345 Discussion of the plan through
notice and comment proceedings was muted. Indeed, the only group that
questioned the SARMAP prediction publicly was the petroleum
industry, which suggested that some emissions controls were
unnecessary.' 6 Likewise, the minutes from the Board of Directors'
meetings evince no real attempt to include a general-public or
environmentalist perspective; instead, the Board primarily deferred to
the technical decision-makers.347 The public was underrepresented on the
advisory committees; the policy committee contained only three public
representatives, none of whom had a technical background, and the
technical committee was composed exclusively of regulators and industry
representatives."'
This lack of participation may be attributable, in part, to apathy;
there is little record of any public attempt to engage the planning
process, and environmental groups' lack of focus upon SJV air quality in
the 90s is well documented.' 9 Nevertheless, apathy may have been
caused, in part, by the difficulties inherent in becoming involved in
model-based planning.
The absence of significant public discussion of the Attainment Plan,
for example, is not hard to explain; the Attainment Plan is very difficult
to understand. It does not provide a qualitative overview of the
attainment strategy.35 Proposed rules are described in terse fashion."'
Uncertainties are ignored, mischaracterized, or described without any
meaningful discussion of their implications.352 Policy choices, like the
decision to regulate only to the minimum extent necessary, are not
explained.353 And the model itself-the tool at the heart of the planning
process-would remain, for almost any reader, an inscrutable black box
producing an unassailable prediction of attainment. The Attainment
Plan, in short, is a document that few non-experts could meaningfully
345. First, through notice and comment proceedings, the public should have been able to engage in
discussion of the Attainment Plan. Second, elected officials on the SJVUAPCD board could, by proxy,
have addressed public concerns about the planning process. Third, though no legal requirement
mandates such involvement, public advocates could have been included in the technical and advisory
committees that played such an important role in the research and planning processes. Finally, had it
chosen to do so, the SJVUAPCD could have engaged in an extensive public outreach effort.
346. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 291-95 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 264-65 and accompanying text.
349. See, e.g., Grossi et al., supra note 215 ("Big-city environmentalists, who do understand air-
pollution speak, just didn't show up for the conversation.").
350. See ATTAINMENT PLAN, supra note 15.
351. See id. chs. 3-4.
352. See supra Part IV.C.4.
353. See supra notes 302-05 and accompanying text.
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critique, and it should be no surprise that the lay public did not try.
Likewise, the absence of significant debate at the board meetings is
unsurprising. The same problems preventing participation by the public
compromised any attempts by members of the board to engage in critical
review of the document. Given their limited technical training and the
deadlines they faced, the board had little opportunity to scrutinize the
decisions of its expert staff." ' An independent assessment might have
provided the basis for the board to exercise more critical judgment, but
by the time the plan was ready for board review, time for such an
independent assessment had run out.
Finally, the lack of lay public representation on the review
committees is easy to understand. The SJVUAPCD and CARB attempts
to include either individual members of the public or environmental or
public advocacy groups to participate on those boards were
unsuccessful.355 If invited, these individuals and groups might have been
reluctant to participate. The boards discussed complex technical issues,
and those discussions would have been daunting to most potential
individual participants. Likewise, unless environmental groups had or
could hire modeling experts, their representatives would have been
unable to offer meaningful input. 356 Their presence might, however, have
lent the advisory committees an aura of balance and fairness, and the
groups' representatives would have risked allowing their presence to be
354. In addition, political decisionmakers may have been uninterested in technical nuances. As one
modeler from the Bay Area Air Quality Management District noted,
As you go up the ladder to the Executive and Board level, you're more and more affected
by and aware of the practical considerations, the legal considerations, the time constraints.
Some of the political realities have to do with how the public is going to react to what we're
putting out and how other agencies are going to react. Down at my level, we're almost
entirely focused on technical issues. We the technical people may say we don't have
confidence in this analysis. The management may say, "Well, give us the best analysis that
you have because we have to meet this requirement. We have to submit our plan on time."
Interview with Robin DeMandel, Research and Modeling Manager, BAAQMD, San Francisco, Cal.,
Apr. 12, 2001, who directed the modeling staff at the BAAQMD for I6 years from 1988 to 2004.
355. Ziman Interview, supra note 253. Ziman said:
My role is not only reviewing. My role has been interacting and participating with the
agencies in the development of the information that provides the technical basis on which a
policy decision is made on a clean air plan. By this, what I mean is that in the State of
California over the last I6 or 17 years, there has been a group that came together initially to
fund a field program in 199o. That was referred to as SARMAP. That group consisted of a
policy and a technical committee, of which representatives from the state local agencies,
environmental ... no, there were no environmental groups... industry, other interested
parties, were involved and continue to be involved over the course of this i6 years.
Subsequently, when commenting on an earlier draft, Ziman described another reason why
environmental representation was absent during Attainment Plan development: to date, no member of
an environmental group active in San Joaquin Valley air quality planning has had the expertise to
constructively participate in highly technical discussion.
356. See Grossi et al., supra note 215 ("Valley air district staff members have been pleading the
dirty-air case for years, but their discussions are complex and jargon-laced. The details are all but
impenetrable for the public without a steep learning curve.").
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interpreted as implicit approval of the committees' work.
3. Distributional Impacts and the Absence of Exclusion
In some respects, the San Joaquin Valley's air pollution problem is
different than a classic case of environmental injustice. Literature and
the limited case law on environmental injustice often focus upon small,
discrete areas of pollution-a poor community containing too many
Superfund sites, or an African American neighborhood bisected by a
highway."' Likewise, traditional definitions of environmental justice
often focus on impacts disproportionately borne by a historically
disadvantaged group.3s8 The San Joaquin Valley's problems, by contrast,
impact broader areas, affecting rich and poor residents alike. Though
there is little conclusive information on the subject, the burdens of air
pollution in the San Joaquin Valley do not appear to be
disproportionately borne by a particular demographic segment of the
San Joaquin Valley's population.
Some traditional environmental justice concerns are nevertheless
present. The population of the San Joaquin Valley is generally poorer,
less educated, and less white, than that of California as a whole.359
Additionally, few of the people impacted by the Valley's air pollution
reap the benefits of pollution profits. The San Joaquin Valley's residents
have contributed to fouling their own nest, but they also can blame the
residents of upwind, wealthier areas for some of their troubles."'
Additionally, some of the businesses that cause many of the Valley's
emissions take their profits elsewhere; many of the giant west side
farming operations, for example, are headquartered outside of the
Valley, and the Kern County oil businesses are neither locally owned nor
important sources of local employment. 6' Even the pollution profits that
357. See, e.g., Eileen G. Jones, Environmental Justice in the New Millenium, at http://www.agecon.
lsu.edu/ESOS-V%2oProceedings/pdf/Jones.pdf (last visited May 21, 2004) (discussing recent
environmental justice cases).
358. See U.S. EPA Environmental Justice, Basic Information ("Fair treatment means that no
group of people should bear a disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences
resulting from industrial, governmental and commercial operations or policies.") available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/basics/ej.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2005); see also NAT'L ENVTL.
JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, STRATEGIC PLAN 6 (Regarding strategic goals for public participation:
"Obtaining the views of minority, low-income, indigenous and agricultural-worker populations and of
federally recognized tribes is a critical component of the deliberative process ...."), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/ej/nejac/nejac-strplan-packageiii6oi.pdf (last
visited Apr. 20, 2005).
359. See supra Part III.C.3 (discussing environmental injustice and model-based planning) and Part
IV.B.2 (discussing the San Joaquin Valley's demographics, economy, and history).
360. CARB's latest assessment of the impact of San Francisco Bay Area emissions on the SJV
concluded that the Bay Area is "at times" an "overwhelming" source of air pollution in the northern
SJV. See CARB, Ozone Transport Review, Apr. 2001, at 43-48.
361. See Mark Grossi, A Rush of Water, A Flourish of Crops, FRESNO BEE, June 20, 1999, at 4, at
http://www.fresnobee.com/man/projects/savesjr/rush.html (stating that "east-side-type communities
are more solid financially than west-side communities, where absentee ownership prevails"); QUINN,
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stay in the Valley are unlikely to find their way, in any significant
amount, to many of those who suffer. Finally, the Valley is not a place
where the participatory political processes that ought to serve as an
antidote to environmental injustice have traditionally functioned well.
The Valley's history is one of coinciding disparities of wealth and
power.362 This context indicates that when an exclusive group of industry
representatives and regulators develop, without significant public input, a
plan that fails to solve a major pollution problem, the level and
distribution of impacts should be causes for serious concern.
F. SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY STUDY SUMMARY
The story of air quality planning in the San Joaquin Valley is, to
date, a depressing one. The experts have not solved the problem and the
public has not been meaningfully involved. Fortunately, the story is not
over. Efforts to achieve compliance are ongoing, activist participation is
on the rise, and the successes of nearby Los Angeles suggest that even
the most polluted areas can, with concerted effort, make dramatic
gains. 6 3 Progress, however, will probably require some reconciliation of
model-based decision-making and public participation, and the failings of
past planning processes in the San Joaquin Valley illustrate how difficult
that reconciliation can be to achieve.
V. RECONCILING MODELING AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
As the San Joaquin Valley ozone story illustrates, science-based
planning and public participation, though both desirable and mandated
by law, come into conflict when planners use complex models. To some
extent, this paradox is unavoidable. We are unlikely to eliminate either
technical decision-making from our environmental planning or public
participation provisions from our environmental laws. But even if this
paradox cannot be entirely resolved, it can be ameliorated; we can retain
the benefits of both participation and modeling while reducing their
conflicts. This section recommends several ways of making such
improvements.
supra note 206 and accompanying text.
362. See id. (discussing the Valley's history). We have no evidence of malice or bad faith, and the
disparate impact of the Valley's pollution, to the extent that there is one, is not nearly stark enough for
a successful civil rights claim. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65
(977) (holding that a discrimination claim requires some evidence of discriminatory intent unless the
disparity in impact is extraordinarily stark). Nevertheless, we believe that situations that might not be
sufficiently acute to qualify, under our current precedents, as judicially remediable nevertheless
qualify as unfair and unjust and merit our concern.
363. See Polakovic, supra note 212; Mark Grossi et al., Smoggiest in the State, FRESNO BEE, Dec. I5,




Many of the tensions between model-based planning and public
participation arise out of the difficulties participants face in trying to
understand model-based decisions.364 One obvious solution to this lack of
understanding, therefore, is to improve modelers' and planners'
communication of information about the use of modeling. This is not an
easy task,365 but there are several straightforward ways in which
discussions of modeling could be improved.
i. Discussing Uncertainty
A public participant cannot effectively scrutinize a model-based
decision without having some understanding of the uncertainties
involved, and both modelers and planners therefore ought to be explicit
and comprehensive in their discussions of uncertainty.
Uncertainty discussions permeate science; even most high school
students have written "sources of error" sections in lab reports, and when
scientists communicate with each other, discussion of limits of knowledge
and potential biases is a normal part of the dialogue. 366 In model-based
planning, however, the discussion of uncertainty can disappear or be
translated into vague and meaningless form before reaching the public.
367
As a result, the public often receives unqualified predictions, depriving it
364. This misunderstanding can occur on several different levels. First, participants may not
understand how the model itself works. Second, they may not understand how the model was used
within the decisionmaking process. For example, they may not be able to discern where subjective
decisions were made and where planners or modelers instead relied on the programmed workings of
the model itself. Third, they may not understand the limitations of the model, as used in that particular
planning process. Finally, they may not understand the decision risks -both in terms of public health
and cost-effective pursuit of goals- associated with reliance upon that model. Ideally, none of this
misunderstanding would occur. In reality, however, most models are too complicated for an average
person to develop an in-depth understanding of the functioning of the model as a tool. The average
participant will probably have to settle for a generalized, qualitative understanding, and will be able to
criticize the construction of the model itself only through the proxy services of an expert. The latter
three types of misunderstanding, however, we believe can and should be effectively addressed.
365. See GARRY BREWER, POLITICIANS, BUREAUCRATS, AND CONSULTANTS: A CRITIQUE OF URBAN
PROBLEM SOLVING 238, 241 (973) (suggesting standards for documentation, and estimating that the
communication effort could cost as much as the model development); MORGAN & HENRION, supra note
so, at 40-43 (expressing the need for documentation and discussing the information to be
documented).
366. See MORGAN & HENRION, supra note Io, at 2 (s99o) ("Natural scientists are expected as a
matter of course to include an estimate of the probable error when they report the value of quantities
they have measured.").
367. See supra Part IV.C.4 (discussing the treatment of uncertainty in the 1994 Attainment Plan,
and pointing out that while uncertainty was mentioned in general terms, the Plan did not clarify the
implications of specific sources of uncertainty). This absence of uncertainty communication may be
partly due to the absence of regulatory guidance about what to do with such information. See
Requirements for Preparations, Adoption, & Submittal of Implementation Plans, supra note i51
(discussing conventional understanding among modelers of legal requirements and uncertainty




of any means of evaluating risks associated with decisions based upon
modeling. 3
This lack of information renders the statutory provisions for public
participation meaningless. A modeling prediction unqualified by
disclosure of known, or knowable," sources of error is fundamentally
deceptive. It conveys a level of certainty that does not exist, hides real
risks, and fails to explain key information that ought to be factored into
policy choices and decisions.370 Without such information, public debate
may be pointless.37' Existing environmental laws and regulations do not
contain clear guidance on how uncertainties should be communicated, or
what level37 or type373 of uncertainty should be considered significant, but
neither do they provide for uncertainty to be ignored or swept under the
rug.374 Accordingly, a statement of results unqualified by known errors
can create a legal violation.375
In addition to being potentially illegal, this insufficient
communication of uncertainties in modeling is avoidable.
Communicating uncertainties and associated decision risks along with
368. See supra Part IV.C.4 (criticizing the discussion of uncertainty in the 1994 Attainment Plan).
369. Determining error ranges, even where possible, can require an intensive effort, and we do not
suggest that agencies must double their expenditures of time and money in order to produce
quantified error calculations as part of every planning effort. See BREWER, supra note 365, at 241
(noting that sometimes the error analysis can be as resource-intensive as the modeling process itself).
Nevertheless, such calculations, where technically and financially feasible, should be enormously
helpful. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at 158-59. If agencies cannot make such calculations, they should
candidly acknowledge the lack of error analysis.
370. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 332-35 (D.C. Cir. i981) (discussing the need for
publicly available information about the limitations of models); supra Part III.B.2.c (discussing the
ways in which a lack of information about uncertainty can skew public perceptions).
371. See, e.g., Lands Council v. Forester of Region One of the U.S. Forest Serv., 395 F.3d IOI9,
1031-32 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that inadequate disclosure of model limitations constituted a violation
of NEPA).
372. For a discussion of the significance of uncertainty levels, see supra part III.B.2.e (discussing
signal-to-noise problems).
373. In some circumstances, laws and regulations deliberately prioritize avoiding certain kinds of
error. In the criminal justice system, for example, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof
embodies a preference for one type of error-freeing a guilty person-over the error of incarcerating
the innocent. The Clean Air Act, or its enforcement regulations, could in theory express a similar
preference by favoring errors of overregulation over errors of non-compliance, but in fact the act
states no such preference. As a result, the selection of an error preference is choice-and a potentially
unacknowledged choice-left to the planning agencies.
374. The Clean Air Act, for example, lacks guidance about how certain an attainment prediction
must be. This lack of guidance, however, does not mean that uncertainty cannot or need not be
discussed.
375. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Costle, 657 F.2d at
332-35; Lands Council, 395 F.3d at 1031-32; McGarity & Wagner, supra note 13, at 10771 (stating that
"if the agency explains its choices and makes the scientific and policy bases for the assumptions that it
employs in its modeling exercises transparent, the courts are less likely to engage in overt usurpation
of the agency's properly delegated decisionmaking power").
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modeling results is quite possible."76 For some processes, analytical, brute
force, or expert elicitation methods are feasible and should be used to
generate quantitative estimates. These estimates should be made
available to the public; even if their mathematical basis is difficult to
understand, an error range is comprehensible even for a layperson.3"
Where such analysis is impossible,"'5 modelers can and should
acknowledge the absence of formal error analysis, but can still include
informal analyses of error. Similarly, modelers and planners also should
emphasize and highlight, in both written documents and public
discussions, significant assumptions, uncertainties and other
contingencies, and they should explain their potential to affect outcomes
and associated risks.
In the 1994 Attainment Plan, planners might have explained that
modelers were unsure about the magnitudes, locations and timing of
potentially major sources of emissions and then described the
implications of those uncertainties for the modeled attainment
demonstration.379  For example, they could have discussed the
uncertainties surrounding their vehicle emissions estimates, and could
have explained how error in those estimates could affect the attainment
prediction."' Instead, although the Attainment Plan emphasized that the
modeling was uncertain, the implications of uncertainties were not
explained to the public.:'
2. Discussing Subjectivity
Subjectivity is an inherent part of modeling, and modelers cannot
work without making assumptions. It also is not necessarily a problem
since many of the modelers' assumptions are likely to be well-informed
376. See generally MORGAN & HENSION, supra note io, at 183-219 (discussing model uncertainty
analysis techniques), 220-52 (showing methods for graphically communicating uncertainty).
377. A statement that a model has predicted compliance with sixty percent confidence is no more
complex than a weatherman's prediction that there is a forty percent chance of rain. The public
routinely makes decisions based on the latter type of prediction and should also be able to understand
the former.
378. Unfortunately, modelers often lack the time or the financial resources, or even the
technological capability, to quantitatively analyze potential modeling error. We do not suggest that a
failure to do the impossible should constitute a legal violation. Instead, we argue that where such
analysis is feasible-and to the extent that it is feasible-it should be performed, and that even if
comprehensive, quantitative analysis of error is infeasible, modelers and planners should still provide
detailed qualitative descriptions of the potential errors that exist and the ways in which those errors
might affect outcomes.
379. See supra notes 3o6-io and accompanying text (discussing uncertainty in the Attainment
Plan); Russell Clemings, Smog Check Fails to Get Gross Polluters, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 15, 2002, at 59
(describing some of the problems encountered by smog check programs).
380. See supra notes 3o6-17 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of the emission
inventory). The modelers and planners also could have explained the ways in which time constraints
had limited their ability to test the model.
381. See supra notes 311-17 and accompanying text.
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and reasonable . 8' Nevertheless, even reasonable assumptions may
incorporate value judgments that public participants would wish to
discuss. Moreover, some of these subjective judgments may concern
matters about which the modelers have no particular expertise; a
modeler or planner, for example, may be no better informed about
societal views on the proper level of risk than the public at large.3
Accordingly, where modelers make assumptions about political,
social, or economic trends-such as assuming that the economy will
continue to grow at a certain rate, or that driving habits will follow
certain trends-the assumptions can and ought to be acknowledged. If
modelers make value choices about acceptable levels of risk, these
decisions ought to be placed in public view.
384
Improved discussions of uncertainty, subjectivity, and associated
decision risks would represent substantial steps toward more inclusive
model-based decision-making processes. Such discussions will not always
be sufficient to assure that model-based planning is transparent; with
additional discussion, environmental documents will become longer and
potentially more intimidating to read. 8' Nevertheless, more complete
discussion would allow public participants to better understand the
reasoning behind, and the risks underlying, model-based decisions.
B. PROVIDING RESOURCES FOR UNDERSTANDING
By improving their discussions of modeling, agencies will increase
public opportunities to understand and critique model-based decisions.
This constitutes only a partial solution to the paradox, however, and
understanding models will remain a daunting challenge, particularly for
poorly-funded participants. Both agencies and others intent on fostering
informed, productive dialogue therefore must recognize that many public
participants -often the very community group opposing a new operating
permit, land development, or other proposed project-ought to be given
the resources to develop their own understanding or to acquire trusted
expert representatives or advisors. This can be accomplished in several
ways.
382. Modelers often have substantial experience in making these subjective judgments.
Nevertheless, experience cannot remove the inherent subjectivity of these judgments.
383. Indeed, a substantial body of literature documents that public perceptions of risk, and
opinions about appropriate levels of risk, differ markedly from the perceptions and opinions of
technical experts. For a seminal discussion of the differences between public and expert perceptions of
risks, see PAUL SLOVIC, PERCEPTION OF RISK (200o); see also DANIEL KAMMEN AND DAVID HASSENZAHL,
SHOULD WE RISK IT? EXPLORING ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, & TECHNOLOGICAL PROBLEM SOLVING 353-
92 (Princeton Univ. Press 2ooi).
384. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 334-35 (D.C. Cir. i98I).
385. See MARSH, supra note 177, at 7 (noting that participants may shy away from involvement
because of "overwhelming amounts of reading").
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I. Educating the Public
One direct way to improve public understanding of model-based
decisions is to provide, particularly early in the planning process,
education about how the relevant models work and how they will be
used.
As a supplement to their legally-mandated public participation
obligations, agencies often engage in public outreach efforts early in
decision-making processes. These outreach meetings typically involve
preliminary discussions about the proposed projects, at which the agency
explains its plans and solicits information about public concerns.3 6 As a
result of such meetings, the affected public is less likely to be surprised
by subsequent decisions, and the agency is less likely to be blindsided by
unanticipated public concerns.
In model-based decision processes, layperson-level tutorials about
model uses could be included within these preliminary outreach efforts.
Such early meetings could increase participants' awareness about what
the models can and cannot do, what types of decisions the relevant
model can support, and, at least qualitatively, the types of uncertainties
to which the model is prone."" This education could reduce some
participants' distrust of science, giving them the confidence to become
involved in the more technical details of decision-making. 318 Likewise,
early meetings could give modelers a chance to hear public concerns and
386. See id. at Io, 16-18; EPA, IMPROVED SCIENCE-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL STAKEHOLDER PROCESSES:
A COMMENTARY BY THE EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD 8 (2oo), available at www.epa.gov/sab/pdfl
eccmoloo6.pdf (noting that successful processes involved "substantial resources to support the review
of relevant scientific evidence and development of scientific summary materials in a form that was
intelligible to stakeholders").
387. Realistically, such meetings might provide public participants with a generalized
understanding of the models themselves; most models are far too complex for their inner workings to
be explained in a community outreach meeting. However, even a generalized, qualitative
understanding of the ways in which a model will be used could allow a public participant to make
important contributions to a planning process. Additionally, to the extent that affected communities
have retained experts with modeling expertise, such meetings could be used to learn and respond to
the preliminary concerns of those experts.
We do not believe that all model-based planning is likely to become accessible to a lay observer
with just a passing interest. The processes we describe are too complicated for someone to become
effectively involved without sustained effort. Our concern, however, is that without better information
about modeling, even a motivated participant-a person who is committed to spending time (or
working with an expert who will spend time) to understand the technical issues at stake-still could
not effectively engage the process. Our public participation schemes are not predicated upon the
notion that anyone, regardless of their level of commitment or engagement, should be heard, but a
process that is closed even to motivated participants does not meet the participatory mandates of our
environmental laws.
388. See, e.g., MARSH, supra note 177, at 13, at www.epa.gov/publicinvolvementlpdf/
sipp.pdf (describing a planning process in which a "Communication and Outreach working group"
focused on "creating an Internet site where information could be posted and by producing 'plain
English' summaries of issue papers"); JASANOFF, supra note 145, at ii (noting the public tendency to
distrust processes that laypersons cannot understand).
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help the agencies frame later discussions of model results'8
9
Agencies also could make general information about models more
accessible. Agencies make repeated use of the same or similar models for
certain types of planning, and standardized discussions about those
models' functions and limitations would be inexpensive to prepare and
make available.3" EPA, for example, could publish explanations of
models, and peer reviews of models,39' in much the same way that it
creates and publishes model performance standards.39 EPA could also
require such publication as a precondition for model approval.3"
2. Increasing Expert Representation
Increased public outreach and more accessible explanations of
modeling will expand the number of potential participants in model-
based planning, but these measures alone will not make all model-based
decisionmaking understandable. Even with these increased resources,
achieving more than just a superficial understanding of complex
modeling will require expertise, and such expertise is usually costly. For
poor communities, participation therefore may remain prohibitively
difficult. Accordingly, agencies also should consider, in selected cases,
making funds available to support public participation.
Such funding mechanisms are not unprecedented. EPA has
experimented, with some success, with "technical assistance grants" that
provide funding for communities affected by Superfund cleanups.394
These grants, according to EPA, proved to be "a considerable success[,]
389. See Marsh, supra note 177, at io, 16-18. See generally Simon, supra note 75 (emphasizing that
often regulatory processes benefit from the surprising contributions of public participants; obviously
such surprises are better received early in the decisionmaking process).
39o . For example, EPA's urban airshed model has been used numerous planning processes.
391. Agencies do sometimes post such peer reviews. See, e.g., EPA, Peer Review of the EPA
Analytical Model: Mercury Emissions from the Disposal of Fluorescent Lamps (Mar. 1998), at
www.epa.gov/epaoswer/hazwaste/id/merc-emi/merc-pgs/peerrev.pdf.
392. Developing outside expert understanding will be far easier if experts can delve into the guts of
the models, and for this reason agencies should eschew proprietary models in favor of those that are
open code. The EPA's regulations establish such a requirement, see Revision to the Guideline on Air
Quality Models: Adoption of a Preferred Long Range Transport Model and Other Revisions, 68 Fed.
Reg. 18,44o, 18,451 (Apr. I5, 2003) ( "the model cannot be proprietary"), but EPA does at times
approve proprietary models for use. Some of those models are widely applied, such as privately
modified versions of the Urban Airshed Model used for urban air quality planning. In these cases,
model limitations may be well understood by the user community, but not by lay stakeholders.
393. Some information about models, and model-based planning processes, is currently available
on the Internet, but such information could be presented more accessibly. CARB and EPA already
provide considerable guidance. See, e.g., California Air Resources Board, Software -Utilities and
Modeling, at http://www.arb.ca.govlhtml/soft.htm (last visited June 2, 2004); U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Support Center for Regulatory Air Models, at http://www.epa.gov/scramooi/ (last
visited May 9, 2004). Most regulatory guidance is intended for use by regulators and modelers,
however, and we propose that these same agencies provide descriptions in lay terms and include
discussion of the implications of model limitations for decision-making.
394. See MARSH, supra note 177, at 5.
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making it easier for community groups to interpret data and reports,
understand technical issues, improve dialogue with EPA, educate nearby
residents about the issues, and establish credibility of the group."395
Likewise, under Project XL,3 6 EPA has offered grants to facilitate
community participation."
Model-based decision processes ought to be prime candidates for
similar grants. If provided with the resources to facilitate such sustained
involvement, community groups may come to see the modeling process
as something to be engaged rather than distrusted and rejected, with
resulting gains in understanding, efficiency, and fairness for all sides. In
the San Joaquin Valley, for example, participant funding might have
provided public advocacy groups an opportunity to contribute to the
technical and policy advisory committees. Such funding might have
allowed public participants to develop and voice concerns that instead
went unheard.
C. IMPROVING JUDICIAL UNDERSTANDING OF MODELING
Improved communication about modeling and increased resources
for public understanding can make environmental planning processes
more inclusive. Both, however, require a commitment to inclusion on the
part of the planning agency, and sometimes, whether because of distrust
of public participants or because of time or cost constraints, that
commitment will be ineffectual or nonexistent. In such situations, citizen
suits and judicial review of model-based decisions may be the only
avenue for facilitating public participation. Obtaining effective review,
however, will be difficult if judges are not sophisticated about the limits
of models.
Conducting judicial review of a model-based decision is not an easy
task. Understanding modeling is typically just as difficult for a judge as
for a would-be participant, if not more so, since the judge is likely to have
little time to develop a sophisticated understanding. Additionally,
potential challengers may be forced to bring arguments on questions of
degree--that the model was not explained clearly enough, for example,
or that disclosure of error was too general. Prevailing on these arguments
is inherently more difficult than prevailing on more black-and-white
claims of error. A challenger who believes models were misused or
inadequately explained will reasonably fear that she can hope for no
395. Id.
396. Project XL is an EPA program designed to allow regulated groups to develop and implement
innovative regulatory programs. See EPA, What is Project XL?, at http://www.epa.gov/
projectxl/file2.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2004).
397. MARSH, supra note 177, at 5. Such funding also need not come from agency sources; private
organizations could make similar "understanding grants" available, and technical experts could
volunteer services on a pro bono basis.
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more than rubber-stamp review. Conversely, an agency that forthrightly
discloses the limitations of its model may reasonably worry that an
opportunistic petitioner may persuade a judge to latch onto those
disclosures and ignore the model's overall utility.
Nevertheless, courts have long provided a blueprint for effective
judicial review. Perhaps the most cogent judicial discussion of modeling
is contained in Sierra Club v. Costle, in which the D.C. Circuit, after
providing an extensive discussion of both the utility and limitations of
models, stated:
The safety valves in the use of such sophisticated methodology are the
requirement of public exposure of the assumptions and data
incorporated into the analysis and the acceptance and consideration of
public comment, the admission of uncertainties where they exist, and
the insistence that ultimate responsibility for the policy decision
remains with the agency rather than the computer. With these
precautions the tools of econometric computer analysis can
intelligently broaden rather than constrain the policymaker's options
and avoid the "artificial narrowing of options that (can be) arbitrary
and capricious......
Employing this standard allows judges to provide effective but
restrained review of model use. The standard does not usurp agency
discretion; its "precautions" focus on ensuring healthy respect for and
public explanation of the limits of models, and would not limit agencies'
abilities to use models even where those models are acknowledged to be
far from perfect. Indeed, the Costle court upheld EPA's model use.3
Under this standard, non-disclosure of uncertainties or concealment of
policy choices from public view would be suspect.4' On the other hand,
candid disclosure of assumptions, uncertainties, policy choices, and
potential model flaws would not leave an agency legally vulnerable."0 ,
Accordingly, an agency would be mandated to convey, but not be
punished for explaining, the limitations of its tools.4'
398. 657 F.2d 298, 334-35 (D.C. Cir. I98I).
399. See id. at 332-35. In addition, the likely remedy in a case where model uses are insufficiently
explained-a remand to the agency for reconsideration and a clearer explanation-would usurp none
of the agency's traditional discretion.
400. See id.
4O. See id. at 332-35 & n.13I.
[M]odels are robed in the elegance of high-speed computers, but they are at base
extrapolations from past experience, projections that must undergo continual examination
and revision. They do not always have the reassuring concreteness of empirical
observations, but they are the best we have to work with in casting our programs. Provided
that the assumptions on which a model is based are adequately explained and justified, we
see no reason why this type of evidence may not be used ....
Id. (quoting Am. Public Gas Ass'n v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 567 F.2d Io16, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1978)); see also Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 878 F. Supp. 1295, 1310 (D.S.D.
1993), affd, 46 F.3d 835 (8th Cir. 1995).
402. See McGarity & Wagner, supra note 13, at section IV (discussing the importance of judicial
understanding that agencies must use imperfect models and uncertain information to make policy).
[Vol. 56:9Ol
TECHNOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY
Review under the D.C. Circuit's standard requires a certain level of
judicial sophistication. Judges must, as the D.C. Circuit did in Costle,
understand that models are both highly useful and inherently imperfect,
and must be willing to assess the ways in which agencies address those
limitations without completely dismissing a models' utility. They must go
further than asking merely whether the model itself bore some rational
correspondence with reality and must also scrutinize how the model was
used and how its uses were explained.4" Nevertheless, the sophistication
of the discussion in both Costle and a series of subsequent cases suggests
that such review certainly is possible, and often does occur. 4"
In combination, clearer discussion of modeling processes, improved
resources for public understanding, and sophisticated judicial review4 5
could make model-based planning substantially more inclusive, thereby
ameliorating the tension between legal imperatives for both model use
and meaningful public involvement. This combination will not, of course,
be a magic solution. Models will remain complicated, and model-based
decisions will continue to be difficult to critique. In some processes,
agencies will be unable to convey sufficient explanations to the public,
and in other situations, agencies may provide excellent explanation of
modeling to potential participants who remain too daunted by the
apparent technicality of the process to meaningfully participate.
4°6
Nevertheless, these improvements would create greater opportunities for
participation, even if those opportunities are not always exploited, and
would represent substantial steps toward more inclusive model-based
decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our environmental laws create a paradox for public participants. On
one hand, these laws, drawing on a longstanding respect for science,
mandate decision-making informed by scientific understanding and,
hence, technical experts. On the other hand, many of the same laws
reflect a similarly longstanding tradition of distrust of government by
calling for public participation. As a result, environmental laws provide
403. See Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
404. See Lands Council v. Forester of Region One of the U.S. Forest Serv., 395 F.3d io19, 1031-32
(9th Cir. 2004); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3 d 1032, 1051-53 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Costle, 657
F.2d at 332-35; McGarity & Wagner, supra note 13 (summarizing cases reviewing models, and general
principles arising out of those cases, and concluding that, despite some outlying results, most courts
have adopted reasonable standards of review).
405. Even if model-based decisions are never subject to legal challenge, the prospect of such
review will provide a powerful incentive for agencies to more clearly explain their uses of models. See
Virginia v. Browner, 8o F.3d 869,880 (4th Cir. 1996).
4o6. Potential participants may also remain uninvolved for a variety of other reasons, ranging from
inertia to conflict-aversion to a lack of confidence that their participation can have any real effects. See
MARSH, supra note 177, at 7 (describing reasons for non-participation).
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for extensive public involvement in processes that the public may find
difficult to understand and affect.
This tension is acute when agencies make decisions using models.
Models are a practical and, in some situations, legal necessity in
environmental planning, and planners often could not accomplish their
goals without some use of modeling. Models also are difficult for even
sophisticated participants to understand. Moreover, despite their utility,
they are inherently limited, uncertain tools that cannot be used without
making subjective assumptions, and their complexity and opacity may
hinder public understanding of their proper uses and limitations.
Accordingly, effective public participation in model-based planning
processes, though legally required and potentially important, is difficult
to achieve.
The San Joaquin Valley's efforts to plan for compliance with the
federal ozone standard illustrate the challenges facing would-be
participants in model-based planning processes. Modelers and planners
in the San Joaquin Valley engaged in a relatively well-funded effort to
develop plans that would achieve attainment of the federal standard by
1999. Despite the Clean Air Act's mandate for public involvement, their
efforts involved participation only from the agency staff and industry.
Publicly available documents did not contain readily understandable
discussions of uncertainties and subjectivity, and the agencies did not
employ mechanisms, such as educational outreach or participation
grants, for improving public understanding of modeling. As a result, the
process was, as a practical matter, closed.
This closure was unfortunate. By providing a means for skeptical
review of the plan, greater public participation might have led to
revisions that would have allowed the plan to succeed. Even if greater
public participation had not led to attainment of air quality goals, it could
have increased public understanding of the Valley's air pollution
problems, creating the foundations for successful collaboration in future
planning efforts. Finally, regardless of any substantive outcome that
greater public participation might have achieved, such participation
would have allowed the public more say in decisions that directly
affected its quality of life. Such a change would have made the process, if
not more effective, at least more consistent with legal mandates for
participation, and also more democratic and just.
Mechanisms for avoiding such closure, without compromising the
technical rigor of planning decisions, do exist. By providing more
complete disclosure of uncertainties and assumptions, modelers and
planners may allow public participants to achieve more thorough
understanding of the uses and limitations of models and the associated
decision risks. Likewise, by providing resources to promote public
understanding, modelers and planners can support public participation;
[V01. 56:9oi
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outreach efforts, publicly available model critiques, peer reviews, and
participant funding mechanisms all can increase the utility of public-
expert dialogue. Finally, sophisticated judicial review of the ways in
which models are used and discussed can provide public participants with
the leverage to more effectively use their participatory rights while also
allowing agencies the flexibility to be candid about the strengths and
weaknesses of their models.
These mechanisms will not be perfect solutions; participating in
model-based planning processes will remain challenging. Nevertheless,
these improvements should help model-based planning to become both
more democratic and more compliant with conflicting mandates of
environmental law.
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